Focus on digital resilience

Egypt’s cyber system: lofty ambitions, but capabilities yet to be built

The focal point is EG CERT, the national incident response team. These are still small, unintegrated companies. iSec stands out as one of the few players with regional ambitions, capable of offering both offensive (red team) and defensive services

by 24Ore NextMed

Sicurezza informatica. La bandiera dell'Egitto, accompagnata da un crittogramma blu e da una freccia rivolta verso l'alto con un lucchetto.  Alamy Stock Photo

3' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

3' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

Egypt has a clear objective: to become a ‘robust, resilient and secure’ country in the digital sphere. This is set out in the National Cybersecurity Strategy 2023–2027, which aims to protect critical infrastructure, foster the growth of a local industry and create skilled jobs. However, there is still a gap between ambition and reality: the industrial landscape is fragmented, training provision is out of step with the market, and the skills gap remains far too wide.

The regulatory framework rests on two pillars: the Cybercrime Act (2018) and the Personal Data Protection Act (2020). However, there is no comprehensive cybersecurity law – which is still being drafted – to ensure the consistent application of standards. On the operational front, the focus is on EG CERT, the national incident response team: a point of reference for critical infrastructure and the public administration, but with a scope that struggles to cover small and medium-sized enterprises, the backbone of the Egyptian economy.

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Operators

Most providers are based in Cairo, often with fewer than 50 employees. iSec stands out as one of the few players with regional ambitions, capable of offering both offensive services (red team, penetration testing) and defensive services (SOC, security operations centre, and incident response). Alongside iSec, companies such as Keys Cyber, Absega and WASS cover specific niches: from risk management to 24/7 monitoring, right through to cloud security. The overall picture, however, is that of a fragmented market, with limited capacity to scale up in response to major incidents without the support of international vendors. This dependence can, in times of crisis, slow down the response and increase costs.

As far as education is concerned, there is a wide range of courses on offer, but they are often too theoretical. The major public universities – Cairo University, Ain Shams, Alexandria, Mansoura and Menoufia – incorporate security modules into their computer science and engineering courses, but there are few dedicated full-degree programmes. Exceptions include structured programmes such as that at the Université Française d’Égypte (cybersecurity & communications engineering) or the Arab Open University, which focus on specialised curricula and international exchanges. The Ministry of Communications has launched e-learning initiatives, and certification schemes (including the EC Council, amongst others) operate in the country. Yet companies continue to highlight the need to train new recruits in-house for 12 to 18 months before they are fully operational.

The mismatch

The crux of the matter is the mismatch between what is taught and what is needed in the field. Companies are looking for skills that can be put to immediate use: SOC and SIEM (security information and event management) management, threat hunting, incident response and malware analysis; on the offensive side, advanced red teaming and exploit development capabilities; in the cloud, secure multi-cloud architectures, container security and DevSecOps (integrating cybersecurity into the software development lifecycle). There is also growing demand for professionals capable of coordinating the various roles involved in detection and automated response. Added to these are essential soft skills: risk communication, critical thinking, and project and stakeholder management. It is in this area that many graduates lack operational skills.

The banking sector is a good illustration of this tension: as one of the most heavily regulated and risk-aware sectors, it struggles to recruit talent with experience in SOC management and threat intelligence. The result is that generalists are being recruited and ‘converted’ to security roles, leading to inevitable delays in filling key positions and leaving operational resilience vulnerable in the short term.

The presentations

Three key factors appear to be crucial. Firstly, to complete the legislative framework with a comprehensive law that harmonises standards, reporting obligations and minimum requirements across critical sectors. Secondly, expanding the industrial base: tax incentives and ‘open’ public procurement can help local companies scale up, including through partnerships with global players and sector-specific centres of excellence (energy, finance, healthcare). Thirdly, reforming training: shorter, more practical university courses; workshops simulating real-world attack scenarios; compulsory work placements; and formal recognition of hands-on certifications within the credit system. Targeted investment in bootcamps and corporate academies, co-designed with industry, can drastically reduce the time to productivity for junior staff.

Egypt has what it takes to accelerate progress: a young population, a strong STEM foundation at university level, and a clear political direction. But cyber resilience cannot be decreed: it must be built. It requires widespread operational capabilities, local supply chains capable of withstanding the impact of major incidents, and, above all, professionals who are ready to take the helm from their very first day on the job. Until these three elements are fully in place, the ambition will remain one step ahead of reality.

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