Sensitive raw materials

Europe is making up for the loss of Nigerien uranium with Russia

Whilst Orano continues its legal dispute with Niamey, which nationalised SOMAÏR, a thousand tonnes of material have been illegally removed from the expropriated mine. Meanwhile, European countries have replaced the African supplier, whose market share has fallen from 25 per cent (2022) to 0.23 per cent. Canada stands to benefit from this. So does Moscow, contrary to the EU’s energy policy.

La miniera nei pressi di Arlit di proprietà della SOMAÏR

4' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

4' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

With Niger’s departure from the Western sphere of influence and following the breakdown in relations between Niamey and its long-standing French partner, Europe has swiftly replaced Nigerien uranium, but has done so by concentrating its supplies on Canada, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Russia. A significant proportion of the conversion and enrichment process remains dependent on Rosatom. The case of Niger demonstrates that the value of uranium does not depend solely on who controls the mine, but on who owns the supply chain and is capable of certifying, transporting, converting, enriching, financing and transforming it into nuclear fuel.

SOMAÏR, Société des Mines de l’Aïr, was 63.4 per cent owned by the French nuclear group Orano and 36.6 per cent by the Nigerien state-owned company SOPAMIN. At the end of 2024, the Nigerien authorities took operational control of the company. Orano subsequently launched a series of arbitration proceedings: on 20 December 2024, it announced proceedings concerning the revocation of the Imouraren mining licence; on 21 January 2025, it announced a second arbitration proceeding against the State of Niger in relation to the loss of operational control of SOMAÏR. On 19 June 2025, the Government of Niger announced its intention to nationalise SOMAÏR. At the end of 2024, SOMAÏR still held 40,108 tonnes of uranium classified as reserves, of which 21,334 tonnes were attributable to Orano’s stake. In addition to these, there were 30,609 tonnes of indicated resources and 28,757 tonnes of inferred resources. On 23 September 2025, the tribunal established at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ordered Niger not to sell, transfer or facilitate the transfer to third parties of the uranium produced by SOMAÏR and retained in breach of the rights claimed by Orano. Niger may exercise physical control over the consignment, but a buyer must assess the risk that the payment, the material or other commercial assets may subsequently be subject to enforcement proceedings.

Loading...

The disputed shipment of uranium

On 27 November 2025, Orano reported that a shipment of uranium had left Arlit, a town in central Niger, without authorisation. The group stated that it had not received any official communication regarding the quantity, destination or security arrangements, and reserved the right to take action against all parties involved. According to local media reports, approximately 1,000–1,050 tonnes of uranium concentrate are believed to have been located in the Niamey area, near Air Base 101, with an estimated value of over 170 million euros. The dispute over the stock transferred from Arlit therefore represents only the first stage of a dispute involving a total of almost 100,000 tonnes.

European nuclear powers

In 2024, nuclear reactors were in operation in the European Union in Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. Nuclear power generation accounts for a particularly large share in France and Slovakia: in 2024, it accounted for approximately 68 per cent and 62 per cent respectively of national electricity generation, not of primary energy production.

In 2022, Niger supplied EU utilities with 2,975 tonnes of uranium (accounting for around 25 per cent of the total), reaffirming its status as one of the main pillars of the EU’s diversification strategy. By 2025, supplies from Niger had fallen to 33 tonnes, accounting for 0.23 per cent of the European total. In the same year, European utilities received a total of 14,678 tonnes of natural uranium. Europe has therefore almost entirely replaced Niger. However, this shift has led to a new concentration: Canada and Kazakhstan alone account for around 57 per cent of supplies; Russia, Australia and Uzbekistan together account for 46.66 per cent. With Moscow’s share on the rise compared with 2022. The problem is not an absolute shortage of ore, but rather the growing dependence on a handful of producers and on Eurasian supply routes that are vulnerable to relations with Moscow.

ORIGINE DELLE CONSEGNE UE

Dati 2025

Loading...

The industrial bottleneck

In 2025, the fresh fuel loaded into commercial reactors in the Union was produced using 11,729 tU (metric tonnes) of natural uranium and 462 tU of reprocessed uranium as feedstock, enriched to 9,112 tSW (tonnes of separation work units). In the same year, European utilities purchased enrichment services totalling 12,130 tSW, of which EU facilities accounted for 72.91 per cent, whilst Russia retained a share of 22.55 per cent. Niger’s withdrawal therefore reduces mining diversification at precisely the moment when Brussels is seeking to eliminate its dependence on Russian nuclear supplies. The crisis in Niger removes a traditional African source at a time when Europe must simultaneously replace Russian raw materials, conversion services, enrichment capacity and assembly operations.

In 2025, the Union’s total stockpiles continued to rise compared with the previous year. Even assuming an order of magnitude of around 12,000 tU per year, the disputed Niger stockpile would represent, in the worst-case scenario of 1,000 tonnes of actual uranium, approximately one month’s worth of European demand. The disputed shipment is therefore of marginal value in a market where every non-Russian tonne that is contractually secure and deliverable via a reliable corridor is becoming increasingly valuable. Over the period 2026–2031, the most likely scenario is not a large-scale clandestine sale, but rather a prolonged stalemate accompanied by negotiations. Niger will seek to convert physical control into financial compensation, access to infrastructure and new mining agreements. Russia and China may use the crisis to secure concessions, but will have an interest in separating any new contracts from the legally disputed stockpile.

Copyright reserved ©
Loading...

Brand connect

Loading...

Newsletter

Notizie e approfondimenti sugli avvenimenti politici, economici e finanziari.

Iscriviti