Mind the Economy/Justice 111

Fires, stories and conscience. This is how our sense of justice is born

29 June 2025

8' min read

Key points

Narrative, Emotion and Moral Learning
Social selection and the evolution of consciousness
The role of social emotions

8' min read

At the heart of our ability to cooperate, to build institutions, to trust others, there is something that precedes law and politics and underpins social and economic life like an invisible infrastructure: it is our sense of justice.

Anthropologist Christopher Boehm explores the origin of this infrastructure and our moral capacities in the final part of his Moral Origins. The Evolution of Virtue, Altruism, and Shame (2012). Underlying his account is the idea that morality is not only a product of our genes, but also a cultural product, the result of continuous learning that develops over time and social space and is passed on to subsequent generations through various mechanisms of intergenerational transmission. Boehm starts from a fundamental observation: in small hunter-gatherer societies, survival depended on the ability to do things together, to trust each other, to cooperate. Even on a small scale, however, cooperation between non-genetically related individuals is always fragile because it is vulnerable to the problem of opportunism. In fact, the action of even a few free-riders, i.e. subjects who enjoy the benefits of the efforts of the other group members without doing their part, is enough to undermine the cooperation dynamic. To reduce this risk, the first small societies began to develop control mechanisms to discourage anti-social behaviour, based on blame and exclusion. However, these mechanisms alone are not enough if their function is not internalised through adherence to a moral code. Moral learning was essential to maintain group cohesion and repress selfish behaviour. This learning was and still is based not only on cognitive processes, but also on emotional ones. Associating certain behaviours with certain emotions is what makes the learning and internalisation of moral norms possible, even as children.

Narrative, emotion and moral learning

One of the most fascinating aspects of Boehm's account is his analysis of the role of oral narratives in the transmission of values. Stories - myths, anecdotes, life stories - not only serve to entertain, but also help to shape the behaviour of the young. Through stories, in fact, group members learn what is right and what is wrong, which characteristics a role model possesses and which ones a transgressor. And this also happens through the anticipation of the different fates that await the characters in the stories: the heroes will be praised, honoured and remembered while the traitors will be punished, humiliated and soon forgotten. "Storytelling is a powerful medium," Boehm writes, "for transmitting moral standards. Through stories, children learn who the heroes and villains are, and the consequences of moral and immoral behaviour' (p. 230). In support of this thesis, he cites numerous cases of peoples such as the Ju/'hoansi of the Kalahari, the Mbuti of the Congo and the Navajo, where stories of punished offenders or rewarded virtuous individuals are used to reinforce the effectiveness of shared norms. In these societies, storytelling is not a marginal activity, but a central pedagogical device in community life and youth education. An emblematic example is the Kung, where tales around the fire often include episodes of 'arrogance punished' or 'generosity rewarded'. These tales teach the importance of respecting norms, but they do so by arousing strong and vivid moral emotions such as indignation and admiration, emotions that facilitate the learning of norms and their internalisation.

Social Selection and the Evolution of Consciousness

But what mechanism guided the development and intergenerational transmission of certain norms and not others? Boehm proposes an original theory, that of 'social selection'. In environments where reputation matters, being perceived as altruistic and cooperative increases the likelihood of survival. In contrast, free riders - those who profit without contributing - are punished or excluded. "Social selection favoured individuals who internalised group norms and could be trusted to behave prosocially even when not observed," writes the anthropologist. This evolutionary pressure led to the emergence of a moral conscience, that is, the ability to anticipate the judgement of others and to regulate one's own behaviour according to informal, shared norms. Adam Smith wrote in his Theory of Moral Sentiments about the internalisation of norms: 'Just as we cannot always be satisfied only with being admired, unless we are at the same time persuaded that we are in some degree worthy of admiration, so we cannot always be satisfied only with being believed, unless we are at the same time conscious that we are really worthy of credit. Just as the desire to be praised and the desire to be worthy of praise, although very similar, are nevertheless two distinct and separate desires, so the desire to be believed and the desire to be worthy of credit, although also very similar, are likewise distinct and separate desires. We do not just want to be praised, we want above all, Smith tells us, to know that we are worthy of that praise.

Shame, in this context, becomes an adaptive mechanism. Boehm writes: 'Shame is a particularly effective internal sanction, often more powerful than external punishment in regulating behaviour' (p. 231). It is not an innate consciousness, but developed and reinforced through social interaction. It is the result of an intergenerational learning process in which moral emotions are cultivated and reinforced over time.

The role of social emotions

Emotions, we said, play a central role in moral learning. Boehm distinguishes in particular between shame and guilt, emphasising that in egalitarian societies shame is more relevant because it is linked to group judgement. Guilt, on the other hand, is more individualised and typical of more complex societies. "In small-scale societies, shame is more socially functional than guilt because it directly reflects group disapproval" (p. 232). Moral learning, then, is not only cognitive, but deeply affective. Children learn to behave well not only because they understand how rules work, but because they learn to emotionally feel the consequences of their behaviour. This approach is fully consistent with contemporary evolutionary psychology, according to which many human emotions evolved to solve recurring problems in the social life of our ancestors. According to Leda Cosmides and John Tooby (The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. Oxford University Press, 1992) for example, shame would have evolved as a mechanism to minimise reputational damage in the case of transgression. When an individual violates a norm, shame induces him or her to retreat, to avoid the gaze of others, to show repentance: all signals that serve to assuage group indignation and prevent social exclusion. Paul Gilbert has described shame as an 'emotion of subordination', useful for maintaining cohesion in hierarchical or egalitarian groups ('What is shame? Some core issues and controversies'. In Gilber, P., Andrews, B., (eds.) Shame: Interpersonal behaviour, psychopathology, and culture. Oxford University Press, 1998). Boehm, in line with this view, observes that in small-scale societies shame is often more effective than physical punishment, precisely because it acts from within

The role of pride, in its 'authentic' form, as distinct from arrogance, has been analysed by Jessica Tracy and Richard Robins, among others, as an emotion that evolved to signal acquired status through prosocial behaviour. In many traditional societies, such as among the Kung or Hadza, pride in generosity or competence in hunting is not flaunted, but acknowledged by the group through narratives and rituals. In their recent report video "Surviving in the savannah with the last stone men" the 'Happiness Project' boys Giuseppe Bertuccio d'Angelo, Nicola Guaita and Davide Fantuzzi follow a group of Hadza from Tanzania on a baboon hunt. In the evening, as they roast and share their prey around a fire, they discuss what happiness is to them. "Protecting the women and children means protecting the heart of the village and maintaining its harmony," says the oldest member of the group, "If we can do that then we can say we are happy. "My greatest joy is seeing the young people grow strong, ready to become hunters," says the most experienced hunter of the group. "That is what fills me with joy" (https://youtu.be/igI9QKW0bQ8?). Happiness stems from the pride of being able to keep the peace and give other members of the village something to live for, and at the same time from the satisfaction of being able to pass on knowledge and skills to younger people who in turn will have to do the same for the next generation. This kind of pride reinforces the motivation to abide by moral standards because it leads to reputational and relational benefits. As Boehm notes, hunters who share meat not only avoid disapproval, but also become moral role models for others.

Indignation is the emotion that is triggered when we observe a violation of norms by others. According to Jonathan Haidt, indignation is an intuitive response that serves to protect the moral fabric of the community. It is what underlies what is known as 'altruistic punishment': the act of punishing an offender even at personal cost while gaining no direct benefit, but only to affirm a principle of justice ('The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment'. Psychological Review 108(4), pp. 814-834, 2001). Boehm describes numerous cases in which when an individual endangers group cohesion, collective indignation leads to forms of ostracism, ridicule or even ritual executions, as among the Aché of Paraguay or the Yanomami of the Amazonia.

Empathy: the basis of moral learning

According to some evolutionary scientists, including primatologist Frans de Waal (Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved. Princeton University Press, 2006). and Cambridge psychologist Simon Baron-Cohen (The Science of Evil: On Empathy and the Origins of Cruelty. Basic Books, 2011) our sense of justice has evolved through the existence of specific neurocognitive processes and in particular through our ability to empathise with others. The ability to perceive and share the emotions of others is what makes moral regulation possible from an extremely early age. Boehm notes that, in many traditional societies, children learn moral norms not through punishment, but through observing the emotions of others and participating empathically in community life. This is consistent with Michael Tomasello's studies (Why We Cooperate. MIT Press, 2009) that moral learning in human children is based on cooperative interactions and so-called 'joint intentionality'.

Boehm's insights into the birth and development of our moral sense and desire for justice have profound implications for the present. In a globalised world, where social networks are fragmented and educational institutions in crisis, the learning of moral behaviour and its transmission are increasingly uncertain. Who educates today for cooperation, responsibility, justice? What examples can children and young people benefit from in their moral development? I wrote some time ago that 'Through emulating the behaviour of people who are experienced and worthy of admiration (old and wise) and, at the same time, willing to share what they have learned (kind), children acquire important knowledge about facts and phenomena even without having had direct experience of them. These same figures, then, are the ones who reinforce adherence to social norms - be kind, help others, do not lie - through the exercise of their approval that children receive whenever they conform to these precepts. It is at this moment that we begin to build that precious asset that each of us tries to cultivate and defend and which we call 'reputation'' (Well-tempered altruism and the rationality of 'we', Il Sole 24 Ore, 26 March 2022). Where are these 'kindly old wise men' today? Finding an answer to this has become urgent because when moral learning breaks down, the bond that holds us together as a society also crumbles.

In this sense, morality is not a luxury, but a condition of possibility for trust and cooperation, for that intangible and invisible infrastructure on which our life in common is founded. A resource that is not given once and for all, but which we continually develop and strengthen in a process of collective evolution. A sense of justice is not inherited but taught. In a time of crisis of trust and social polarisation, rediscovering the evolutionary and cultural roots of our morality can help us rebuild the invisible fabric that holds societies together. Because, as Boehm reminds us, 'getting by requires getting along'. We will only succeed by walking together.