If protocols stifle judgement and accountability within organisations
An excess of rules and procedures can turn supportive tools into rigid constraints, limiting personal initiative and the ability to adapt in complex situations
There is an image that captures our times well: a doctor standing before a patient, holding a treatment protocol. He has known that patient for years; he understands their history, their vulnerabilities and their fears, and senses that the standard treatment might not be the most suitable. But he also knows that deviating from the protocol means taking a risk. Not just a clinical one, but a legal, bureaucratic and reputational one.
This scene is repeated every day in many different forms: in businesses, in courts, and even on football pitches. In recent decades, we have entered an era of hyper-regulation, convinced that codifying every activity guarantees objectivity, scientific rigour and fairness. The premise is clear and reassuring: if we define clear rules and reduce individual discretion, then we will minimise arbitrariness and improve the quality of decisions.
This is partly true. Protocols stem from a noble intention: to reduce human error, ensure consistency in treatment and make processes more transparent. In medicine, guidelines and treatment standards have saved lives and reduced arbitrary practices. It would therefore be naive, as well as wrong, to pit the doctor’s judgement against the science of protocols. The point is another: what happens when the protocol, created to support judgement, becomes its substitute? Are we prepared to accept this?
Hyper-regulation has also made its way into the world of football. The introduction of VAR and the associated protocols for its use were adopted with the aim of reducing obvious errors, increasing fairness and correcting the most serious decisions. But football, like any complex system, is not made up solely of isolated incidents. It consists of sequences, intentions, contact, simulation, psychological dynamics and situational assessments. This has led to some paradoxical situations: cameras showing a player’s simulation that leads the referee to issue a second yellow card to the opponent, and the protocol preventing VAR intervention because, as it is not a straight red card, the incident does not fall within the specified criteria. The injustice is visible and objective, but the system cannot act to uphold a rule.
The problem arises whenever protocol claims to encompass the whole of reality. When rules, rather than guiding judgement, stifle it. When adherence to procedure becomes more important than the quality of the decision. In such cases, we are no longer dealing with a scientific approach, but with a bureaucratisation of reality.

