A resurgence of Islamists and a dismal turnout: the election in a two-speed Morocco

The most likely scenario is a renewal of the ruling coalition between Pam, Rni and Istiqlal, which hold 228 of the 365 seats in the Moroccan parliament. Pre-election disagreements between PAM and RNI have cast doubt on the prospect of an agreement, but analysts consulted by Sole 24 Ore- Next Med favour an agreement that would see a reshuffling of the hierarchy within the existing coalition. The resurgence of the PJD – which was dealt a blow in the 2021 elections but has been revitalised by a result that cements its role in opposition – may prove to be the most significant factor. “It is one of the few parties with genuine popular support and which does not rely on the backing of patronage networks like the others,” explains Riccardo Fabiani of the International Crisis Group. The party’s profile, says Fabiani, is that of a force which attracts votes from the conservative, religious lower and middle classes who are hostile to the normalisation of relations with Israel championed by the leadership in Rabat. Opposition to Tel Aviv, Fabiani points out, “was one of the key factors that enabled this party to recoup some of the votes it lost in 2021”.

The resurgence of the PJD and the slump in voter turnout appear to stem from a common source: the dichotomy between Morocco’s record-breaking economic growth and the underlying fragilities of its economic and social fabric. On the one hand, there are the $20 billion in investment in roads, airports and stadiums for the FIFA World Cup, the recovery of the agricultural sector, rising demand and a reputation cemented by two key milestones: the regaining of investment-grade status from the sector leader S&P Global Ratings in September 2025 and overtaking South Africa in the industrialisation rate calculated by the African Development Bank. On the other hand, the country continues to face an estimated unemployment rate of 37 per cent among 15–24-year-olds, average monthly wages for 50 per cent of the workforce are below the equivalent of 400 euros, and dissatisfaction with access to basic services, which also led to the Gen Z protests in late 2025.

“The image of a two-speed Morocco is confirmed,” explains Aldo Liga of ISPI’s MENA Observatory. “There is a Morocco that is modernising and making its mark on the international stage, and a Morocco dominated by hardship, left behind by Rabat’s development projects.” The 2030 World Cup itself, says Liga, is “the symbol” of a dualism that the outgoing government has addressed more in announcements than in action.

The other unknown factor, Liga points out, is the fallout from the Ceuta crisis and the rift with one of the three countries involved in the 2030 World Cup itself: Spain, which is co-hosting the tournament alongside Morocco and Portugal. This rift could ‘take up a great deal of the new government’s energy’, says Liga. Perhaps the prospect of Morocco’s exclusion could prove to be a decisive factor, and Rabat’s role in the emergency concerning the exclave remains to be defined. “But Morocco’s image as a reliable partner has been weakened,” says Liga, “and it will have to be rebuilt during this parliamentary term.”