The comment

AI is no longer just software: the real battle is over energy and infrastructure

From the showdown between ChatGPT and DeepSeek to the race to build data centres, secure electricity supplies and control the systems that link artificial intelligence to businesses. The United States, China and Europe are investing in different parts of the same supply chain: the real competitive advantage will lie in having computing power available, secure data and platforms that are difficult to replace

Liang  Wenfeg, fondatore e amministratore delegato di DeepSeek (Imagoeconomica)

5' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

5' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

Artificial intelligence is undergoing a transformation. Until recently, competition seemed to focus mainly on models: who had the most powerful algorithm, who achieved the best results in tests, and who could produce a response at the lowest cost. But now the tide is turning and the challenge is shifting to a much more concrete and tangible level, towards what is needed to make those very same models work on a day-to-day basis and integrate them into businesses and public administrations.

A few figures may help to illustrate the scale of the change we are talking about. As of 31 August this year, China had registered 1,112 generative AI services, compared with 302 at the end of 2024 and 748 at the end of 2025. The same system also listed 731 applications linked to already registered models. This means that DeepSeek – namely China’s largest AI company, founded by Liang Wenfeng, which develops large-scale open-source language models – whilst undoubtedly remaining a key player, is no longer sufficient on its own to describe the market in Beijing. This is because there are complementary companies that build the entire ecosystem required to use the model: Alibaba develops Qwen, Tencent links its models to platforms and developer tools, Baidu integrates Ernie with the cloud, and Huawei links Pangu to its Ascend accelerators.

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The price of the token matters less than the cost of the completed work

By September 2026, the Chinese market was already showing very aggressive price segmentation for inference. DeepSeek V4.1-Flash quoted $0.30 per million input tokens not present in the cache and $1.20 per million output tokens at peak rates; MiniMax M2.7 used the same basic pricing structure; Tencent offered GLM-5.3-Flash via TokenHub at 0.8 renminbi per million input tokens and 2.8 renminbi per million output tokens.

However, the nominal cost of the token is not the sole factor that will determine industry-wide adoption. A model that costs less but requires more checks, greater human supervision or a longer validation process may ultimately prove more expensive. That is why, until a model reaches the minimum level of reliability required by the process, quality takes precedence over price. Once several systems exceed that threshold, other variables become decisive, such as integration times, latency, security, data residency, the cost of computational capacity, the possibility of private deployment and compatibility with existing software.

The US race to catch up with the Dragon

Even the United States has now taken the competition beyond the laboratories. Microsoft, AWS, Google, OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta and Nvidia dominate different segments of the chain, such as models, cloud services, accelerators and management software. A few examples: OpenAI, in April 2026, stated that Stargate had already exceeded 10 GW of secured infrastructure capacity in the United States. In the same month, Anthropic announced, in partnership with AWS, up to an additional 5 GW and over $100 billion worth of technology over a ten-year period. Microsoft indicated around $175 billion in capital expenditure for 2026, whilst Alphabet forecast between 175 and 185 billion.

Of course, these figures cannot simply be added together, as they relate to different periods and operations. What we can do, however, by linking the various elements, is to observe how AI is becoming an industrial issue on a vast scale. And so the factors that were previously observed in the Chinese market are once again coming to the fore: to make a model work, you need chips, memory, data centres, networks, electricity and cooling systems.

The Fate of Europe

The direct consequence is that Europe too must face a new problem. Having moved beyond fruitless discussions about which models to use, Brussels will need to ascertain how much computing capacity the continent will be able to control – or at least have at its disposal on a stable basis. By 2026, the European Union had planned for 19 AI Factories and 13 satellite centres, with over 2.6 billion euros committed to the initiative and around 10 billion earmarked for the period 2021–2027 for the EuroHPC infrastructure and the AI Factories. Added to these programmes is InvestAI, with a target of mobilising 200 billion euros and a 20-billion-euro fund to support up to five AI Gigafactories.

A mere fraction, when compared to the investments made by Big Tech in Silicon Valley. However, great caution is required when comparing them with the major American corporations. The 175 billion from Microsoft and the 175–185 billion from Alphabet relate solely to 2026; InvestAI’s 200 billion, on the other hand, is a multi-year target.

For Italia, the problem is particularly pressing. AI will have to be integrated into a production system consisting largely of manufacturing firms, which are often integrated with software, machinery and external supply chains. And the more artificial intelligence becomes embedded in production processes, the more important it becomes to be able to change technology without having to rebuild the entire infrastructure from scratch.

France also views the issue in terms of technological sovereignty, whilst in Germany the topic is primarily linked to industry. The United Kingdom has taken a different approach altogether, focusing on keeping as many options open as possible. The AI Opportunities Action Plan aims to increase public AI computing capacity by at least twentyfold by 2030. The framework set out for 2026 included one billion pounds for public computing and a new heterogeneous supercomputer costing 750 million pounds.

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The energy hub

Ultimately, however, all this development boils down to one thing: energy. The International Energy Agency estimates that global electricity consumption by data centres could reach around 945 TWh by 2030. The United States and China are expected to account for almost 80 per cent of the projected growth up to that date. For the Dragon, the increase in electricity demand from data centres between 2024 and 2030 is estimated at around 175 TWh.

This is the aspect that is often overlooked in the public debate on Artificial Intelligence. Behind every model lies a supply chain comprising semiconductors, memory, data centres, network connections, large-scale cooling systems and software. If any of these elements are missing, one cannot reasonably expect the capital invested to be transformed into actually available computing power.

The challenge in the coming years will therefore also be a race against the clock to build infrastructure. China will need to overcome its constraints, particularly in semiconductor production. The United States will need to transform its access to capital and its lead in cloud computing and software into physical capacity. Europe will need to successfully bring its planned projects to fruition whilst maintaining interoperable systems.

For businesses, the conclusion is just as clear-cut. Thinking of AI as a standard software licence may work as long as switching providers is straightforward. However, when data, digital identities, agents, networks and production processes all end up within the same architecture, even switching platforms can become costly.

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