Mind the Economy/Justice 73

John Rawls and the intellectual challenges on justice, equality and freedom

John Rawls is the most important political philosopher of the 20th century and his work constitutes an indispensable reference for anyone wishing to reason rigorously on the themes of justice, equality and freedom. His thought develops around this classic triad, and around these three concepts are concentrated the main intellectual challenges that he sought to address by finding original and profound solutions

2 June 2024

John Rawls, filosofo, il 20 marzo 1987 a Parigi (Photo by Frederic REGLAIN/Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images)

8' min read

Today's is the sixteenth and final article we dedicate to the philosophical and political thinking of John Rawls. Since I began this exploration around the idea of justice in January last year, he is certainly the thinker to whom I have devoted the most space and detailed analysis. The reason is quickly stated. John Rawls is the most important political philosopher of the 20th century and his work constitutes an indispensable reference for anyone who wants to reason rigorously on the themes of justice, equality and freedom. His thought develops around this classic triad, and around these three concepts are concentrated the main intellectual challenges that he sought to address by finding original and profound solutions.

Beyond Utilitarianism

The first challenge that Rawls sets himself is that of overcoming the utilitarian vision that until then had dominated Western political thought through the definition of a more complex and profound idea of social justice, one that fully respects the rights of individuals and not only the well-being of society. The second challenge is to overcome the tension between the idea of freedom and that of equality through the elaboration of an original proposal of social democratic liberalism. The third challenge, finally, is that which comes from the pluralism of contemporary societies. Communities of men and women that must stand on legitimate and stable power despite the different and even incompatible worldviews that their individual members usually embrace.

On the first point, Rawls' move is a bold one. Indeed, he rejects the utilitarian view for which political justice is about how institutions determine aggregate distributions and the possibility of maximising the overall well-being of a community. Rawls is more interested in individual citizens and the possibility of them enjoying a minimal set of inalienable and incompressible 'primary goods'. Underlying the idea of political justice is thus the ability of institutions to respect the freedom and rights of citizens that cannot be subordinated to anything else. This means that an increase in the welfare of the majority can never justify a reduction in the freedom of a minority, as is natural from a utilitarian perspective. Rawls, in the tradition stretching from Hobbes to Kant, bases the emergence of the institutions that are to regulate social coexistence on a rational contract based on mutual benefit, impartiality and reciprocity.

Criticism from commentators

The Rawlsian idea of justice has attracted more than a little criticism from commentators. Libertarians in the wake of Robert Nozick condemn without appeal any policy of redistribution seen as robbery or a form of slavery. A less radical but no less important critique comes from other authors, such as Martha Nussbaum and David Gauthier, for example, who although close in spirit to the American philosopher's approach, highlight the lack of inclusiveness of the Rawlsian social contract. Indeed, he assumes that rational, free subjects, "fully cooperative members of society for their entire lives", as he writes, negotiate in the original position.

Rational, free and fully cooperative subjects because only between subjects with these characteristics can an exchange agreement that is mutually beneficial be generated. It is, in fact, the possibility of mutually gaining something from the exchange that grounds and legitimises the contract. Our reciprocal possibility of offering something to the other constitutes, in this sense, its primary reason. Here, then, is the need to consider citizens who "although they do not have equal capacities, have an essential minimum of moral, intellectual, and physical capacities that make them fully cooperative members of society," Rawls continues. This means that everyone is assumed to have such capacities as to enable him or her to play an active role in society and that no one has special or particularly difficult needs. As is easy to understand, this assumption of equality has strong implications for those with special needs or severe disabilities. David Gauthier is explicit on this point when he states that "These people are not part of the moral relations to which contractualist theory gives rise". Similarly, 'What do modern contractualist theories of justice have to tell us,' Martha Nussbaum wonders, 'about [the problems of vulnerability and dependency]? Practically nothing'.

Between benevolence and law

In this way, the justice negotiated by the 'rational, free and cooperative' reverberates on the 'excluded' only on the level of benevolence and not on the level of law. "In this sense," writes Catherine Audard, "many readers of Rawls may share the feeling that he is not addressing some of what they consider to be the most pressing justice issues in our societies. (...) What happens to those members who do not possess the required capacity to enter into contracts and accept their terms as fully cooperating citizens? Are they excluded from justice?" Other critics targeting the consequences on the theory of justice that derive from its contractualist root focus instead on the dimension of global justice towards the innocent inhabitants of illiberal and violent countries and finally on the inability of Rawlsian theory to extend the concept of justice to animals, a topic on which utilitarianism has much to say. It should be remembered that what is arguably the most important contemporary utilitarian philosopher is that Peter Singer author of Animal Liberation, the founding text of the animal rights movement;

Reconciling freedom and equality

The second major challenge of the Rawlsian construction relates to the attempt to reconcile freedom and equality. Political institutions that promote equality generally implement redistributive policies, from the point of view of freedom are viewed negatively due to the fact that redistribution is rarely implemented voluntarily by those citizens from whom resources are taken away. Liberals, on the other hand, traditionally do not view inequalities that arise after equal opportunities have been secured negatively. Such inequalities, in fact, are seen as the result of personal responsibility or natural differences that politics cannot remedy and with which institutions should have nothing to do. For Rawls things are different because justice concerns the basic structure of a society, its fundamental institutions. In this sense, formal equality of opportunity is not sufficient for a just society because if, then, in spite of equal opportunity, someone continues to be so poor or disadvantaged that he or she cannot participate in social and political life, or loses the self-esteem necessary to feel fully a citizen, he or she will be deprived of some of the primary goods that Rawls considers inalienable. Equal opportunities are therefore not enough if access to primary goods is not guaranteed to all citizens. There can be no true freedom without a certain amount of equality.

This perspective has also attracted much criticism both from the right, from liberals and libertarians, and from left-wing authors such as Gerald Cohen. In conclusion, it can be said that the Rawlsian transformation of liberalism has had profound effects on contemporary political thought. As Catherine Audard states, this transformation 'has reinforced the defence of constitutional democracy by separating it from purely liberal concerns for individual liberty. It has introduced an awareness of the weight of unequal basic social structures and the threat they pose to freedom and security. It has also given new urgency to the joint defence of political, civil and social rights and opposition to governments that continue to claim that the struggle for economic growth can justify the sacrifice of fundamental rights'.

The third major challenge, the one that occupied Rawls in the latter part of his life, can be described as the challenge of pluralism. A pluralism that manifests itself at different levels. On the one hand, it concerns the state sphere in which the different worldviews that citizens adopt clash; on the other, there is the level relating to the relationship between different states with respect to the different political regimes that meet and clash in the arena of international relations.

Worldviews

How is it possible to imagine a just basic structure that is both legitimate and stable when citizens have both reasonable religious and secular worldviews that are at odds with each other and even completely incompatible? This is the problem of de facto pluralism, as Rawls calls it, which characterises modern democratic states. Two fundamental concepts are proposed to resolve this question, two concepts, that of 'consensus by intersection' and that of 'civic duty', which we have discussed at length in recent weeks. Consensus by intersection' is that fundamental core of deep values that each of the worldviews present in a democratic society must possess. Seeking such a consensus means seeking out and valuing what unites us rather than what divides us. This common core of shared values is joined by the 'duty of civilisation' that prescribes that in the political sphere any measure that is binding on all citizens cannot be based on values that belong only to a single worldview. Such personal and private convictions cannot govern the public sphere, they cannot be invoked as an argument on which to base public choices.

In the international sphere, however, Ralws' liberal vision takes the form of a new law of peoples. A set of rules on which the states that are part of the 'Peoples' Society' will agree, made up of states that are properly liberal but also of 'decent' states that, while not being fully democratic and liberal, are also not aggressive towards other states and respect fundamental human rights internally and adopt popular consultation procedures. A huge challenge is that of stability and just peace between states, given that in addition to those that form the 'Society of Peoples' there may be others governed by absolutist regimes and still others that are, due to their aggressiveness and disregard for human rights, veritable 'outlaw' states.

Realistic Utopia

The challenge of pluralism in international relations that Rawls tackled with originality and rigour may not have been entirely won, but it certainly gave rise to a new discipline, that of so-called global justice, the development of which, in the face of today's dramas, is more necessary than ever;

The central ideal of John Rawls' thought was that of a 'realistic utopia'. That is, the possibility of demonstrating the even theoretical possibility of achieving a just and stable society through a reasonable path of transition. What he sought to do was to demonstrate the feasibility of such a path and the rationality of such an institutional arrangement. One might ask, however, whether it is not fairer to consider our worth as individuals and as a community on the basis of the lives we actually live and not on the basis of the lives we might live. There is certainly no denying that the actual realisation of such an ideal is important, but Rawls, as Thomas Pogge, one of his last pupils, reminds us, believed that 'as long as we are rightly confident that a self-sufficient and just collective life among human beings is realistically possible, we can hope that we or others will one day, somewhere, achieve it'. Giving ourselves a 'realistic utopia' as an end goal does not mean choosing an unattainable ideal, but rather - this was the Rawlsian approach - putting ourselves in a position to start realising that utopia. Rawls' political philosophy can flank and support such an undertaking because it is able to neutralise the cynicism and resignation that are the main enemies of any project of social reform.