Kuwait tightens up on citizenship. Checks with allies and fewer welfare benefits

The crackdown on citizenship has come full circle. Kuwait has reached a turning point in its political history: moving away from the hybrid monarchical-parliamentary system that has characterised the emirate for decades – currently led by Sheikh Misha’al Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah – towards a model of executive centralisation that is reshaping identities, rights and internal power dynamics. The virtual suspension of parliamentary life in May 2024 paved the way for a series of decrees – 116/2024, 158/2024 and, above all, the recent 52/2026 – which redefine citizenship as an administrative and security tool, removed from judicial scrutiny and linked to stringent requirements regarding single nationality, biometrics and genetic proof of lineage.

The crux of the reform is both legal and political. Article 22 of Decree-Law 52/2026 classifies every decision on the acquisition, revocation or loss of citizenship as an ‘act of sovereignty’ that cannot be challenged: a sharp break with the previous practice which allowed for administrative appeals all the way up to the Court of Cassation. At the same time, Article 11 bis imposes an obligation on naturalised citizens to renounce any other nationality, failing which the naturalisation decree will be retroactively annulled; Article 16 links revocation to the total loss of economic benefits and entitlements; Article 20 defines DNA and biometrics as verification tools.

The scope of who qualifies as a citizen is thus defined by stricter and more technical criteria, but above all with fewer safeguards. Tens of thousands of cases are reportedly under review: internal estimates put the figure at up to 70,000 individuals, including those whose citizenship has been revoked and those undergoing verification, with a focus on the approximately 40,000 women who have been naturalised through marriage. The message is: to plug loopholes relating to dual citizenship and irregular documentation; to reshape the demographic and political balance by curbing the expansion of electoral bases that might be at odds with the traditional axis of the ruling family.

From an economic perspective, the aims of the austerity measures are clear. To reduce the number of welfare recipients in order to cut structural expenditure and free up resources for the transition to the “New Kuwait 2035” programme. In practice, this means savings of up to €17 billion by 2031 and an improved valuation of sovereign debt. Rapid reforms are also on the horizon – ranging from the possible introduction of VAT to the privatisation of utilities – as well as the relaunch of infrastructure projects that have been on hold. There are also risks: liquidity shifting towards more predictable jurisdictions, and a less liquid property market where non-citizens have limited access to home ownership.

Kuwait’s decision forms part of a regional security strategy: the integration of databases with Gulf partners, transnational registers and the standardisation of protocols. It marks the transition from a parliamentary exception to alignment with more centralised models. If the fragmentation of tribal opposition remains manageable, the emirate could consolidate a form of ‘technocratic stability’ that trades debate for swift decision-making and fiscal sustainability. The next window of opportunity will reveal a great deal: the expiry of the 90-day deadline for single-nationality status, and the large-scale implementation of biometric checks. If macroeconomic indicators improve whilst capital and talent remain at home, the gamble will appear to have paid off. If, on the other hand, investment and the property market cool off, the price of this new sovereignty could prove steep. In any case, the signal is already clear in the Gulf: in Kuwait City, citizenship has become the linchpin of a new system of governance.