Missing funds and human rights violations, how the EU spent (badly) almost 5 billion in Africa

Funds used in a dispersed manner, projects 'overestimated' in their effectiveness and a third reason for criticism, the most delicate one: an 'inadequate' attention to the human rights of migrants and to abuses against them. This is the balance sheet drawn up at the end of September by the EU Court of Auditors, an institution that monitors EU funds, on the results and the - various - problems of the so-called Eu Trust Fund, or EUTF: a €5 billion trust fund set up by the EU in 2015 to intervene in the three regions of Sahel and Lake Chad, the Horn of Africa and North Africa, some of the most sensitive areas for migratory flows on the Continent. Bettina Jakobsen, the member of the European Court of Auditors responsible for the report, has already spoken publicly of a model hinging on "fragmented support" and "little attention to strategic priorities", reiterating to Sole 24 Ore and Der Standard the inconsistencies that have emerged in the report. A lunge that calls into question the entire framework of EU policies on the management of movements, starting from the pillar consecrated by agreements such as those with Libya, Tunisia or Egypt: the externalisation of the control of departures, the ratio of the billionaire financing granted in the last remnants of the legislature to Tunis and Cairo.

The Court of Auditors' rejection has rekindled the spotlight, at least in the EU, on an instrument that emerged at the peak of the so-called migration crisis in 2015 and was already criticised by the audit body in 2018. The fund was created with the stated objectives of supporting the "stability" of the region to contribute to "better management of flows", setting priorities that include measures against human trafficking, efforts to stabilise regions and the protection of vulnerable migrants. The fund, the Court points out, has received over EUR 5 billion in contributions and provided support to 27 African countries. The largest share of its allocation, EUR 4.4 billion (88%), is drawn from the European Development Fund and the EU budget with two contributions of 66.9% and 20.8% respectively. The remaining 12% comes 37% from Germany, 20% from Italy and 43% from 'other donor countries'. As of December 2023, payments amounted to just over EUR 4.5 billion, distributed with 42% going to the Sahel, 36% to the Horn of Africa and 20% to North Africa. The issues are those challenged by the report, after an analysis applied mainly to five countries: Ethiopia, Gambia, Mauritania, Libya and Tunisia..

The Court's report goes into detail about various distortions in the functioning of the fund. There are cases of "inflated accounts" and "inaccurate declarations", or even denunciations of "activities that are no longer sustainable, difficult to implement or not directly linked to the most urgent aspects of the migration crisis", such as the "renovation of the Al Shabbi promenade in Benghazi", the restoration of the Roman theatre in Sabratha, Libya, or the provision of sports and kitchen equipment for schools with "urgent basic infrastructure needs". One of the most critical chapters remains the one on human rights violations, expressed in the gap between 'EU intentions' and the results of projects receiving EU funding. Among the most indicative examples are the 'potential human rights risks associated with more EUTF activities in Libya', one of the countries at the heart of the border control outsourcing strategy espoused by Brussels and individual governments, led by the Italian one. The supply of boats, equipment and training to the Libyan Coast Guard, the report points out, was created with the intention of "increasing surveillance" and "reducing deaths at sea", except for resulting in the cases contested by the Court and denounced by various non-governmental organisations: the equipment "may not be used by the beneficiaries", the trained personnel are careful not to observe the principle of "do no harm" to migrants, and those involved evade "monitoring", an accusation renewed and extended in the case of "detention centres" inaccessible to external observers and humanitarian workers.

The author: human rights not adequately addressed

Jakobsen, the Court member responsible for the report, points out that the core of criticism had already formed at the time of the first findings in 2018. Six years later, little has changed: "The most worrying aspect is that the funds are still not sufficiently targeted or focused on the most urgent priorities or needs," he points out, highlighting at least three elements of criticism. The first is that 'the Migration Fund is simply too thinly spread as it finances too wide a range of actions in the field of development, humanitarian aid and security. In future, the Fund will have to focus more on preventing history from repeating itself'. Secondly, Jakobsen adds, 'the results of the projects financed are often overstated. For example, the audit team visited a craft workshop that had been declared completed, but in reality the building was not completed at all and was therefore not operational'. Thirdly, there is a bland focus on human rights, including standard procedures for collecting complaints about cases of abuse: 'In particular, the Commission has no formal procedures for reporting, recording and following up on alleged human rights violations in relation to EU-funded projects. Our auditors cannot therefore confirm that all allegations have been followed up".