Mokha and Bab el-Mandeb: the Yemeni crisis becomes a European issue

The latest military developments along Yemen’s western coast deserve to be viewed from a broader perspective than one strictly linked to the country’s internal conflict. Mokha is not merely a Yemeni port city. Nor is Bab el-Mandeb simply a strait situated at the southern end of the Red Sea. What is happening today in this area directly affects the security of the shipping lanes linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, the operation of the Suez Canal, Egypt’s economic interests, European energy security and, inevitably, Italia too. Following days of fighting in the provinces of Hodeida and Taiz, the Houthi forces have extended their presence southwards, as far as Mokha, whilst government forces and their allies have redeployed some of their units towards the area of Dhubab, even closer to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The very latest reports speak of Houthi troops on the outskirts of Dhubab itself. Beyond military interpretations and the accounts provided by the parties involved, the strategically significant fact is clear: the centre of gravity of the Yemeni conflict is shifting towards one of the world’s most sensitive maritime corridors.

To understand what is happening, you first need to look at a map. Bab el-Mandeb connects the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea. From there, ships continue towards the Suez Canal and then on to the Mediterranean. It is an almost continuous route: Indian Ocean – Gulf of Aden – Bab el-Mandeb – Red Sea – Suez Canal – Mediterranean Sea. Any significant instability at one of these points has consequences along the entire chain. For this reason, Mokha assumes an importance that far exceeds its size. The city lies on the coast leading directly to Bab el-Mandeb and to the islands that geographically dominate the southern access to the Red Sea. The issue, therefore, is not simply a matter of asking who controls a particular city or military position. The more important question is this: what security balance will emerge along the eastern coast of Bab el-Mandeb?

For many years, the international community has treated various regional issues as separate matters: Yemen, Gulf security, Iran, the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and the Suez Canal. This distinction is becoming increasingly unrealistic. Energy and trade routes link these issues together far more swiftly than diplomacy can. The current difficulties facing shipping in the Gulf region have further increased the strategic importance of the Red Sea route. In this context, any new uncertainty surrounding Bab el-Mandeb carries greater international significance than in the past. It is not necessary to envisage a complete closure of the strait to understand the consequences. In international maritime trade, indeed, the perception of risk can be almost as important as the risk itself. An increase in the perceived threat can lead to higher insurance premiums, changes in shipping routes, higher transport costs, longer delivery times and, in extreme cases, a decision by shipowners to sail round Africa via the Cape of Good Hope. These are thousands of additional kilometres that inevitably end up translating into economic costs.

There is also a factor that is sometimes underestimated in Europe. The security of the Suez Canal does not begin at Suez. It begins much further south. From the point of view of international shipping, Bab el-Mandeb can be considered the true southern gateway to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. If shipping companies do not consider it sufficiently safe to pass through Bab el-Mandeb, the Suez Canal loses some of its commercial significance. This reality makes the stability of western Yemen a strategic issue for Egypt as well. Cairo is economically dependent on traffic through the Suez Canal and naturally regards the security of the Red Sea as an integral part of its own national security. The more instability increases in the southern stretch of the Red Sea, the more difficult it becomes to separate the Yemeni crisis from Egypt’s strategic interests.

For Italy, too, the issue is not far removed. Italia occupies a unique position in the Mediterranean. Its ports, industries and supply chains depend to a significant extent on the continuity of trade routes between Europe and Asia. A ship that bypasses Bab el-Mandeb and Suez does not merely alter a route on a map. It affects lead times, costs, insurance, the availability of goods and competitiveness. For a manufacturing and export-oriented economy such as Italy’s, maritime security in the Red Sea should therefore be considered part of national economic security. There is also a geopolitical dimension. Italy has historically maintained important relations with both shores of the Red Sea and with the Horn of Africa. Its geographical position and diplomatic tradition could enable it to contribute to a less crisis-driven and more strategic European vision of the region. Not merely protecting ships when a crisis arises, but helping to create the conditions to ensure that such crises do not become permanent.