New EU summits, Meloni's canvas to put tax cuts for 2025 on the table

No one is unbalanced. In official statements everyone - including Giorgia Meloni - defines any hypothesis as premature, postponing the opening of the confrontation until after the vote on 8 and 9 June. But the negotiations on the future government of the EU are actually already underway and will be at the centre of the tête-à-tête that will take place on the sidelines of the European Council on 17 and 18 April.

It is a very delicate game for the premier, destined to be directly reflected on the domestic front as well. This can already be understood by observing the electoral campaign, the multiplication of trifles between allies with Matteo Salvini - the latest example - who proposes a mini building amnesty without Meloni's knowledge (and also that of the Forza leader Antonio Tajani) and who makes the League's MEPs vote in Strasbourg against the new Pact on Migration and Asylum supported instead by the Italian government, the premier's Brotherhood of Italy and Forza Italia.

This is the climate. Which is not likely to improve after the vote. The publication over the past few days of a Def without programmatic indications - on which the surge of the building subsidies weighs dramatically - was motivated by the need to deal with the new rules of the Stability Pact. However, this justification is destined to disappear in the coming months, when the executive will send the medium-term structural fiscal plan to Brussels in September. In essence, the numbers of the next manoeuvre. The first objective - reiterated by Meloni and also by the Minister of Economy Giancarlo Giorgetti - is to confirm the cut in the tax wedge and the amalgamation of the Irpef rates, which are worth a total of about 14 billion. Going back, giving up aid and raising taxes and contributions on payrolls is not a viable option for the PM.

The big question mark remains as to where the resources will be found. A search that will take place when the infringement procedure for excessive deficit has probably already been opened and with a debt that is also increasing due to the superbonus. The relationship with Brussels therefore remains decisive. Meloni is well aware of this, so much so that right from the start of her adventure at Palazzo Chigi she has favoured dialogue with European leaders, with the president of the Strasbourg Parliament Roberta Metsola, with the president of the European Council, Charles Michel, and with the outgoing president of the Commission and candidate for the encore from the EPP, Ursula von der Leyen. With her Meloni has established a solid relationship both on the defence of Ukraine and on migration (see the trips together to Tunisia and Egypt but also the green light to the centres in Albania wanted by the Italian government). But beyond supporting von der Leyen, whose candidature is encountering several obstacles, the premier's bet is to be among the protagonists of the negotiations that will decide the new European structure. To achieve this, she must first of all present herself with a consistent and loyal number of deputies.

That is why she is ready to take the field personally, leading Fdi in all constituencies, and running almost exclusively 'political personnel', i.e. party people who answer directly to her. This is the share package with which she counts on being able to direct at least part of the games. Including those that will open in the aftermath of the ballot box verdict on the parliamentary groups. Meloni will remain in the Ecr, the Conservative party hitherto dominated by the Pis Poles but of which Fdi is destined to become the majority shareholder. It is not just a question of numbers but also of specific weight. And Meloni's is high. Agreements before Parliament will be made in the European Council. It will be the leaders of the 27 who will decide who will lead the EU for the next five years. And if Meloni succeeds in playing a leading role in the new structure, she will have credits to claim and to spend.