The ritual and the rule: the hidden structures of human cooperation
Perhaps today many rituals are emptying of meaning, but certainly the deep need for meaning that once generated them has not disappeared
7' min read
7' min read
There is a thread that binds the ancient bands of Pleistocene hunters and gatherers to the more sophisticated contemporary social institutions. That thread is called cooperation, and its resilience depends on a simple yet fragile condition: that no one takes more than his due. That is, the costs and benefits of cooperation must be distributed according to a principle of justice.
A rather fragile foundation on which to base life together. Fragile because vulnerable to opportunism. The presence of a bully who can take everything or a free-rider who parasites the efforts of others is enough to discourage those who would be willing to cooperate from doing so. For why cooperate if the risk of being deprived of one's contribution outweighs the expected benefit? Cooperating ceases to be rational and the social system collapses. How did the human species learn to cooperate despite the threat of bullies and opportunists? This is the basic question that Australian philosopher Kim Sterelny addresses in his The Pleistocene Social Contract: Culture and Cooperation in Human Evolution (Oxford University Press, 2021). An issue that also has a very special relevance today.
The evolution of the anti-bully
The great apes live in hierarchically structured groups in which, as Sterelny reminds us, 'aggression decreases as rank is lowered, while submission and fear, on the contrary, increase' (p. 56). These are groups in which access to resources and status is highly unequal. Whoever finds a juicy fruit or a piece of meat, if he occupies a lower place in the group hierarchy, knows for sure that that food will be taken away from him. In this context, it is pointless to invest in tools, technology or cooperation. Cooperation is not stable because its eventual fruits will be systematically plundered. "A bully," writes Sterelny, "can monopolise the entire profit of a cooperative enterprise" (p. 55).
Yet, at some point in our evolutionary history, things changed. Someone started to oppose such logic. A real evolutionary leap occurred when our ancestors learned to say 'no' to bullies. What happened? Three essential things: the invention of weapons, we learned to form alliances and we started to createshared moral rules.
The first two factors, the invention and development of weapons and the ability to form coalitions, introduce a profound novelty into the social equilibrium of those early hominid groups. Indeed, as Sterelny notes, 'Weapons have the power to make a coalition of individuals, even if physically weak, potentially lethal to the dominant alpha individual' (p. 62). It is a concept that Thomas Hobbes will take up in his Leviathan when he writes at the beginning of Chapter XII: 'Nature has made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind that, although one man is sometimes found manifestly stronger physically or of a more ready mind than another, yet when all things are calculated together, the difference between man and man is not so considerable, that one man can consequently claim for himself some benefit that another cannot claim, as much as himself. For,' Hobbes continues, 'with regard to bodily strength, the weaker has sufficient strength to kill the stronger, either by secret machinations or by allying himself with others who are with him in the same danger. Weapons and alliances create the possibility of punishing those who do not respect group rules, bullies and opportunists. But in the absence of a centralised monitoring infrastructure, of a monitoring institution, how could anyone tell who was breaking the rules, who was bullying or free-riding?


