The EU Action Plan for the Mediterranean is moving forward. But it is time to involve the regions
This autumn, Europe will present the operational update to the Pact first unveiled in 2025. It will be underpinned by universities, digital transformation and cable interconnectivity. Beyond the funding, what Mare Nostrum can offer is the intersection between administrative areas and a third path to innovation, beyond the techno-right and techno-left models that monopolise the debate
Key points
Thirty years separate the Barcelona Declaration from the Pact for the Mediterranean, adopted by the College of Commissioners in October 2025 and officially launched on 28 November, on the very day of that anniversary. The Barcelona Process was, in fact, launched in 1995 with an ambition that today moves us with its courageous and necessary naivety: to build an area of peace and shared prosperity through trade liberalisation and cultural dialogue. The Union for the Mediterranean also inherited its original flaw: a structure in which one side planned and the other received. Cooperation was, in reality, a neighbourhood policy, where ‘neighbourhood’, in the implicit lexicon of Brussels, refers to what lies outside. Thirty years on, the outcome is clear: an imposing institutional framework, but a capacity for action that falls short of expectations.
The new Pact appears to have taken this on board. It is explicitly based on co-creation, co-ownership and shared responsibility, and on 17 April produced an initial Action Plan comprising twenty-one initiatives organised around three pillars. Above all, it is conceived as a dynamic document: a second edition of the Plan is expected in the autumn. This means that, as these lines are being written, the text that will guide the next cycle is currently being drafted in its new version.
Traffic and demographics
The fact that the Mediterranean has returned to centre stage is no longer a theory to be explored. It is a fact. It must be managed, developed and put to good use. The Mediterranean, also known as the Mare Nostrum, accounts for 1 per cent of the world’s waters and carries over 20 per cent of global maritime traffic, with 3,500 ships passing through it every day; the Strait of Sicily alone, just 145 kilometres wide at its narrowest point, is home to two gas pipelines, twenty telecommunications cables and two power cables. Over 95 per cent of intercontinental data traffic travels via submarine cables, and the Mediterranean has become a strategic global hub. Despite the crises in Suez and Hormuz, in 2025 the region’s main container ports handled over 72 million TEUs, representing growth of 5.9 per cent, and the Euro-Mediterranean area now accounts for around 31 per cent of world trade, worth almost 7,600 billion dollars; SRM estimates point to a further increase of 15 per cent by 2030, exceeding the global average.
Overlaid upon this geography of migration flows is a demographic trend of the opposite direction and equal strength. The median age in Africa is now 19.5 years; by 2050, one in four people on the planet will be African, and more than a third of young people aged between 15 and 24 will live on that continent. Nowhere else in the world brings an ageing Europe into such close contact with the greatest reservoir of youth in human history. It is a proximity that Europe can continue to treat as a border issue, or recognise for what it is: an opportunity.
A third way between technology and humanism
There is, however, a deeper – and less widely discussed – reason why the Mediterranean matters at this stage. The global debate on innovation and future agendas is currently dominated by two visions that are clashing with increasing intensity. On the one hand, there is a techno-right-wing capitalist vision that promises to transcend the state, limitations and the community, moving towards private frontiers where the sovereign individual is emancipated from fragility through technology. On the other, a techno-left-statist vision that promises the containment and planetary management of variables, the algorithmic governance of risk, and the engineering correction of injustice. They appear to be antagonistic, and in many respects they are. They certainly are in their approach. But their para-metaphysics is identical: both regard the human condition as a solvable defect; both are nihilistic. Mimetic rivalry, then, as Girard would have said: they clash not in spite of being twins, but precisely because (deep down) they are.

