The slowdown in logistics

The hidden cost of Hormuz is becoming a permanent item in industrial budgets

From energy to European factories, the Gulf crisis is turning route security into a permanent additional cost for all supply chains. The delays are, in fact, causing congestion on other routes as well. At the Salalah docks, ships are facing waiting times of up to 36 hours. In Colombo, quay utilisation stands at 110 per cent, with over 50,000 TEU backed up. Meanwhile, ships around the Strait and at Bab-el-Mandeb are subjected to constant minor attacks

by Charlye Ghezzi

5 November 2026

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Versione italiana

On 14 June 2026, the United States and Iran announced a ceasefire agreement that provided for the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz. Four months later, the gap between diplomatic commitment and commercial security remains the decisive factor: as at 30 October, the International Maritime Organisation had recorded 122 confirmed incidents and 24 seafarers killed in the waters affected by the crisis. The problem is not merely getting a ship through, but enabling thousands of operators to plan repeat voyages, insure them and meet delivery contracts. A route may be formally accessible yet remain economically unviable. It is this disconnect – even more so than the temporary rise in oil prices – that is transferring the conflict between Washington and Tehran into corporate balance sheets, the decisions of Gulf governments and the competitiveness of European manufacturing.

The US military operation against Iran, launched on 28 February and notified to the United Nations Security Council under Article 51 of the Charter, had among its stated objectives the protection of shipping and regional partners. Mediation by Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey contributed to the agreement of 14 June, but the renewed hostilities reported by the UN in July revealed the fragility of the arrangement. Tehran can make transit costly without physically preventing every passage; Washington may possess conventional military superiority without guaranteeing every shipowner an insurable risk.

The evacuation mission itself, co-ordinated by the International Maritime Organisation, highlights the limitations of the ceasefire: between 23 and 26 June, 136 ships carrying around 2,900 seafarers were evacuated; a subsequent attack forced the suspension of the security arrangements. In October, UK Maritime Trade Operations continued to report oil tankers hit by projectiles, fires and interference with transit in the Strait of Hormuz and off the coast of Oman.

IL COSTO NASCOSTO DI HORMUZ

Petroliere colpite da proiettili, incendi e interferenze con il transito nell’area dello Stretto e presso le coste omanite

Raw material flows through the Strait

The sheer scale of the issue explains why it extends beyond the shipping industry. According to the US Energy Information Administration, the volume of petroleum products passing through the Strait of Hormuz fell from 21.6 million barrels per day in the fourth quarter of 2025 to 4.9 million in the second quarter of 2026: a decline of 77.3 per cent. Crude oil and condensates fell from 15.9 to 3.7 million barrels per day, whilst refined products fell from 5.7 to around 1.1 million. Liquefied natural gas suffered an even sharper decline, from 10.5 to 0.8 billion cubic feet per day, representing a fall of approximately 92.4 per cent.

Nor have alternative routes automatically absorbed the shortfall in volumes. Between the fourth quarter of 2025 and the second quarter of 2026, oil flows through Bab el-Mandeb rose from 5.4 to 8.1 million barrels per day, whilst those around the Cape of Good Hope fell from 9.9 to 9.4 million. The vulnerability of the alternatives became apparent in September, when attacks temporarily disrupted the Saudi East-West oil pipeline, which previously carried over 5 million barrels a day towards the Red Sea. On 15 September, Brent crude reached, according to the same agency, $131 per barrel. Relocating infrastructure away from the Strait of Hormuz does not mean removing it from the geography of the conflict.

Furthermore, the detour around Africa does in fact affect a second factor: not only the cost of transport, but also the fleet’s production capacity. The World Bank in 2024 – comparing the Covid-19 pandemic and the temporary crises in the Suez Canal – had estimated that, for the Europe–Asia routes affected by the Red Sea crisis, 3,000–3,500 nautical miles and an additional seven to ten days, with 700,000–1.9 million TEUs of container capacity absorbed by the longer rotations. Maersk diverted its ME11 and MECL services round the Cape from 1 March 2026; the following July, when it resumed using Suez for some MECL rotations, it indicated an expected saving of seven days westbound and fourteen days eastbound.

Congestion at other airports

In its update of 30 October , Hapag-Lloyd reports that yard utilisation in Salalah stands at 84 per cent, with waiting times for berthing of up to 36 hours; in Jeddah, the utilisation rate is 76 per cent, whilst in Colombo it exceeded 110 per cent, with over 50,000 TEU backlogged in transfers between terminals. Jebel Ali is operating with irregular calls. These figures, which relate to individual terminals and are also influenced by weather conditions, show that alternative ports, feeder services, customs and road transport do not have infinite capacity. A container may arrive at the alternative port and still miss its next connection, tying up capital and materials needed at the factory.

Naphtha and ethane feed into different petrochemical processes; ethylene and propylene form part of the polyethylene and polypropylene production chains, which are essential for packaging, technical components and consumer goods. Gas also influences the production of ammonia and fertilisers. It is not enough to look at the Brent to determine how much a food package or a car component will cost: the quality of the resin required, plant operations, the availability of specialised vessels and the timing of when contracts pass on price increases all play a part.

In modern distribution, the crux of the matter is financial as well as logistical. More days in transit mean more goods to finance before they are sold; an additional stock buffer limits the risk of stock-outs but ties up liquidity, requires space and can become obsolete. Diversification only works if it is genuine: two commercial suppliers may depend on the same chemical plant, the same port or the same IT service. The prior vetting of an independent supplier requires time and resources that cannot be improvised after a production line has come to a standstill.

Attacks on maritime software

Finally, this vulnerability affects the software that controls cargo, aircraft and terminals. In 2026, the International Maritime Organisation highlighted the risks of interference with GNSS, whilst the European Aviation Safety Agency updated its guidance in July on jamming and spoofing of satellite signals. Jamming can disrupt a position; spoofing can produce one that appears credible but is false. The draft revision of the NIST guidelines on the security of industrial operating systems, published in September 2026, also highlights dependencies on the cloud and connected infrastructure.

There is therefore a very real risk that governments will continue to bear the costs of defence and infrastructure protection; shipowners will have to decide how much flexibility to maintain; and industrial companies will have to choose which suppliers to approve and which stocks to finance.

Charlye Ghezzi is a geopolitical analyst and specialist in technology and government security

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