Cyber security

The law is failing to keep pace with hybrid warfare: defending the state is becoming a legal risk

From school security alerts to strategic infrastructure, the response to digital threats is putting the coordination between institutions and businesses to the test. Professor Andrea Genovese, Professor of Private Law at the University of Tuscia, draws attention to the need for clarity regarding procedures and responsibilities

Adobestock

4' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

4' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

All it takes is a threatening message to bring lessons to a halt, mobilise the police and put families and school staff on high alert. The bomb threats that have affected Italian schools show how a threat, even without causing physical damage, can disrupt public services and generate social costs.

Not every threat made online, however, constitutes a cyberattack, nor do such incidents in themselves prove the existence of a single mastermind. According to Professor Andrea Genovese, Professor of Private Law at the University of Tuscia, ‘the novelty does not necessarily lie in individual acts: threats, sabotage and false alarms have long been part of the experience of legal systems; what has changed is the ability to combine them, to multiply their effects through technology and to simultaneously affect different sectors of economic and social life. The modern threat, therefore, is not measured solely on the basis of immediate damage, but also by its capacity to disrupt the normal functioning of institutions and to undermine citizens’ confidence in the continuity of public services’.

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The informational and psychological aspects of hybrid threats can amplify fear and mistrust, but the most tangible issue arises when the attack targets energy networks, healthcare systems, transport or industrial facilities: a digital failure can quickly turn into a problem of physical security and service continuity. However, establishing the facts and assigning responsibility require thorough investigations, not strategic labels.

The legislative landscape

Public authorities rely on complex systems that require specialists, technology and timely intervention, and many of these capabilities lie with private companies. The private sector can thus play a decisive role in prevention and recovery, without thereby assuming public powers. Who authorises the intervention? Within what limits? And who is accountable for decisions taken under pressure? There is no shortage of regulations, but every case is different and requires its own assessment. Decree-Law 82/2021, converted into Law 109/2021, established the National Cybersecurity Agency; Law 90/2024 strengthened the framework for combating cybercrime; Legislative Decree 138/2024 transposed the NIS 2 Directive. The Prime Ministerial Decree of 22 April 2026 concerns the management of national security crises, including hybrid threats.

The problem, according to Genovese, lies in reconciling these tools with public procurement, data protection, administrative liability and investigative activities. It is here that what Genovese defines as ‘legal unpredictability’ emerges: not the absolute absence of law, but the difficulty of knowing in advance the legitimate course of action, the competent authorities and the consequences of decisions.

The aim is not to relax controls, but rather to ensure that procedures are clear and verifiable before an emergency arises. Article 76(2)(c) of the Public Contracts Code permits, subject to strict conditions, the negotiated procedure without a call for tenders in cases of extreme urgency arising from unforeseeable events for which the administration is not responsible. This is not an indiscriminate exemption: urgency, justification, documentation and proportionality remain essential. Framework agreements, protocols and specialist resources already identified can reduce lead times without compromising legal compliance.

The powers of the State

Defensive activities, too, have clear boundaries. Vulnerability assessments, attack simulations and intrusion containment require explicit authorisation and a defined technical scope. Article 615-ter of the Criminal Code protects systems from unauthorised access: a defensive purpose does not automatically legitimise operations on third-party systems. Assignments must specify objectives, duration, systems involved, permitted operations and traceability. Articles 28 and 32 of the GDPR, the preservation of evidence and investigative requirements also remain relevant.

In the event of threats to schools, headteachers, the police and public security authorities intervene in accordance with their respective remit. The Prefect carries out the duties set out in Article 13 of Law 121/1981; the Acn and the Csirt Italia intervene when a cyber-security aspect falls within their remit. The challenge lies in rapidly coordinating the assessment of physical risks, digital checks, communication and the protection of individuals.

The approach outlined by Genovese does not require the creation of a new authority. Before considering a new legal framework for an integrated response, it is necessary to assess the effectiveness of existing regulations and procedures, and to establish points of contact, agreements, activation criteria and documentation systems. Only genuine gaps would justify targeted legislative measures; any decree-law would, in any case, have to comply with the requirements of Article 77 of the Constitution. When responsibilities and procedures are fragmented, the public official in charge may be tempted to choose the path least likely to attract criticism, rather than the most effective one. This is the risk of defensive administration.

Administrative and judicial oversight remains an indispensable safeguard: however, it must be able to be exercised over timely, reasoned and documented decisions, without confusing the scrutiny of individual responsibilities with the assessment of the quality of the rules. National security is, by now, a shared responsibility, but not an indistinct one. It is the role of the institutions to set policy, grant authorisations and safeguard the public interest; it is the role of businesses to provide specialist expertise within transparent limits. The challenge for the legislator is to make what the law already permits immediately practicable and to fill only the genuine gaps. Because during a crisis, time is of the essence, but speed must remain compatible with accountability.

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