The law is failing to keep pace with hybrid warfare: defending the state is becoming a legal risk
From school security alerts to strategic infrastructure, the response to digital threats is putting the coordination between institutions and businesses to the test. Professor Andrea Genovese, Professor of Private Law at the University of Tuscia, draws attention to the need for clarity regarding procedures and responsibilities
Key points
All it takes is a threatening message to bring lessons to a halt, mobilise the police and put families and school staff on high alert. The bomb threats that have affected Italian schools show how a threat, even without causing physical damage, can disrupt public services and generate social costs.
Not every threat made online, however, constitutes a cyberattack, nor do such incidents in themselves prove the existence of a single mastermind. According to Professor Andrea Genovese, Professor of Private Law at the University of Tuscia, ‘the novelty does not necessarily lie in individual acts: threats, sabotage and false alarms have long been part of the experience of legal systems; what has changed is the ability to combine them, to multiply their effects through technology and to simultaneously affect different sectors of economic and social life. The modern threat, therefore, is not measured solely on the basis of immediate damage, but also by its capacity to disrupt the normal functioning of institutions and to undermine citizens’ confidence in the continuity of public services’.
The informational and psychological aspects of hybrid threats can amplify fear and mistrust, but the most tangible issue arises when the attack targets energy networks, healthcare systems, transport or industrial facilities: a digital failure can quickly turn into a problem of physical security and service continuity. However, establishing the facts and assigning responsibility require thorough investigations, not strategic labels.
The legislative landscape
Public authorities rely on complex systems that require specialists, technology and timely intervention, and many of these capabilities lie with private companies. The private sector can thus play a decisive role in prevention and recovery, without thereby assuming public powers. Who authorises the intervention? Within what limits? And who is accountable for decisions taken under pressure? There is no shortage of regulations, but every case is different and requires its own assessment. Decree-Law 82/2021, converted into Law 109/2021, established the National Cybersecurity Agency; Law 90/2024 strengthened the framework for combating cybercrime; Legislative Decree 138/2024 transposed the NIS 2 Directive. The Prime Ministerial Decree of 22 April 2026 concerns the management of national security crises, including hybrid threats.
The problem, according to Genovese, lies in reconciling these tools with public procurement, data protection, administrative liability and investigative activities. It is here that what Genovese defines as ‘legal unpredictability’ emerges: not the absolute absence of law, but the difficulty of knowing in advance the legitimate course of action, the competent authorities and the consequences of decisions.


