The Dragon over the Sahel: China’s space race overshadows EU and Italian interests

China’s space diplomacy is seeking to expand into the wider Mediterranean and the Sahel, reshaping the balance of power in regions that are also vital to European and Italian security. Whilst Rome is launching the Mattei Plan to consolidate energy cooperation with Africa, Beijing is weaving a network of satellite agreements to offer a closed and dependent technological ecosystem. Satellite navigation systems and Earth observation constellations have become the nervous system of the contemporary economy and security landscape. They synchronise energy grids, manage supply chains, monitor harvests and track troop movements. For decades, Italia has enjoyed a strategic advantage in the Mediterranean, supported by a world-class space industry capable of producing some of the world’s most advanced observation satellites. From 2021 onwards, China, through its BeiDou navigation system and its remote-sensing constellations, has begun offering African and Middle Eastern countries a comprehensive, turnkey package, free from the political conditions and technological restrictions that accompany agreements with the West. To understand the strategic significance of this shift, one must consider the geography of Italy’s national interests. The Sahel and North Africa are not distant lands as far as Rome’s security is concerned, but rather Europe’s southern border – the buffer zone on which energy stability, the control of migration flows and the fight against international terrorism depend. Italian companies operate in complex environments in Algeria, Libya and, potentially, in future scenarios of stability in the Sahel. To protect this infrastructure, monitor the routes of human traffickers departing from the North African coast and track the movements of jihadist militias in the desert, Italia relies on satellite intelligence. Italian radar satellites are infallible eyes surveying those regions, but what happens when host countries begin to develop their own space capabilities, relying exclusively on Beijing?

If a country in the Sahel or North Africa decides to bring its critical infrastructure into line with Chinese standards, integrating BeiDou systems for logistics and using Chinese remote-sensing satellites for border monitoring, this creates a structural dependency. It is like building a railway network with a different track gauge: once the tracks have been laid, changing them becomes an extremely costly, if not impossible, undertaking. The remote-sensing satellites sold or donated by Beijing to African countries are inherently dual-use. The very same orbital eyes that can monitor drought in the Sahel can be used to map military bases, track the movements of Italian or allied special forces, and support precision-guided weapon systems. China is well aware of this, and its willingness to transfer these technologies is a geopolitical weapon that must be closely monitored.

At present, the country that has officially adopted Chinese technology is Niger. Following the breakdown in relations with France, the local junta signed a memorandum with the Russian company Glavkomos in November 2024, with the aim of providing troops with imagery to assist in ground operations against jihadist militias. The Chinese have entered the fray much more recently, probably towards the end of last year. This sets the stage for direct competition with Italia, the only Western country present with its own troops. With regard to Burkina Faso, reports refer to an official statement from the Chinese government which mentions, as part of the Belt and Road Initiative, an agreement to transfer BeiDou technology for monitoring a hospital during the Covid pandemic. A similar development has also taken place in Lebanon in recent years in connection with the construction of the port of Beirut. Senegal, for its part, has entered into agreements with the China National Space Administration (CNSA) to cooperate on the International Lunar Research Station (ILRS), China’s lunar research project. In 2021, representatives from 50 African countries met in Beijing to sign a framework agreement with the China Satellite Navigation Office (CSNO), and since then individual partnerships have grown in both number and quality. Egypt, for example, has developed no fewer than two large-scale projects with the China Academy of Space and Technology under the AIT model. At the forum, Xu Hongliang, then Secretary-General of the China National Space Administration, expressed his willingness to share more information to foster the exchange of expertise, with a view to making African countries self-sufficient in terms of satellite technology.

In 2020, the following African countries launched satellites into orbit: South Africa, Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria and Sudan. Pioneers thanks to decades of strategic investment and international partnerships, Egypt and South Africa each have 13 satellites in orbit. Nigeria, with seven satellites, is a key player in West Africa. Algeria has six. Ghana has developed GhanaSat-1. The Kingdom of Morocco is a leader in the sector, having acquired the Mohammed VI A satellite, worth $500 million. Other African countries, particularly those in the Sahel, must either cooperate with these satellite programmes, rely on international partners, or deploy drones. Drones have significantly lower surveillance and data-processing capabilities than satellites. However, these aerial platforms can also be used for attacks. The three AES countries signed a space cooperation agreement with their new strategic partner, Russia, in Bamako on 23 September 2024. The agreement was signed with Glavkosmos, a subsidiary of the Russian space agency Roscosmos. Two satellites are at the heart of this initiative. One will be dedicated to telecommunications and promises to improve internet coverage, as well as enhancing radio and television broadcasts. The second will be dedicated to Earth observation. Thanks to its high-resolution imaging capabilities, it should be of great assistance in border surveillance and in preventing the risk of insurrection. In January 2026, in particular, Russia and Burkina Faso began assessing the construction of a communications satellite designed to accelerate Burkina Faso’s digital transformation, paving the way for connectivity, mapping and early-warning services. Designed to cover the Sahel region, the satellite will also aim to protect government communications and strengthen the resilience of networks during crises.

Against this backdrop, the Italian space industry finds itself facing an uneven playing field. Italia is Europe’s third-largest space power, with an industry capable of designing and building satellites of the very highest quality. Italian companies regularly take part in international tenders to supply technology to countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Egypt, for example, is a long-standing partner of Italia in the Mediterranean, and Rome has always sought to maintain a strong influence in the defence and space sectors in Cairo. Beijing is not only competing on quality, but also on its business model: it offers rock-bottom prices, preferential financing through Chinese state-owned banks, immediate technology transfers and zero interference in internal affairs. And this is where China is expanding its space cooperation by offering satellite packages for precision agriculture, water resource management and border security. For a government in the Sahel, having a satellite that monitors the movements of armed groups along the porous desert borders is a matter of survival.