Alternative routes

Trump’s plans for the Caucasus remain on paper

The Tripp project promises to link Asia and Europe via Armenia, reshaping the balance of trade. However, with shareholdings, funding yet to be finalised, costs to be borne by Yerevan and hostility from Tehran, key issues regarding governance and economic sustainability remain unresolved. Brussels will need to ensure that the new infrastructure does not duplicate that already in operation without adding value.

by 24Ore NextMed

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Da sinistra, il presidente dell’Azerbaigian Ilham Aliyev, il presidente degli Stati Uniti Donald Trump e il primo ministro dell’Armenia Nikol Pashinyan.   EPA/NATHAN HOWARD

5' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

5' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

The fate of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity, the US-backed project to build a transport link through Armenia, will depend on the ability to transform a political agreement into a manageable infrastructure system, even when the interests of its promoters diverge. For Yerevan, the issue concerns market access, the sustainability of public commitments and the effective exercise of sovereignty; for Tehran, it concerns the distinction between US commercial participation and a security-focused presence; for Europe, the compatibility between new connections, development funding and existing energy infrastructure. Tripp cannot be assessed solely on the basis of the shares held by the company tasked with developing it.

At the time of the signing of the treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan, on 8 August 2025, President Donald Trump had stated: ‘It’s been a long time; they’ve been fighting for 35 years, and now they’re friends and will remain so for a long time to come. It is a great honour to welcome everyone to the White House for this historic peace summit.’ He added: “I would like to congratulate these two visionary leaders, the Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan and the Azerbaijani President Aliyev, for coming to Washington to sign this historic joint declaration. It is an extremely important document that has been long awaited.”

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The economic factor

Under the proposed structure, the US side would hold a 74 per cent stake in the development company and Armenia a 26 per cent stake, for an initial period of 49 years. A possible extension of a further 50 years, subject to mutual agreement, would bring the Armenian stake to 49 per cent. These figures define ownership and duration, but do not quantify the capital actually available to build railways, roads and electricity connections. The documentation from the US International Development Finance Corporation also distinguishes between the parent company and individual projects: the establishment of the former does not oblige the DFC to finance the latter, and should it invest in their capital, its direct and indirect stake should not exceed 40 per cent. This has a clear industrial implication: each infrastructure project will have to strike its own balance between capital, debt, revenue and contractual obligations.

The DFC announcement of 3 June 2026 must also be interpreted within its own context. The approved $2.5 billion relates to several operations, including a $1.5 billion investment platform in the Indo-Pacific, and does not constitute an overall allocation for the Tripp. The company’s approval represents an institutional step forward; the financing of a specific project requires further steps. Confusing the two levels would result in a misleading financial representation and could encourage public commitments before it has been determined who will bear additional costs, delays or lower-than-expected revenues. Furthermore, the economic value of improved accessibility does not automatically correspond to the revenue the company can collect: savings for exporters and importers may benefit the Armenian economy without translating into an equivalent sum available to repay lenders.

Infrastructure under construction

The trilateral declaration published by Armenia on 7 November 2026 established the first technical working groups on transport and electricity transmission. On 2 November, the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had identified railways, roads and power lines as immediate priorities, leaving gas and oil pipelines for later discussion. This distinction prevents the project from being described as a single infrastructure, with every component already defined. A railway requires operational connections, services and maintenance; a power line requires operational coordination, metering and load balancing; digital systems must have clear responsibilities for access, support and recovery. Economic risk arises when a project is completed before the connections necessary for its operation are in place, generating costs without the expected revenue.

The Sisian–Kajaran road project provides a concrete point of comparison, whilst remaining distinct from the Tripp funding. The European Investment Bank describes a 60-kilometre link, divided into two sections and including the Bargushat tunnel, with an indicative total cost of 1.349 billion euros and EIB financing of 236 million, the agreement for which is scheduled to be signed on 12 November 2024. It is incorrect to transfer these costs to another route; rather, it is significant to note the extent to which design, infrastructure, environmental assessments and tendering procedures impact the preparatory work. Furthermore, the 105,000 tonnes of goods that have arrived in Armenia via Azerbaijan since November 2025, as reported in the minutes of the 12 November 2026 meeting between Pashinyan and the Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev, document existing transit activity, not the traffic of a Tripp that has already been completed.

The bilateral agreement on the TRIPP preserves Armenia’s public liabilities, but their effectiveness will depend on the implementing measures. Law HO-467-N, adopted on 12 November 2026 and published the following day, allows for certain differentiated regulations for companies established under treaties in which the Armenian State holds at least a 25 per cent stake. The articles of association and the shareholders’ agreement therefore play a substantial role in defining governance. The question is not merely whether Yerevan formally possesses a power, but whether it can exercise it whilst a commercial dispute remains unresolved. The bilateral framework also imposes costs on Armenia relating to land acquisition and the clearance of third-party rights, whilst providing for specific tax exemptions: public expenditure and lost revenue may therefore precede the benefits. The one-year notice period required for termination of the agreement does not constitute an immediate operational remedy.

For Iran, this institutional boundary has security implications. On 16 October 2026, the Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi linked concerns about the US presence to trust in Armenian partners and the continuation of consultations. In the previous September, the Iranian ambassador to Armenia Khalil Shirgholami had linked acceptance of the project to the protection of Armenian sovereignty and the absence of a US military or security presence.

The role of Brussels

The EU–Armenia partnership on connectivity can coordinate transport, energy and digital sectors, but it does not combine different instruments into a single financial plan. The €270 million from the 2024–2027 Resilience and Growth Programme and the €2.5 billion in expected investment under the Global Gateway have different scopes and should not be added together as part of the Tripp budget. Between November 2027 and November 2028, the assessment criterion will be the translation of political support into enforceable contracts, funding that is actually available and accepted services: an analytical window, not an official completion deadline.

According to Tripp, leaving interface issues unresolved whilst commitments increase means that every subsequent correction becomes more costly. Armenia will bear the administrative and land-related costs set out in the agreement; investors and contractors may face delays and disputes; European partners will risk ending up with infrastructure lacking the connections needed to generate value. The most sound approach is to proceed in stages when conditions allow, whilst maintaining control over risks that remain undefined. The success of Trump’s strategy will be measured by the institutions’ ability to rectify a problem without disrupting the entire system.

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