Turkey is arming Mali and setting its sights on the Sahel’s raw materials

Last November, Bamako hosted its first defence exhibition (Bamex 25). It was a well-attended event, featuring no fewer than 30 Turkish companies, and enabled the Mediterranean-facing country to dominate the proceedings and effectively transform the event into a framework for security cooperation within the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). This was a key step towards making Turkey a partner of the states led by military juntas that have rejected Western military assistance. During Bamex, Mali also signed an agreement for the direct delivery of Bayraktar TB2 drones. Following the French withdrawal from the Sahel region, Recep Erdogan saw fit to step up efforts, reaping the benefits of agreements initiated more than a decade ago and kept under wraps at least until 2021. The first pillar was the military training cooperation agreement, ratified in September 2010, which laid the foundations for the training of Malian personnel by Turkish instructors. In 2015, a significant step forward was taken with the signing of joint protocols aimed at technical support, the donation of equipment, the exchange of intelligence, the sale of arms and ammunition, and the modernisation of equipment. Following the 2021 coup in Mali and the expulsion of French forces in 2022, Turkey signed further security and defence agreements with the Malian junta, focusing primarily on logistical support.

Aselsan, Turkey’s largest electronics company, plays a central role in the Turkish-Malian defence ecosystem. It supplies products ranging from communications and information technologies to radar and electronic warfare, from electro-optics to avionics, and unmanned systems. In recent years, the company has installed advanced systems on Malian military aircraft to counter improvised explosive devices and aerial threats. Last May, the company introduced new electronic warfare and anti-drone solutions, including the KORAL AD system, which is capable of detecting and jamming the radars of enemy aircraft. In short, these technological developments appear to be directly relevant to Mali’s operational requirements in the context of counter-insurgency in the Sahel. Put simply, the scheme devised by Ankara makes it increasingly difficult for the African country to break free from these agreements and switch suppliers. In practice, the Turkey–Mali military partnership, with Aselsan as its technological arm, reveals a model of strategic influence that differs from both the Western and Russian approaches.

In terms of scope, agreements with other African countries and participation in events such as Bamex 25 point to a complex and, in some respects, non-bilateral continental strategy. Turkey signed a major defence and maritime trade pact with Somalia in February 2024, an energy and security agreement with Niger in July 2024, a military cooperation protocol with Djibouti in July 2025, and a financial cooperation agreement with Senegal in August 2025. Mali is the gateway to the Sahel, but the network extends from Niger to Somalia. Aselsan, with exports exceeding $2 billion in 2025 and contracts worth $5.7 billion, has the financial and production capacity to support this expansion.

However, the partnership does entail significant risks for both parties. For Mali, as we noted above, there is a risk of reduced strategic flexibility and excessive vulnerability should Ankara limit its support. For Turkey, its association with a junta subject to Western sanctions and the use of the Sahel as a testing ground for military equipment entail reputational risks and geopolitical tensions with the West. Not to mention the ongoing dualism between Moscow and Ankara itself. Whilst both actors benefit from France’s withdrawal, their interests are not entirely aligned. Russia primarily provides direct security support through the Wagner Group/Africa Corps, whilst Turkey offers an integrated technological ecosystem. This complementarity currently allows for coexistence, but creates potential conflicts over influence in the long term. The underlying issue remains raw materials and which country will secure long-term access to them. In the event of disagreements, Bamako would become a battleground between the two countries.