Ukraine and the EU: between European aspirations and political obstacles, the long march to Brussels

In June 2017, Ukrainian citizens with biometric passports were granted the right to travel without a visa for short stays in the Schengen area (90 days every 180 days), with the usual EU exceptions.

Until 2022, accession remained more a distant prospect than a concrete goal. The European Commission linked progress to the implementation of structural reforms on the rule of law, the fight against corruption and the reduction of oligarchic influence. Systemic fragilities and so-called 'enlargement fatigue', resulting from the accession of Eastern European countries in 2004 and years of economic crisis and austerity, represented further obstacles. The last enlargement was Croatia in 2013. Only with the Russian invasion did the Ukrainian prospects become concrete: enlargement remains, after all, a political decision.

Membership is not a discretionary award: it is governed by the treaties. According to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, any European state that respects the values of the EU can apply. A long process follows based on assessments by the Commission and unanimous decisions by the member states.

The Copenhagen criteria of 1993 set the conditions: stable democratic institutions, respect for human and minority rights, a functioning market economy, and the capacity to absorb the obligations of membership, i.e. to adopt the EU acquis and to cope with competition in the internal market.

Technically, the alignment concerns 33 chapters, now grouped into six clusters: 'Fundamentals', 'Internal Market', 'Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth', 'Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity', 'Resources, Agriculture and Cohesion', and 'External Relations'. The Fundamentals open first and close last, determining the pace and credibility of the whole process.

When the Commission recommended candidate status for Ukraine, it set out seven immediate priorities: constitutional court reform, judicial reform, anti-corruption measures, governance of SAPO and NABU, anti-money laundering rules, implementation of the anti-oligarchy law, alignment of audiovisual legislation, and revision of minority laws.

The path is slowed down by national vetoes. Viktor Orbán's Hungary is strongly opposed, while Robert Fico's Slovakia conditions its support on a strict interpretation of the criteria. Both countries, together with right-wing populist parties across Europe, question the sustainability of the Ukrainian impact on the EU budget.

Roman Petrov, holder of the Jean Monnet Chair of EU Law at the National University of Kiev-Mohyla Academy, calls the situation 'paradoxical': the clusters are not officially open, but technical work continues informally in the so-called 'Lviv format', awaiting the political unanimity needed to start formal negotiations.

Petrov warns that 'for now, the biggest problems concern Hungary and Slovakia. But governments may change, and with the Hungarian elections in April, the situation may evolve. However, a wave of anti-Ukrainian populism could also spread to Western Europe, with France and Germany most at risk'.

Many analysts wish for a faster enlargement, not only for Kiev, but also for Montenegro, Moldova and Albania. Some have speculated a 'membership-lite' entry for Ukraine as early as 2027: inside the EU, but without full rights and veto rights. Petrov replies that 'this is unrealistic: without full membership, these scenarios do not exist. There are no partial memberships with voting rights. The only option is full membership'.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz also ruled out any light formula. Germany remains a key player in the European balance.

According to High Representative Kaja Kallas, "the enlargement model requires time, stability and gradual reforms. Today's geopolitical environment is unstable and often coercive. A deadline cannot be set, because accession only comes after comprehensive reforms'.

Petrov explains: 'As long as the war continues, accession is not possible. Security, economics and law prevent it. Member states are not ready to guarantee the sovereignty of a country at war. Financial and military aid is one thing; sending contingents is another'.

In Brussels, wartime membership is seen as an unprecedented challenge, not an impossibility. The 'Lviv format' accelerated the process, providing Ukraine with technical criteria normally reserved for formal negotiations.

The most advanced cluster is the External Relations cluster, mainly political-diplomatic. The Internal Market and especially the Fundamental clusters (rule of law and corruption) require continuous reforms and tangible results. Some reforms, such as connectivity and green transition, require legislation, investment and administrative capacity, further complicating the wartime path.

Two factors are often underestimated: the evolution of US-EU relations and the need for internal reform of the EU, which today is inadequate for a large-scale enlargement. The simultaneous accession of Ukraine, Moldova and the Western Balkans would require significant changes and complex negotiations for all 27 Member States.

Petrov concludes: 'Enlargement is first and foremost political. Without unanimity, even significant progress is not enough. Each national parliament must ratify the accession, raising complex questions about who will control the process and which governments will be in power when the votes are taken'.

*This article is part of the European journalistic collaboration of the 'EU Neighbours East' project