A new Macedonian party is flying the flag of Greater Albania in defiance of Edi Rama

In June, at the Western Balkans summit in Montenegro, Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni chose not to attend. This decision was interpreted in Rome as a clear political signal: to avoid endorsing the idea, supported by Paris and Berlin, of proceeding with ‘phased’ enlargement, starting with Montenegro and postponing the accession of the other Western Balkan candidates until a later date. Such a stance would have put Italia on a collision course with Edi Rama’s Albania, its key ally, and would have risked further weakening the position of North Macedonia, already hampered by the Bulgarian veto. North Macedonia has, in fact, returned to the centre of the Balkan stage not because of a sudden push towards Brussels, but because it has become the battleground between two leaders who have for years been vying for political and symbolic leadership of the Albanians in the region: Albin Kurti, Prime Minister of Kosovo, and Edi Rama, Prime Minister of Albania. Caught in the middle is an increasingly cautious European Union, which views the Balkans through the lens of instability and would clearly prefer to begin enlargement with the smaller and more ‘manageable’ Montenegro, thereby avoiding a ‘package deal’ on enlargement. A choice that risks fuelling tensions precisely where the region is most fragile and which also puts Italia – historically close to Rama – in an awkward position.

In recent months, the VLEN coalition, a new Albanian political force in North Macedonia, has become a key player. Many of its leaders come from circles close to the Kosovar Vetëvendosje movement, Kurti’s political platform: they share its anti-corruption rhetoric, its anti-elite stance and a cross-border network linking Kosovar activists, NGOs and Macedonian civic movements. VLEN represents a break with the past, openly challenging the traditional DUI, the Macedonian Albanian party allied with Rama and considered more moderate and pro-EU. Tensions between Tirana and the new Macedonian Albanian movement have reached unprecedented levels. This summer, Edi Rama prevented VLEN representatives from entering Albania. According to Albanian government sources, the network of activists close to Vetëvendosje is believed to be among those responsible for the recent wave of anti-Rama protests in Albania: spontaneous demonstrations, coordinated social media campaigns and political pressure that the Albanian Prime Minister regards as part of a regional strategy by Kurti to weaken him. Rama believes that Kurti is building a pan-Albanian network – revolutionary in essence – spanning Kosovo, North Macedonia, Albania and Montenegro, capable of mobilising young people and anti-elite movements. A network which, according to Tirana, is specifically aimed at destabilising Albania’s domestic political landscape.

Aware that openly pan-Albanian rhetoric, which evokes the ideas of Greater Albania, would have counterproductive effects on European public opinion — and above all on the delicate balance of power with Serbia — Rama is attempting to rein in Kurti’s activism, whilst Kurti is challenging him precisely on that very ground: by presenting himself as the leader of a pan-Albanianism that is civic and transnational, capable of redefining the regional balance of power. For Rama, this project is dangerous: it risks alarming Brussels, irritating Belgrade and further complicating Albania’s path towards the EU.

On the Macedonian front, the situation is equally complex. North Macedonia has taken significant steps towards the EU, including the much-discussed Prespa Agreement with Greece, which resolved the name dispute and paved the way for Euro-Atlantic integration. Today, Athens openly supports Skopje’s accession to the Union. The real obstacle, however, is Bulgaria, which for years has been engaging in systematic obstructionism, repeatedly stalling negotiations and imposing conditions that Skopje considers politically untenable and culturally intrusive. The Bulgarian blockade has its roots in the agreements signed by the government of Zoran Zaev with Sofia in 2017 and 2019. Those agreements provided for constitutional amendments to recognise the Bulgarian minority and the implementation of the so-called Second Protocol, a document establishing mechanisms for the joint review of history, culture, language and literary heritage. For Sofia, the protocol is a tool for ‘harmonising’ historical narratives; for Skopje, it is perceived as a mechanism for controlling identity that would give Bulgaria a permanent right of veto over school curricula, history textbooks, public commemorations and linguistic definitions. Furthermore, it would open the door to legal disputes: any difference of interpretation could turn into a diplomatic incident, paralysing the accession process. The Macedonian Prime Minister, Hristijan Mickoski, has said he is open to a compromise: yes to constitutional reforms, but no to the implementation of the Second Protocol, which is considered too intrusive and potentially destabilising. Sofia, however, insists: without the protocol, there will be no progress on the negotiation chapters.

According to regional diplomatic sources, Donald Trump’s United States has already opened a confidential channel of communication with Sofia to persuade Bulgaria to ease the pressure on Skopje. Washington is said to have drawn on a significant precedent: in 2018–2019, it succeeded in persuading Bulgaria not to block North Macedonia’s accession to NATO, despite concerns over national identity. Today, the objective is said to be similar: namely, to prevent the Bulgarian-Macedonian dispute from becoming a new point of vulnerability in the Balkans. It is highly likely that the US is biding its time until the most opportune political moment, most probably the Bulgarian presidential elections this coming autumn, which could reshape the domestic balance of power and provide a diplomatic window for an agreement.