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After Mokha: Yemen is no longer a war on the periphery

For years, the international community has treated the war as a crisis that could be contained: periods of fighting followed by truces, negotiations that began and then broke down, and humanitarian aid intended to prevent the country’s complete collapse. The Houthis have used the truce to build up their military strength

by Arhab Mohamed Al Sarhi

24 September 2026

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Miliziani yemeniti durante una manifestazione a sostegno degli Houthi (Foto AP/Osamah Abdulrahman)

7' min read

Translated by AI

Versione italiana

Key points

Bab el-Mandeb changes the scale of the conflict
From Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb
Saudi Arabia faces its toughest challenge yet

7' min read

Translated by AI

Versione italiana

For years, the international community has treated the war in Yemen as a crisis that, in some way, could be contained: periods of fighting followed by truces, negotiations initiated and then broken off, and humanitarian aid aimed at preventing the country’s complete collapse. However, the latest developments in Mokha raise a different and far more uncomfortable question: has the Yemeni crisis really been contained, or has its full-scale eruption simply been postponed? What has happened on the west coast is significant not merely because a strategic city has passed under the control of another force. Mokha is situated in a geographical context that means it cannot be regarded as just another Yemeni city. From that coast, one looks directly towards Bab el-Mandeb, one of the world’s most sensitive maritime passages, towards the Horn of Africa and towards a route linking the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and, via the Suez Canal, to the Mediterranean Sea. And it is precisely here that the nature of the war changes.

The problem isn’t just Mokha

Simply asking how Mokha fell risks losing sight of the main issue. The most important question is another: how is it possible that, after more than a decade of war, an armed group is still capable of altering, in a relatively short space of time, a strategic balance upon which Yemeni and regional actors had based their assessments for years? The answer does not lie solely in the strength of the Houthis. Recent events have once again highlighted a structural weakness in the front opposing the movement: a proliferation of decision-making centres, divergent interests, difficulties in coordination and years of competition between forces which, at least formally, are supposed to belong to the same camp.

Wars, however, are not decided solely by the number of men or the quantity of weapons available. They require leadership, a strategy and, above all, a shared political vision. And it is precisely here that one of the fundamental problems of contemporary Yemen emerges. There are numerous actors who know perfectly well who they are fighting against, but who do not necessarily agree on the Yemen they intend to build after the war. The Houthis have made use of the years of the truce. These years of relatively reduced hostilities were not years of inactivity. The Houthis have had time to reorganise, recruit new forces, strengthen their missile capabilities and further develop drones and military equipment produced or assembled locally. Whilst part of the international community interpreted the reduction in fighting as the possible start of a slow transition from war to politics, the Houthis also used that same period to improve their military position. This is a point that deserves particular attention. A truce that fails to lead to a political agreement and the strengthening of institutions may, over time, simply become a lull between two phases of the same war.

Bab el-Mandeb changes the scale of the conflict

What makes the current situation different from many previous phases of the Yemeni war is, above all, the geography. Bab el-Mandeb is not exclusively a Yemeni, Saudi or Arab issue. It is one of the main arteries of international shipping, and the economic interests of dozens of countries pass through those waters. Furthermore, the Houthis do not necessarily need to ‘close’ the strait to turn it into a means of exerting pressure. In international maritime transport, it is sufficient simply to increase the level of risk. If insurance premiums rise, if shipping companies have to alter their routes, or if ships require greater security measures, the economic impact begins long before any complete interruption to shipping. This is the difference between controlling a territory in the interior of Yemen and gaining influence in the immediate vicinity of one of the main international shipping lanes. In this case, geography itself becomes power.

From Hormuz to Bab el-Mandeb

The situation becomes even more delicate when viewed in a regional context. The tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have already demonstrated just how vulnerable energy and trade routes can be. At the same time, the Houthis’ increased ability to exert pressure around Bab el-Mandeb introduces a further element of instability. Europe, China, the United States and the Gulf States cannot therefore regard what is happening in Yemen as a distant crisis. The global economy depends on a relatively limited number of strategic sea lanes.

When more than one of these points simultaneously becomes vulnerable to geopolitical pressures, the whole equation changes. However, we must avoid an overly simplistic interpretation that reduces the Houthis to a tool that Tehran can activate or deactivate at will. The relationship with Iran is real and strategically important, but the movement also has its own interests, objectives and dynamics within Yemen. Understanding this interplay is essential for any credible policy towards them.

Saudi Arabia faces its toughest challenge yet

For Riyadh, the latest developments bring back into focus an issue that Saudi Arabia has been trying to manage for years: how to prevent Yemen from becoming a permanent source of threat to its borders, infrastructure and energy interests without being dragged back into open warfare? The military option, on its own, has shown its limitations. But even mere containment has its limits. Bilateral negotiations may temporarily ease tensions, but they cannot, on their own, rebuild a Yemeni state or resolve the internal divisions that have helped create the current situation. This is the crux of the matter.

In the long term, Saudi Arabia’s security is unlikely to be separated from the existence of a stable Yemeni state, capable of exercising authority over its own territory, borders and ports. On the other side of Bab el-Mandeb lie Djibouti, Eritrea and the Horn of Africa, an area where the military and commercial interests of numerous regional and international powers converge. The presence, at close quarters, of an armed force equipped with missiles, drones and maritime operational capabilities inevitably alters the security calculations even of countries not directly involved in the Yemeni war. And this is where a fundamental shift in the geopolitical position of Yemen comes to the fore. For years, the question has been: how do regional crises affect Yemen? Today, we must also ask the opposite question: how might events in Yemen affect the region and the rest of the world? But where do the Yemenis fit into all this?

In the debate over oil, ships, straits, military bases and international alliances, there is a very real risk that Yemen itself will disappear. And this is perhaps the most painful aspect of the current situation. Once again , the Yemeni citizen risks becoming a mere number in an equation far greater than himself: a displaced person, a casualty, someone dependent on international aid, or simply a citizen forced to pay higher prices for food, fuel and transport because a road has been closed or a port is no longer operating normally. Whilst the world debates the safety of shipping through Bab el-Mandeb, Yemenis continue to worry about the safety of their homes, their livelihoods, medicines and their children’s future. This is not a minor contradiction. It is at the heart of the Yemeni tragedy. Every external actor views Yemen through the lens of their own interests: border security, shipping, Iran, energy, the Red Sea, terrorism or regional competition. The question that all too often goes unanswered is much simpler: who views Yemen from the Yemenis’ perspective?

Yemen as a battleground for competing external interests

Over the years, the objectives of the various Yemeni factions have become increasingly intertwined with those of regional and international powers, to the point where it has become difficult to distinguish between them. And this is probably one of the greatest dangers of the phase that is now beginning. If Yemen continues to be a theatre in which regional actors pursue broader objectives through local allies, it is unlikely that there will be a genuine Yemeni victor, regardless of how many times the front lines shift. One faction may capture a city. One country may lose influence whilst another gains it. Alliances may shift. But if, in the meantime, the state continues to weaken, it is Yemen as a whole that will lose out.

Security in the Red Sea cannot be built on the ruins of the Yemeni state. Any international strategy that addresses Red Sea security without simultaneously addressing the future of the Yemeni state will inevitably remain incomplete. Military ships can be deployed. Missiles can be intercepted. Certain trade routes can be protected. Temporary agreements can be reached to de-escalate the situation. But these measures serve only to manage the risk. They do not eliminate the causes that give rise to it. A more sustainable solution must necessarily involve the restoration of the Yemeni state’s institutions, the strengthening of a credible political and military structure, and the establishment of a political process that gives Yemenis themselves a tangible stake in peace.

Mokha’s message

Mokha should therefore not be interpreted merely as the conclusion of a battle. It should be seen as a warning. The first is that putting a war on hold does not mean resolving it. The second is that the fragmentation of the forces opposing the Houthis is no longer merely an internal Yemeni issue: its consequences may affect regional and international security. The third is that the security of Bab el-Mandeb cannot be separated from Yemen’s political future. But the most important warning is another. Continuing to turn Yemen into a battleground where other actors settle their scores will inevitably lead to new wars. The countries of the region have the right to protect their own security. The international community has the right and the duty to safeguard freedom of navigation and its own interests. But the Yemenis, too, have a right to something that is all too often forgotten: that their country should not remain merely a strategic location over which others compete.

Perhaps this is precisely the most important message that should come out of Mokha today: there can be no lasting security in the Red Sea without a stable Yemen. And there cannot be a truly stable Yemen as long as the Yemeni people continue to pay the price for conflicts and rivalries that extend far beyond their country’s borders.