Air defence is no longer just a theoretical concept. European investment needs to be increased fivefold

For decades, Europe has treated missile defence as an insurance policy: expensive, sophisticated, but destined to remain in the background. That era is over. The war in Ukraine, the pressure on the Middle East and the simultaneous demands from allies have turned every interceptor into a political decision: which city, base, port, power station or unit to protect when there is not enough ammunition to go round? This is not merely a crisis of arsenals. It is the point at which security, industrial capacity, public finances and strategic autonomy become one and the same issue. The United States and Europe are increasing orders and production lines; but official timetables suggest that the response will take years. In the meantime, Italia, France, Germany and the United Kingdom must move from a collection of national programmes to a genuine continental system: layered, interoperable and governed by common rules of priority. The NATO Secretary-General, Mark Rutte, quantified the shortfall on 12 March 2026: the Alliance must increase its capabilities fivefold, and thus by 400 per cent, its air defence and anti-missile systems and is still a long way from that target. Behind that percentage lies a more uncomfortable truth. A Patriot, SAMP/T NG or IRIS-T system does not, in the abstract, protect ‘Europe’: it covers a specific area, consumes ammunition and depends on radar, command, maintenance and supplies. On 3 June 2026 Rutte confirmed that PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors were continuing to flow into Ukraine, but identified production speed as the central problem and acknowledged that intense military operations can affect stocks. The crux of the matter is therefore not whether a single reallocation has ‘depleted’ a theatre — given that public sources do not allow this to be proven — but rather who possesses the authority to allocate a scarce resource when Europe, Ukraine and the Middle East are all demanding it at the same time. Deterrence begins precisely here: with the credibility of the reserve, not with the nominal number of launchers.

In the US Army’s request for 2027, the Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement programme is valued at $12.229 billion. The overall acquisition target has been raised from 3,376 to 13,773 interceptors. The planned schedule is also telling: 244 units in 2027, then 1,672 in 2028, 1,675 in 2029, 1,684 in 2030 and 1,690 in 2031. These are not stocks available today; they are future capabilities, subject to industrial delivery and funding. The document adds a crucial detail for the allies: the unit price also depends on the volume of overseas military sales. European security thus becomes part of the same equation that must replenish US reserves. Washington remains the Alliance’s technological anchor, but this scale-up confirms that demand has outstripped the production architecture conceived in the post-Cold War era.

A missile is not created when Parliament votes on the budget. It is created when thousands of components – propellants, semiconductors, sensors and energy materials – arrive in the correct sequence at a certified production line. The Government Accountability Office reported on 30 April 2024 that, in a missile programme, the lead time for an electronic component had risen from 19 to 34 months; on 24 July 2025, it also noted that the Department of Defence relies on over 200,000 suppliers, whilst retaining limited visibility into the deeper levels of the supply chain and the origin of certain materials. This is the hidden constraint: not only the final assembly capacity, but the availability of qualified subcontractors, test benches, security-cleared personnel, multi-year contracts and capital willing to wait. Rutte himself noted that a young person starting training in 2026 might not be fully available to the defence industry until 2030. The shortage, therefore, cannot be resolved by quarterly announcements: it requires predictable demand, advance payments, risk-sharing and orders of sufficient duration to justify new facilities.

Italia plays a more significant role than the public debate suggests. The SAMP/T NG, developed with France through OCCAR and Eurosam, combines Leonardo’s Kronos Grand Mobile High Power radar with the engagement module built by Thales and MBDA Italia in the Italia configuration. The contract of 18 July 2023, worth approximately 700 million euros, has launched five batches for the Italian Air Force. The system is designed to counter aerodynamic and ballistic threats, saturation attacks and high-speed targets. This is where Italia’s strategic value lies: not merely as a purchaser, but as a centre of expertise in radar technology, command, integration, propulsion and munitions. Transforming this position into negotiating power requires a steady stream of orders, protection for subcontractors and a doctrine that links the defence of military forces, energy infrastructure, ports, air bases and industrial hubs.

France is Rome’s natural partner in the long-range sector. On 14 July 2026, Paris and Kyiv announced Ukraine’s intention to order four SAMP/T NG, with modules to be made available progressively from 2027, and the Franco-Italian authorisation for the licensed production of the Aster 30 in Ukraine. On 11 March 2025, OCCAR had already signed an agreement, on behalf of France, Italia and the United Kingdom, to accelerate Aster production: a supply chain linking land and naval defence. London is adding the CAMM family to this. The £118 million contract, announced on 22 August 2025, involves the purchase of six Land Ceptor launchers and doubles the deployable Sky Sabre component. Berlin is building a layered defence system: on 3 July 2024, the Bundestag authorised the procurement of four Patriot systems and missiles worth almost 1.4 billion euros, with deliveries to take place in stages by 2030. These are complementary programmes; they become inefficient if radar, command, maintenance and stockpiles remain national silos incapable of cooperating under attack.