From Bernard Lévy to Boulos, Haftar’s pro-foreign manoeuvres are the same

Amidst this complex situation, I found myself in Tripoli, where I was working as a journalist for an international daily newspaper and, at the same time, as a correspondent for an Arab television channel. I was living in the same building as a commander of one of the militias tasked with ensuring the security of Belhaj’s headquarters within the Mitiga base.

During one of our conversations, regarding me as someone close to his circle because of my work at the Arab broadcaster accused of siding with the Islamists, he revealed to me the existence of a secret meeting for which he had personally organised the security arrangements. Ali Zeidan, Khaled al-Sharif, Khalifa Haftar and Bernard Lévy had attended, in the presence of Abdelhakim Belhaj.

According to the source, whom I considered reliable, Lévy had proposed a compromise formula for the distribution of posts during the meeting: the return of Ali Zeidan as head of the government, the appointment of Haftar as Minister of Defence, the appointment of Khaled al-Sharif as Deputy Minister of Defence, and the appointment of Belhaj as Minister of the Interior. The source said that those present had accepted the proposal, but the leak of information about the meeting had scuppered the idea, provoking widespread opposition amongst the public and in political circles and ruling out any possibility of implementing it.

I therefore published an article about the incident in the newspaper, signing it with a pseudonym. But the matter did not remain a secret for long: Belhaj contacted the editorial team to protest against what had been published, asked for my telephone number and rang me, reprimanding me with words that contained a veiled threat and asking me to come to his office in Tripoli in person. Naturally, his objection did not concern the truth of the incident, because he knew better than anyone else that it was true. What annoyed him was the disclosure of the published details, the identity of the person who had leaked them, and what they might reveal about contacts and agreements incompatible with the image of hostility publicly displayed by the key players on the Libyan scene.

I agreed to turn up three days later, but I had already decided to leave Libya immediately, at dawn the following day, without even telling my colleagues, except for one. I did indeed leave in such a way as to conceal my destination, abandoning my work in Libya and leaving the newspaper, because I was not prepared to put my life or that of my source, Tawfiq Touba – who died about five years ago and whose name I am revealing today for the first time – at risk.

There appears to be a considerable time gap between the proposal put forward by Bernard Lévy in 2014 and the American initiative within which Massad Boulos is operating in 2026. But the intention has not changed, just as the name of Haftar has not changed; his son Saddam has now joined him, through a different approach that envisages the creation of a small state in the territories under their control, in eastern Libya.

To pave the way, Saddam launched a project called ‘Barqawi’, presenting it to the Libyan people as a way of positioning the country amongst the region’s influential players and transforming it into an economic hub of the eastern Mediterranean, with the resulting benefits for the population, whilst breaking free from the centralism of Tripoli, its political failure and its militias.

To this end, it has taken concrete measures, establishing media channels and organising meetings to which numerous Arab and Libyan journalists and media professionals were invited, in order to draw attention to the failure of western Libya and to present eastern Libya as an independent and developed entity. It intended to announce the division of the country in mid-September 2025, during what was termed the first Media Congress, organised specifically in Benghazi from 15 to 17 September.

At the same time, he has taken concrete political steps through public and secret visits abroad, including to Israel, to promote his own project and present himself as a useful tool for the interests of others in part of Libya. Some major powers opposed this, leading to the initiative being halted. The affair nevertheless raises questions about the nature of the role played by the Haftar family and about the link between these agreements and the calculations of international powers in Libya and the region. He appeared to be someone willing to sell off his country’s territory to anyone who would install him as president, even if only over part of it.

During the period from Lévy to Boulos, Haftar took control of the east of the country under the pretext of establishing a Libyan national army and combating terrorism, in the context of a war which I believe was orchestrated at an international level and for which pretexts and justifications were specifically fabricated, so as to facilitate his rise to power and transform him into a leading figure.

The danger inherent in the functional role I am discussing today lies in the fact that, whilst it has not succeeded in conquering the whole of Libya by force, it is now seeking a more subtle approach, through the Boulos initiative, to confer legitimacy on its armed forces by means of an alliance with the internationally recognised Government of National Unity, and to enable them to enter Tripoli. Should this approach fail, the possession of an armed force and territorial influence in the east would still enable him to divide Libya and serve certain international interests and strategic calculations.

The true objectives that certain international powers are seeking to achieve through the governance structures in Libya – with the associated consequences for the future of the Libyan state and the regional balance of power – certainly do not prioritise oil or the reduction of conflict, as is claimed. Instead, they relate directly to the fragmentation of the region and the dismantling of its national armies, in Egypt, Algeria and Tunisia, as well as in Sudan and the African countries neighbouring Libya.

This is another issue that will be worth exploring in future articles, in order to explain in detail and with supporting information the role of Haftar and his sons in transforming Libya into a state that serves the interests of others.

Reda Shaaban, a writer specialising in Libyan affairs