Cronos, Aphrodite and Leviathan. The gas fields that supply the EU and bolster Cairo’s position

A key part of the supply chain is located in Egypt and relates to liquefaction capacity. The country has two large plants, one in Damietta and one in Idku (between Alexandria and Rosetta). The former has a capacity of around 5 million tonnes per annum, whilst the latter adds a further 7.2 million tonnes via two liquefaction trains. On paper, the Egyptian system can therefore process around 12.2 million tonnes of liquefied natural gas per year. Nevertheless, the plants’ capacity and the actual quantity of gas available are not one and the same. In recent years, Egypt has had to contend with high domestic demand and insufficient domestic production to meet it. In 2025, Egypt’s LNG imports reached around 1.2 billion cubic feet per day, compared with around 300 million in 2024. In June 2026, the country also had four floating storage and regasification units, with a total capacity of around 2.7 billion cubic feet per day. And here lies the first paradox: Cairo possesses the facilities to export LNG, yet at certain times it must import LNG to supply its own market. For this reason, the mere arrival of new gas from Cyprus – or from Israel – does not mean that all of that gas will be available for export. Some of it may have to be absorbed by Egyptian demand.

The supply chain would rest on a delicate balance. The more production from the eastern Mediterranean fields increases, the greater the likelihood that Damietta and Idku will be used on a permanent basis for exports. Conversely, if domestic demand in Egypt were to continue growing faster than supply, the liquefaction plants would risk remaining underutilised. This is why Cronos must be viewed within a broader context. The Cypriot field is the first in a series of new offshore production projects that could supply the Egyptian system. Off the coast of Cyprus lies Aphrodite, another field containing an estimated 5.6 trillion cubic feet of gas in place. The development plan envisages a floating platform with a maximum capacity of around 800 million cubic feet per day and four initial wells. Even more significant is the situation regarding Leviathan, in Israel. The field’s partners have secured authorisation for approximately 130 billion cubic metres of additional exports to Egypt and, in January 2026, approved a $2.36 billion investment to expand production. The stated aim is to bring annual capacity to 21 billion cubic metres from 2029. Cronos, Aphrodite and Leviathan can therefore be seen as pieces of the same jigsaw. None of the three projects, taken individually, would be sufficient to build a major regional hub. Together, however, they can supply Egyptian plants with sufficient quantities to ensure more regular liquefaction operations. This is the necessary condition for Damietta and Idku to transition from intermittently used infrastructure to a stable platform for the international LNG trade.

This is where Greece comes into the picture. Its role within the system differs from that of Egypt. The Alexandroupoli terminal in Thrace, which commenced commercial operations in October 2024, has a sustainable regasification capacity of approximately 5.5 billion cubic metres per year. Further north, the Greece-Bulgaria Interconnector currently has a capacity of around 3 billion cubic metres per year, with the potential to reach 5 billion. From here, the gas can continue on to Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova and Ukraine via the Vertical Corridor. Athens’ role is therefore to provide a southern gateway to the South-Eastern European gas system. This does not, of course, mean that every shipment produced at Damietta must necessarily reach Alexandroupoli. LNG is sold on the market and can be routed to various terminals. However, the presence of Greek and Balkan infrastructure increases the number of possible destinations and makes the regional distribution system more comprehensive.

Il Cane a sei zampe holds a 50 per cent stake in Cronos, is the field operator, holds a 50 per cent stake in SEGAS, the company that manages Damietta, and will market approximately 1.4 million tonnes per annum of LNG attributable to its share of production. It is therefore present both at the source of the supply chain – the Cypriot offshore field – and at its most critical industrial stage: liquefaction in Egypt. This does not, however, mean that Italia can unilaterally decide where the gas will end up. The field falls under Cypriot sovereignty, the Egyptian facilities fall under Egyptian sovereignty, and the LNG marketed by Eni and TotalEnergies will form part of their respective sales portfolios. For TotalEnergies, the logic is similar, albeit with a different degree of integration on the Egyptian side. As Torlizzi points out, ‘the entire system will come into operation from 2028 onwards, i.e. after the energy crisis Europe is currently facing, and not during it. Europe will have to face the winter of 2026/2027 with the storage levels it currently has.’ Not to mention that the first gas deliveries in 2028 could instead coincide with Qatar returning to full capacity and with a surge in new US liquefaction capacity – in other words, with a potentially oversupplied market and prices well below current levels. The issue is a delicate one: without giving the slightest consideration to Turkish interference in the region and the long-standing problem of Northern Cyprus, Nicosia controls the territory and the offshore concessions; Eni and TotalEnergies control Cronos from an industrial perspective; Egypt controls the processing and liquefaction plants; the companies market the LNG; ships transport it and European terminals regasify it. From that point, the gas enters the continental networks and can be transferred to other countries. The outcome will only be decided after 2028, and that part of the world is merely one square on a wider chessboard where the players contest games whose outcomes are often unpredictable.