The comment

Cyber and AI calculate the time it takes for a situation to escalate. But it is up to the states to decide

Drones in Ukraine and the Middle East, and the use of artificial intelligence in theatres of war, have reduced the time required for tactical decision-making to a matter of moments. We must be equally adept at creating the time needed to understand. Because the next leap in deterrence may not be a more powerful weapon or a faster algorithm, but the ability to prevent speed from turning uncertainty into a military response.

Drone militare in quota (Imagoeconomica)

5' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

5' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

Two Eurofighters from Italy took off on a scramble mission and shot down a drone in Lithuanian airspace. In the hours that followed, it was still unclear where it had come from or why it was there. It is one of the most striking images of the war – or perhaps not a war – that is changing: we may be forced to act before we fully understand what we are reacting to. The problem has a name that is well known in cybersecurity: time. But there is a paradox. For years, we have been working to reduce the time needed to detect an attack and respond. In geopolitics, however, there is a timeframe that we should not compress too much: the time between the perception of a threat and the decision to raise the level of confrontation. We could call it Mean Time to Escalatethe average time to escalation.

At a political level, this timeframe is still lengthy: formal authorisations, consultations between allies, sanctions and military decisions take days, weeks, sometimes months. At a tactical level, however, the window narrows down to minutes and seconds. Sensors, drones, autonomous systems and AI observe, correlate and suggest responses at a speed incompatible with the traditional pace of politics. It is within this window that the newest risk lies: not so much the geographical spread of conflicts, but the fact that tactical time can drag political time into its own rhythm.

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The Russian-Ukrainian front is already showing signs of this friction. Sub-threshold pressure – measured actions designed to produce effects without openly crossing the threshold of a military response – can force the adversary to react. A relatively inexpensive drone can trigger radar alerts, prompt fighter jets to take off and activate chains of command. Testing defences is nothing new: it was also done during the Cold War. What has changed is the cost and the scale. Today, this can be achieved using unmanned, expendable and reusable systems, whilst AI correlates what the response reveals with satellite imagery, communications and open-source intelligence. Today, it is perhaps even less politically risky. A drone may accidentally stray off course. In the past, spy planes were capable of moving the hands of the Doomsday Clock ever closer to zero.

The cyber issue

Cyber takes this asymmetry even further, as it allows the ground to be prepared before a confrontation takes place, whilst at the same time being incredibly difficult to detect and attribute. On 13 July, the European Union adopted the largest package of cyber sanctions ever imposed against the Russian ecosystem. The point is not merely the sanctions themselves. It is the difference in speed: a digital operation can be prepared and carried out in a matter of hours; formally attributing it, building political consensus and responding takes much longer. This gap between operational time and institutional time is in itself a strategic vulnerability. The Middle East highlights another aspect of the problem: the fragility of the nodes.

The Strait of Hormuz is the most obvious example. Before the conflict, an average of around 125 large ships passed through it each day; on 15 September Reuters counted just four. There is no need to capture a node to produce a global effect. It is enough to alter the risk for the entire network to begin reconfiguring itself. This applies to a maritime strait, but also to a submarine cable, a cloud region, a satellite constellation or an energy network. The new geopolitics is also the geopolitics of dependencies. And this is where the two theatres begin to resemble one another: not because there is necessarily a single central authority, but because infrastructure, technologies and decision-making timescales are becoming increasingly interdependent. Energy shapes industrial capacity; the cloud underpins civil and military services; satellites support navigation and targeting; drones consume interceptors. The distinction between the civil, technological and military spheres is becoming increasingly blurred.

The issue of artificial intelligence

Complicating the picture is Artificial Intelligence, which is already in use at the operational, analytical and decision-making levels, although so far no one has officially entrusted it with the role of ultimate and autonomous decision-maker. It promises speed, detachment and impartiality. But will a machine ever be able to decide on its own to go to war? The primary effect of AI is to reduce the time between observation and action. In September, Google Threat Intelligence documented a telling case: after compromising a cloud resource, a group built an automated campaign in under six hours capable of stealing thousands of login credentials. Activities that used to require a great deal of human labour are now prepared and launched in a fraction of the time. But speed does not replace industrial scale: it multiplies it.

Ukraine is reminded of this every day: ammunition, interceptors, production and logistics remain crucial. It is no coincidence that European forces are moving towards larger arsenals and less expensive systems that can be produced on a large scale, because ammunition is being used up faster than it can be replenished. A thousand drones incapable of adapting become predictable; even the best algorithm, without production capacity, remains a prototype. The winner is whoever can quickly transform what they learn into something that can be produced and deployed at scale. It is here that speed, whilst an advantage, can become a risk. According to a CNN investigation, an analyst from the US Special Operations Command is reported to have used a chatbot to assess the cargo of a Chinese ship in the Middle East.

The system is said to have mistaken that cargo for material intended for a nuclear programme, and US forces are said to have begun preparing to intercept and board the vessel, with air support, before the error was discovered and the operation called off. The point is not that AI decides in place of humans, but that humans decide on the basis of a reality poorly constructed by AI. A decision can be entirely human and yet still wrong, if the information is false or cannot be verified within the time available. Thus, the human-in-the-loop – the human formally involved in the process – risks offering a guarantee that is more in form than in substance.

Time for analysis

In the cyber domain, the aim is to detect an attack and respond as quickly as possible. Between states, however, it is essential to allow time for analysis: to distinguish an attack from an error, a provocation from an incident, and a genuine correlation from one falsely generated by an algorithm. That time does not arise of its own accord; it must be planned: independent sources and sensors, checks before irreversible decisions are taken, open channels of communication even in the midst of a crisis and, above all, the discipline not to automate the step that transforms a tactical response into political escalation. Industrial warfare will not disappear. Superimposed upon it is an adaptive form of warfare, in which cyber warfare, AI, electronic warfare and autonomous systems are increasingly shortening the gap between information, decision-making and effect. Those who design doctrines, decision-support systems and rules of engagement must treat time not as a performance metric to be optimised, but as a security variable to be managed.

We are building systems capable of seeing and reacting ever more quickly. We will need to be equally adept at creating the time needed to understand. Because the next leap in deterrence may not be a more powerful weapon or a faster algorithm, but the ability to prevent speed from turning uncertainty into escalation.

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