Drones, water and deterrence: the war in Iran is changing our society and industry
Apart from the military forces deployed against Tehran and the destruction of its defences, there are no verified figures on the nuclear stockpiles and facilities that have remained intact. The focus has shifted to water and electricity infrastructure, ushering in a phase – similar to that in Ukraine – of conflict with no clear objectives or timeframe. This phase will fundamentally alter European thinking in the coming years, in terms of value chains and production networks.
Key points
The war against Iran has shown just how fine the line has become between tactical victory and strategic success. Thousands of targets can be struck, fleets neutralised and facilities destroyed without eliminating the adversary’s residual potential, restoring freedom of navigation or establishing a sustainable political order. For Italia, France and Germany, geographical distance from the Gulf does not equate to strategic distance: energy, shipping, fertilisers, insurance, the defence industry and Mediterranean security now all form part of the same theatre. All the more so as the scope of security is also changing: cheap drones pitted against expensive interceptors, civilian infrastructure transformed into instruments of coercion, cyber-attacks coordinated with kinetic operations, and industrial supply chains required to produce faster than the contenders can consume. The US assessment paints a picture of unquestionable operational superiority, but this does not amount to the end of the war. According to the White House, during Operation Epic Fury, US forces carried out over 10,200 sorties, struck more than 13,000 targets, and intercepted over 1,000 drones and more than 700 ballistic missiles. The targets included over 2,000 command and control centres, 1,450 military industrial facilities, 1,500 air defence systems, around 800 drone-related sites, more than 600 naval targets and over 450 missile systems or depots. The United States Central Command subsequently assessed that over 85 per cent of Iran’s industrial base linked to ballistic missiles, drones and naval capabilities, and credited the operations with neutralising 82 per cent of air defence systems and 161 naval vessels belonging to 16 distinct classes. These are US operational estimates, not independent verifications. They do not measure how quickly the sites can be rebuilt or what proportion of the missile and nuclear arsenal has survived.
Tehran’s nuclear capabilities
The most serious information gap concerns, in fact, the nuclear programme. In report GOV/2026/33, dated 4 June 2026, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency noted the declared existence of 22 nuclear facilities and one site outside the complex, but reported that, in early June, the inspectors had only been able to gain access to the Bushehr power station. The Agency was therefore unable to verify the other facilities, the inventory of centrifuges, the suspension of enrichment activities or the location of stockpiles. The latest estimated stock level prior to the suspension of inspections, as at 13 June 2025, stood at 9,874.9 kilograms of enriched uranium, including 440.9 kilograms enriched to 60 per cent in uranium-235, 184.1 kilograms enriched to 20 per cent and 6,024.4 kilograms enriched to 5 per cent.
The document also notes that on 2 July 2025, the Iranian President signed a law suspending cooperation with the Agency; the inspection agreement signed in Cairo on 9 September 2025 by the Director General and the Iranian Foreign Minister, Abbas Araghchi, was subsequently declared invalid by Tehran on 20 November 2025. All this uncertainty forces adversaries to plan on the basis of the most dangerous scenario and makes further pre-emptive operations more likely, without guaranteeing that they will yield better results or intelligence.
The second paradigm shift, which has been extensively tested in Ukraine, concerns the relationship between offensive and defensive costs. An official analysis by the US Department of Defence notes that the Shahed-136s accounted for 66 per cent of Iranian responses between 28 February and 9 March 2026, whilst not compromising US combat capability — Small Drones, Big Problems: A First-Principles Approach to Counter-UAS – US Department of Defence – 8 July 2026 — . However, the effectiveness of saturation is not measured solely in terms of targets destroyed. The war against Iran has produced an impressive military outcome without providing the victors with a strategic conclusion based on reliable data. Demolished installations, reduced fleets and compromised chains of command coexist with three decisive unknowns: the remaining size of Iran’s arsenal, the impossibility of verifying the fate of nuclear material, and Tehran’s ability to shift the pressure from military bases to civilian infrastructure. Relatively inexpensive drones, missiles, cyber-sabotage and maritime interdiction can transform Western air and naval superiority into a test of industrial resilience.
The absence of decisive effects on the armed forces does not, in fact, mean that the effects of drones are strategically irrelevant. When targeting airports, terminals, substations, pumping stations and water treatment plants, the attacker does not need to gain air superiority: they must force the defender to protect too many points simultaneously, distinguish between real and false targets, and use up interceptors, flight hours, radar and maintenance resources.
