Analysis / Pulse

From Rome to Budapest via Paris: vote Gen Z

A comparative analysis of youth voting in ten European countries shows that the idea of a 'conservative Gen Z' is largely a myth

by Lorenzo Pace

5' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

5' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

The youth vote in Italia is not tilted to the right. On the contrary, on recent occasions it has gone against the tide compared to national results, in which the parties now in government have won by a fair margin. Analysing the last two national elections - the European elections of 2024 and the political elections of 2022 - reveals a preference, especially among the Z generation, for centre-left parties. Let's start with 2022, when the centre-right led by Giorgia Meloni emerged as the most voted coalition (44% of preferences).

Yet, according to estimates by Quorum/YouTrend, the party with the most votes in the 18-34 age group was the 5 Star Movement (21.2%), followed by Fratelli d'Italia (17.3%) and the Democratic Party (16.8%). Similar numbers emerged from the Ipsos polling institute. The 5 Star Movement would be the most voted party in the 18-34 age group with 20.9% of the vote, followed by the Democratic Party (18.7%) and Fratelli d'Italia (15.8%).

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Little change, however, as two out of three parties on the podium are now in the so-called 'wide field'. During the last political elections, therefore, it emerged that young people seem to have been more inclined to vote for parties with centre-left or progressive positions. Lega and Forza Italia, in the centre-right, are among those least voted for by the youngest segments of the population. This trend is even more pronounced during the European elections in 2024. According to Ipsos, among Gen Z voters (i.e. between 18 and 27 years of age), the PD was the most voted party (23%), followed by FdI (17%) and the Green and Left Alliance (13%), which exceeded the M5S by one percentage point.

In contrast, the centre-right, again the overall winner, regained ground especially among voters in the older age group (the GenX, i.e. between 44 and 59), where Fratelli d'Italia obtained 33% and the League 12%.

The 2025 regional elections, seven in all, do not help to enrich this analysis. In those cases, in fact, it is more complicated to draw a picture, since preferences were influenced by leadership and territorial issues more than by simple ideological affiliation.

France: young people attracted to extremes, but not more than adults

In France, the youth vote is often cited as evidence of a turn to the right, but the data tell a more nuanced story. In the 2022 presidential elections, according to Ipsos exit polls, Marine Le Pen's Rassemblement National gathered 26% of the vote among 18-24 year-olds and 25% among 25-34 year-olds, a share only slightly higher than the national average (23.6%) and lower than that recorded in the 35-59 age group. In the second round, Le Pen was strongest among 25-34 year-olds (49%) and especially among 50-59 year-olds (51%), while among the youngest prevailed Emmanuel Macron.

At the same time, the most relevant fact is the success of the radical left: Jean-Luc Mélenchon was the candidate most voted for by young people in the first round, with 31% among 18-24 year olds and 34% among 25-34 year olds. The growth of the far right among young people is thus real in the long run, but does not make them the main engine of its rise. Also weighing on this is the high abstention rate among young people, especially in the legislative elections, which reduces the electoral impact of under-30 preferences.

Ireland: protest and progressive vote coexist

In Ireland, the last presidential election showed a peculiar phenomenon: a record number of void ballots (almost 13%), driven by a social campaign that mobilised mainly young men. An exit poll found that 68% of those who cancelled their vote would have chosen a conservative candidate who was excluded from the competition.

However, looking at overall voting intentions, the picture changes dramatically. In the pre-election polls, 83% of voters aged 18-34 supported the candidate of the left-wing coalition Catherine Connolly. Party voting also confirms the progressive prevalence: Sinn Féin and Social Democrats are clearly first among young people, while the more conservative formations remain marginal. Rather than a turn to the right, a gender divide and a strong protest component emerge.

Croatia: young people divided, but with a strong right-wing weight

In Croatia, the youth vote appears more balanced and less clearly progressive. According to an Ipsos poll following the parliamentary elections in April 2024, the most voted party among 18-29 year olds was Možemo!, a green-left formation, with 21.7 per cent. However, if one adds up the support for the main centre-right and right-wing parties (HDZ, DP and MOST), the majority of youth votes are on the conservative side.

The gender factor is decisive: the right-wing parties have a predominantly male base, while Možemo! and the Social Democrats are mainly supported by voters. Here too, rather than a 'conservative generation', an internal polarisation emerges.

Greece: distrust in democracy, but no conservative turn

In Greece, young people express a deep dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy, but without translating it into a massively right-wing vote. A national survey by the Eteron institute shows that 17-34 year olds judge the democratic quality of the country to be very low, but call for more participation, more listening and a renewal of the political system.

In the 2023 elections, the conservative New Democracy party obtained lower percentages among young people than the national average (28-29%), while the left-wing and anti-establishment forces - Syriza, Pasok, KKE, Mera25 - were overrepresented. In 2024, New Democracy lost further ground among the under-35s, overtaken by Syriza. The Greek youth vote thus appears critical and fragmented, but not structurally oriented to the right.

Bulgaria: the young vote as a protest vote

The Bulgarian case represents one of the clearest exceptions. In the parliamentary elections of October 2024, more than half of the voters aged between 18 and 29 voted for populist or newly formed nationalist parties. The leading party among young people was Mech (Sword), followed by other anti-system and nationalist forces.

According to analysts, this is less an ideological conversion to conservatism and more a protest vote against the traditional parties, in a country marked by chronic political instability and low participation. Young people remain the least mobilised electorate and most inclined to experiment with new political offers.

Czech Republic: young people more liberal than average

In the Czech Republic, the younger generation continues to be more liberal, pro-European and cosmopolitan than the older generation. In the last parliamentary elections, liberal parties and the liberal left performed above average among 18-29 year olds, while the extreme right remains under-represented.

The only exception is a new radical right-wing party, supported almost exclusively by young men. Here again, the central fact is not an overall conservative turn, but an increasing gender polarisation.

Austria: conservative values, vote not automatically to the right

In Austria, young people show a combination of apparently contradictory values: concern for the environment and openness to migration, but also a strong demand for security and stability. In the 2024 elections, the Neos Liberals performed above average among young people, while the ÖVP remains strong especially among older voters.

The Freedom Party (FPÖ) is particularly strong among men under the age of 44, but without a clear over-representation of youth compared to other age groups. Scholars speak of a 'synthesis of values' rather than a clear ideological shift.

Hungary: anti-government youth, not necessarily progressive

In Hungary, the central fact is the erosion of youth consensus for Fidesz, in power for over fifteen years. Polls show that the under-40s are the main reservoir of consensus for the new Tisza party, born as a cross-party alternative to the Orbán government.

Self-identification as liberal or pro-European is growing among young people, especially among women and those with a higher level of education. More than a shift to the left or right, a demand for change and alternation emerges in a political system perceived as blocked.

*This article is part of the European collaborative journalism project "Pulse" and was contributed by Silvia Martelli (Il Sole 24 Ore), Alicia Alamillos (El Confidencial, Spain), Conor O'Carroll (The Journal Investigates, Ireland), Marina Kelava (H-Alter.org, Croatia), Adrian Burtin (Voxeurop, France), Lena Kyriakidi (EfSyn - Efimerida ton Syntakton, Greece), Krasen Nikolov (Mediapool, Bulgaria), Petr Jedlička (Deník Referendum, Czech Republic), Kim Son Hoang (Der Standard / ORF, Austria) and Boróka Parászka (HVG, Hungary).

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