From the Digital Services Act to the visa ban: how the Breton case came about

In parallel, Breton's own public communication is also criticised by pro-digital rights actors: Eff, Access Now and ARTICLE 19 ask him to avoid an enforcement perceived as politicised and to clarify the interpretation of 'systemic risks', precisely so as not to hand over the argument that the DSA is used as political leverage to his opponents.

The quantum leap occurred on 28 May 2025, when US Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced a new 'visa restriction policy' aimed at 'foreign nationals' deemed responsible for restricting/censoring protected freedom of expression in the US.

The rationale is: if a foreign authority or its supporters push American platforms to remove or restrict content that would be protected in America, Washington can respond by preventing it from entering the country. Deterrence is not only aimed at governments, but also at "ecosystems" that - in US reading - influence the moderation, advertising and reputation of platforms.

In the summer of 2025, the US posture becomes operational: Reuters reveals an internal dispatch dated 4 August and signed by Rubio thatinvites US diplomats in Europe to engage governments and relevant authorities to promote opposition to the DSA, collect examples of alleged censorship affecting US Americans or companies, and push substantial changes to the law. Once the diplomatic machine is set up, therefore, the visa measure becomes the final part of the strategy.

The debate soon entered political and research circles. A letter from scholars (circulated in the run-up to hearings and political clashes in the United States) contests 'maximalist' readings of the DSA as a instrument of global censorship and insists on the idea that the law, rather, introduces procedures and obligations that strengthen users' rights and the transparency of platforms.

On 4-5 December 2025 the European Commission fines X EUR 120 million for violations of transparency obligations under Dsa, naming among the problems the design of the 'blue tick', the advertising archive, and access to data for researchers. It is the first major Dsa sanction of its kind and has a highly symbolic value because it hits the platform of Elon Musk, a central figure in the American debate on free speech and a political ally (now somewhat less so) of Trump.

Within days of the State Department's announcement comes domestic pressure: Senator Eric Schmitt writes to Sarah B. Rogers openly calling for "sanctions and visa restrictions" against foreign individuals and entities linked to an alleged "international censorship regime", explicitly citing the multa a X and the European framework.

When the State Department announces 'actions to counter the global complex of industrial censorship', the framework is complete. There is the policy (May), there is the diplomatic campaign (August), there is the symbolic event (fine to X) and there is a domestic political push (Schmitt). The novelty of December is personalisation, with the measure being taken not against an institution or a government, but against individuals.

Breton, although no longer a commissioner, is the perfect target because he embodies the most media-driven phase of the confrontation with X and, for Washington, the very essence of the regulatory system. The other four names serve to target what the administration describes as the 'civic-operational' arm of the pressure, organisations that - in the American reading - influence moderation and the advertising market.

A years-long dispute thus ends not on a technical table, but in a gate at the airport. Five names become a passport stamp, and the word 'rules' slips into 'retaliation'. In the background the same questions remain - who decides what stays online, who pays when it goes wrong, who dictates global standards - but now they have a different noise: the dry one of a door closing between allies.