Gender-based violence: compensation should be paid for the shame of displaying socially recognisable bruises
In addition to physical injury, the compensation should also take into account the distress and embarrassment felt by the woman at having to show the marks of the violence on her body
The woman who is the victim of gender-based violence is entitled to compensation not only for physical injury, but also for the feelings of shame and frustration she experiences when appearing in public bearing the marks of the beatings. Thus, in a groundbreaking ruling, the Court of Cassation has recognised social embarrassment caused by bruises as part of non-physical harm. The Supreme Court upheld the appeal of a wife who had been beaten by her ex-husband and ended up in A&E with a black eye. The trial judges had found that there was physical injury – albeit limited, given that the injury was not serious – but no evidence of non-pecuniary damage.
The embarrassment caused by socially recognisable signs
In the view of the Court of Cassation, however, non-pecuniary damage may be presumed. The fear and anxiety of encountering her ex-husband, who lived near her home, was compounded by the fact that she was forced to go out without being able to conceal the bruises on her face, a clear sign of physical assault: non-pecuniary damage that cannot be subsumed under minor physical injury. This aspect was completely overlooked by the Court of Appeal. Neither the Magistrates’ Court nor the Regional Court, in fact, gave due weight to the decisive consideration not only of physical pain but also of ‘the profound emotional distress of the psychological humiliation – as stated in the judgement – objectively suffered as a result of the violent abuse endured, in addition to the objective moral impairment inflicted upon the victim’s emotional equilibrium, linked to the frustration and shame caused by the socially recognisable marks left on their body by the violence of others’.
A principle that the Court of Cassation sets out in black and white, emphasising its greater significance ‘in cases where the offence can be classified, in even more serious and intolerable terms, as a recognisable instance of gender-based violence’.

