Iron Gate: Washington tightens its grip on Iran
The new US task force aims to crack down on the land-based trafficking of arms, technology and goods subject to sanctions. However, Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan have energy and trade interests that are difficult to sacrifice. For Europe, the risk is a rise in costs across industrial and agricultural supply chains
Key points
Washington can make trade with Iran more expensive, complicate payments and discourage intermediaries. However, to achieve a lasting reduction in land-based trade flows, it must convince governments that they would have a great deal to lose from a crackdown on relations with Tehran. This is the main challenge facing the Iron Gate Task Force, the new body announced on 7 November 2026 by the US Central Command. Comprising around twenty military and civilian personnel and based in Tampa, it will be tasked with coordinating federal agencies in combating the movement of arms, dual-use technologies, sanctioned goods and proceeds deemed illicit across Iranian borders and the Caspian Sea.
The initiative extends the pressure exerted by Washington on maritime routes to the mainland, but faces a different obstacle: control of border crossings lies with national authorities. Whilst a bank can block a payment to avoid jeopardising access to the US financial system, stopping a lorry, restricting rail transit or closing a customs post requires a political decision by the country concerned. For Baghdad, Ankara and Islamabad, such a decision would have immediate consequences for energy supplies, exports and business activity.
Iraq, Turkey and Pakistan
Iraq is the most striking example of this contradiction. In 2024, it imported around 9 billion cubic metres of gas from Iran, a figure that fell to 6 billion in 2025. The World Bank attributes this decline to supply difficulties for electricity generation. Yet, in that same year, 2025, the country consumed around 24 billion cubic metres of gas: four times the volume purchased from Tehran.
The availability of domestic resources offers Baghdad the prospect of gradual self-sufficiency, but does not address immediate needs. Recovering gas associated with oil extraction requires collection and processing facilities, connections to the network and regular supplies to power stations. The initial processing unit at Ratawi, announced by TotalEnergies, has a design capacity of 50 million cubic feet per day, equivalent to approximately 520 million cubic metres per year at full capacity. Whilst this is a significant contribution, it is still insufficient to replace Iranian supplies.
The diversification of imports also faces a geographical constraint. The agreement to purchase up to 258 billion cubic feet per annum of Turkmen gas provides for transit through Iran. Baghdad may therefore seek new suppliers, but it remains dependent on the infrastructure and transit conditions that pass through its neighbour’s territory.
