‘The reconstruction in Syria presents an opportunity for the Gulf states and Turkey. I fear not so much for Lebanon’
We met Ronnie Chatah, a political analyst and university lecturer, in Beirut; he helps us understand the dynamics and economic implications that Syria’s reconstruction may have for Beirut and the Middle East. ‘The money that was coming in was mainly from the Gulf, and today it is being channelled towards Damascus. It is a form of punishment by the GCC nations against my country for having placed itself within Iran’s sphere of influence.’
‘Historically, Lebanon has been far more important to Syria than Syria has been to Lebanon. Syria has played a significant role in Lebanese politics: the Assad regime effectively ran the country. At one point, around 20 per cent of the Lebanese population were Syrians. Many of them have not returned, not only for security reasons, but also for financial ones,” explains Ronnie Chatah, a political analyst, university lecturer and host of the podcast The Beirut Banyan. Speaking to us in Beirut, he helps us understand the dynamics and economic implications that the reconstruction of Syria may have for Lebanon – and for the Middle East.
Is the Lebanese government now in a position to take the necessary steps to benefit from the reconstruction of Syria and derive economic advantage from it?
‘Last November, at the Beirut One investment conference – organised by the Lebanese Ministry of Economy and Trade in conjunction with the Economic and Social Council (CESE), and attended by over 150 investors, major international companies and the Governor of the Central Bank of Lebanon – a fundamental prerequisite emerged: the need for security to be sufficiently stable to allow for economic recovery. This was before the war that began in March 2026. I am speaking at a macroeconomic level: everyone identified security as the main issue. Today, the security situation in Lebanon has changed radically – for the better – and the same applies, in the long term, to Syria. It is therefore likely that a more favourable environment will emerge. However, Lebanon will never become an economic power or a regional hub. It will never achieve economic development on a very large scale. It will be impossible to persuade businesses not to invest in Dubai: it is the UAE that has taken on that role. I would say that Dubai is also a direct consequence of Lebanon’s loss of the role it once played in the region. Take, for example, the Lebanese company Anghami, a music streaming platform often described as the regional equivalent or competitor to Spotify: it has left Lebanon for the Emirates. But the most important factor for the stabilisation of Syria, and indeed Lebanon, is one whose influence is waning: primarily Iran. With the war having begun in March, it is clear that no one will invest in Lebanon – not even the Lebanese diaspora – until this issue is resolved. The end of the Assad regime in Syria and the political changes in Lebanon – in particular the significant curtailment of Hezbollah’s influence, including the killing of its former leader Hassan Nasrallah, which occurred within a few weeks of one another – have paved the way for positive stabilisation, albeit at an extremely slow pace.”
What is the main risk factor preventing Lebanese entrepreneurs living abroad from returning to invest in their own country?
‘Trust is the most important issue for the Lebanese diaspora, more so than any other factor. Trust has been destroyed: the perception that assets and investments are safe in Lebanon has been lost. It took decades to build that trust, and, following the 2019 financial crisis, I do not believe that those who managed to save at least part of their assets are now willing to bring them back to Lebanon. This isn’t just about billionaires: middle-income families think the same way too. It is not just a question of war; the Lebanese banking sector, too, is now in a near-zombie state. It is operating at the bare minimum of what it should be doing, especially when compared with the situation not so long ago. As for the billionaires, many are still in Lebanon. We have, for example, a former Nissan tycoon. But I do not believe a country can revive itself through this sort of person. Moreover, it was not just the 2019 crisis: there have been several successive waves of inflation, making it increasingly difficult to bring Lebanese investors back to the country. The confidence built up in the years following the civil war has now been eroded. The lira, the Lebanese currency, had stabilised and had even gained in value. There was confidence even during the Syrian occupation, despite the violence and clashes between Hezbollah and Israel in the south. There was a sense of reconstruction and regional peace; Lebanon took part in the Madrid Conference; it was believed that the Syrian occupation would not last forever; and there was a government that encouraged investment. All of that has now vanished.”


