‘The reconstruction in Syria presents an opportunity for the Gulf states and Turkey. I fear for Lebanon, however.’

Proteste pro Hezbollah

Recenti proteste contro il governo di Beirut e a favore di Hezbollah

What competitive advantage might Lebanese businesses have in Syria?

‘When it comes to post-war reconstruction, I am thinking of the companies that lived through the aftermath of the Lebanese civil war and have shown a genuine interest in Syria’s reconstruction. But it is not just about that. Lebanese media companies, too, now see opportunities that were previously impossible. The same applies to regional tourism, at all levels. The idea is to promote tourism that is not exclusively local. I do not believe that Lebanon is currently the main driving force behind Syria’s reconstruction. We must remember that, historically, relations with Syria have been long-standing and difficult. However, due to the state of perpetual war in Lebanon, it is currently difficult for companies to build up the capacity needed to invest in Syria. The region as a whole, on the other hand, sees an opportunity in Syria. Take the banking sector, for example. A few weeks ago, the Syrian president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, was in a restaurant in Damascus and paid with a Visa card. It may seem trivial, but it is a novelty in the country. I imagine that the Lebanese banking sector – or what remains of it – is investing in Syria in this area, but it is doing so mainly behind the scenes. Countries such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, are taking the lead. Lebanon is not a particularly significant player in Syria. The fact is that, for the Lebanese, Syria has never been regarded as an economic driver. If anything, the opposite was true: it was Syrian workers who came to Lebanon to work. And Lebanon was also a place where former members of the Syrian regime sought safety. For better or worse, it was the place to go to hide. For the Lebanese, the Gulf was a far more lucrative destination for economic opportunities. At a macroeconomic level, the money flowing into Lebanon was mainly from the Gulf; today, however, it is being channelled towards Syria instead. It was a form of punishment meted out by the GCC countries against Lebanon for aligning itself with Iran’s sphere of influence.”

If Lebanon were to invest in Syria in its own economic interest, how could it avoid entering into a relationship that would place it in a sort of vassalage?

‘This has far more to do with security than with economic investment. It means, for example, that the Syrian army does not have to pursue Hezbollah in Lebanon. Curiously, it was President Donald Trump who had floated this possibility, but the proposal did not find support in Syria. From a certain point of view, we are fortunate that Syria does not see its survival as tied to the decisions taken here. But even if all the conflicts were to end, if the Iranian regime were not to collapse but were to change its way of operating, and if the region were to manage to live without constant wars, I cannot imagine this area thriving any time soon. Too much damage has been done. Even the Syrians who once brought their money here – those who were able to do so – have left. Today in Lebanon, it is perhaps mainly dubious businesses and individuals subject to sanctions who have an interest in staying. And this is certainly not a factor that makes the country any more attractive. It is a form of crony capitalism. One of the fundamental differences between the Lebanese and Syrian markets was that Lebanon had an open market, whilst Syria had a closed economy: they were two systems that bore no resemblance to one another. Tourism once dominated the Lebanese economy; today, remittances are its lifeblood. What is happening now is that Turkey is pushing Lebanon to join forces with Syria in a joint venture, but this is not a process driven exclusively by Syria.”

What political reforms does Lebanon need to implement to kick-start its economic recovery?

‘The figure most committed to reform is the current Prime Minister, who wants the country to function in accordance with the institutional framework. The Ministers for the Economy and Finance cannot do much more than has already been done: guaranteeing support measures, offering some form of subsidy and enabling the Lebanese people to make ends meet. For reforms to really take off, a level of long-term security is needed that will allow the agreement with the International Monetary Fund to be carried forward. Seven years ago, we were already deprived of this opportunity. Today, most politicians are focused on funding the Lebanese army, but, in my view, no reforms can be implemented under the current conditions. Even in the 1990s, reforms failed to take hold because of the ongoing war. Lebanon can be compared to Somalia: it is close to being a failed state. There are aspirations within the government, but from a public policy perspective it is impossible to realise them. If there had been a way to do so, it would have been done already, because ordinary people want it. We are still a war zone. Half of Lebanon is in dire straits, with people who have lost everything and are trying to work out how to get by. This is not how you rebuild a country. It is a massive drain on resources for the economy and the government. And it leaves no room for serious reforms.’