Armed algorithms

The Mediterranean cyber space: a new geography of power is taking shape

Those who control chips, cables and software can influence the sovereignty of others without owning their infrastructure. In the wider Mediterranean region, including the Gulf states, the decisive factor is the freedom to use technology

by Pierguido Iezzi

16 October 2026

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Tareq Amin, amministratore delegato di Humain, società saudita di Intelligenza artificiale Imagoeconomica

4' min read

Translated by AI

Versione italiana

4' min read

Translated by AI

Versione italiana

As the digital race intensifies, it is becoming increasingly clear that owning infrastructure does not mean controlling it. In the Gulf, for example, part of technological sovereignty is negotiated in Washington, even before the new data centres become operational. In May 2025, the US and the United Arab Emirates announced in Abu Dhabi an AI campus with a projected electrical capacity of 5 gigawatts. A few months later, Washington authorised the Emirati company G42 and the Saudi company Humain, led by CEO Tareq Amin, to each purchase the equivalent of up to 35,000 Nvidia Blackwell GB300 chips, whilst imposing security and reporting requirements. Two states are funding their own technological ambitions; a third is setting the conditions for access to a technology that is crucial to realising them.

In this context, in the wider Mediterranean, dialogue between states calls for a common question: what benefits does each seek to derive from cyber capabilities, and what constraints limit their use?

Five power programmes

In the programmes of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar, as we have seen, technological transformation relies on investment and partnerships. Once the purchase has been made, the key issue becomes building local expertise: who will be able to manage the equipment and migrate a service? The speed with which a data centre is opened does not indicate how long it takes to switch providers. It is this second timeframe that should be assessed in digital sovereignty programmes.

France and Israel offer two examples of integration between expertise and employment. Paris has entrusted Comcyber with military operations in cyberspace, with a stated offensive doctrine. In Israel, the link between military experience and entrepreneurship is also fostered by the association of former members of Unit 8200, which founded and supports the 8200EISP accelerator.

Iran, on the other hand, exploits its adversaries’ digital exposure to exert pressure. It is an asymmetric lever: a civil vulnerability provides a point of political pressure without requiring superiority over the adversary’s entire system.

Turkey is committed to industrial autonomy. The 2024–2028 cyber strategy promotes the development and use of domestic technologies to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers. For this approach to deliver autonomy, it must be possible to correct and adapt systems without having to wait for third parties to intervene.

For Italia, Spain, Greece, Egypt and Morocco, the management of interconnections offers another perspective. The Medusa project involves landing points in all these countries; BlueMed, developed by Sparkle, strengthens Italy’s connections in the Mediterranean. For Italia, it is crucial to link investments in connectivity to verifiable commitments regarding continuity: the capacity to intervene, alternative routes and restoration times. Ownership of a cable does not resolve the question of who manages access or ensures maintenance. It is on these functions that the ability to exert influence – even during a crisis – is built.

The autonomy test

The true test comes when infrastructure is targeted. On 8 and 9 October 2026, drone attacks damaged Yandex’s data centres in Sasovo and Kaluga, Russia. The company announced the complete shutdown of the former and the partial unavailability of the latter’s infrastructure, without being able to provide a definite timeframe for restoration. National ownership of the technology, on its own, does not guarantee the continuity of services. On 12 October, in France, a cyberattack on the refrigeration systems of hundreds of supermarkets forces several outlets to dispose of spoiled food. CERT-FR reported numerous instances of the systems’ remote control devices being compromised. The perpetrators and motives behind the operation remain to be clarified.

These two incidents illustrate just how difficult it is to separate the security of infrastructure from that of the services that depend on it. In Russia, a physical attack disrupts digital operations; in France, a cyber-attack causes physical damage to the food supply chain. For those responsible for managing ports, energy networks and transport links in the Mediterranean, the challenge is a practical one: which activities can continue when the system that coordinates them fails? The answer depends on the contingency plans in place and the time required to activate them.

The concept of sovereignty

Purchasing from abroad can be a rational decision whilst at the same time strengthening security through alliances. The risk increases when there is a lack of expertise, rights to intervene or alternative solutions available in a timely manner. Even concentrating capabilities and services with a single national operator requires an assessment of the consequences should that operator become unavailable.

A dependency becomes critical when replacing a technology takes longer than the country can afford to be without it. In that gap, a commercial relationship can become a lever capable of influencing a national decision. And, at the same time, it can prove to be a vulnerability if it involves relying on a technology which, for geopolitical reasons, may suddenly become inaccessible.

A difficult balance to strike in the current climate of global instability, but one that states must learn to manage if they are not to lose control of their digital domain. We have entered the era of Armed Algorithms: power is no longer measured solely by what a technology can do, but by its ability to influence the freedom of choice of those who depend on it.

Pierguido Iezzi – Cyber Director, Zenita Group