Mokha and Bab el-Mandeb: the Yemeni crisis becomes a European issue
The Houthis’ offensive against Riyadh and their capture of cities in the south, along with their control of the entrance to the Red Sea, are opening up the prospect of a maritime crisis. This is forcing the EU to review its political approach and cooperation with Yemen
Key points
The latest military developments along Yemen’s western coast deserve to be viewed from a broader perspective than one strictly linked to the country’s internal conflict. Mokha is not merely a Yemeni port city. Nor is Bab el-Mandeb simply a strait situated at the southern end of the Red Sea. What is happening today in this area directly affects the security of the shipping routes linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean, the operation of the Suez Canal, Egypt’s economic interests, Europe’s energy security and, inevitably, Italia too. Following days of fighting in the provinces of Hodeida and Taiz, Houthi forces have extended their presence southwards, as far as Mokha, whilst government forces and their allies have redeployed part of their units to the area of Dhubab, even closer to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The very latest reports indicate that Houthi troops are on the outskirts of Dhubab itself. Setting aside military interpretations and the accounts provided by the parties involved, the strategically significant fact is clear: the centre of gravity of the Yemeni conflict is shifting towards one of the world’s most sensitive maritime corridors.
A geography that leaves no room for indifference
To understand what is happening, we must first look at a map. Bab el-Mandeb connects the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean with the Red Sea. From there, ships continue on to the Suez Canal and then on to the Mediterranean. It is an almost continuous route: Indian Ocean – Gulf of Aden – Bab el-Mandeb – Red Sea – Suez Canal – Mediterranean Sea. Any significant instability at one of these points has consequences along the entire chain. For this reason, Mokha takes on an importance that far exceeds its size. The city lies along the coast leading directly to Bab el-Mandeb and to the islands that geographically dominate the southern access to the Red Sea. The issue, therefore, is not merely a question of who controls a particular city or military position. The most important question is another: what security balance will emerge along the eastern coast of Bab el-Mandeb?
The risk of crises becoming concentrated
For many years, the international community has treated various regional issues separately: Yemen, Gulf security, Iran, the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa and the Suez Canal. This distinction is becoming increasingly unrealistic. Energy and trade routes link these issues together far more rapidly than diplomacy can. The current difficulties facing shipping in the Gulf region have further increased the strategic importance of the Red Sea route. In this context, any new uncertainty surrounding Bab el-Mandeb carries greater international weight than in the past. It is not necessary to envisage a complete closure of the strait to understand the consequences. In international maritime trade, in fact, the perception of risk can be almost as important as the risk itself. An increase in the perceived threat can result in higher insurance premiums, changes to shipping routes, higher transport costs, longer delivery times and, in extreme cases, shipowners deciding to sail round Africa via the Cape of Good Hope. These are thousands of additional kilometres that inevitably translate into economic costs.
The true southern border of Suez
There is also a factor that is sometimes underestimated in Europe. The security of the Suez Canal does not begin in Suez. It begins much further south. From the point of view of international shipping, Bab el-Mandeb can be considered the true southern gateway to the Red Sea and the Suez Canal system. If shipping companies do not consider it safe enough to pass through Bab el-Mandeb, the Suez Canal loses some of its commercial significance. This reality makes the stability of western Yemen a strategic issue for Egypt as well. Cairo is economically dependent on traffic through the Suez Canal and naturally regards the security of the Red Sea as an integral part of its own national security. The more instability increases in the southern stretch of the Red Sea, the more difficult it becomes to separate the Yemeni crisis from Egypt’s strategic interests.
For Italy, too, this issue is not far off. Italia occupies a unique position in the Mediterranean. Its ports, industries and logistics chains depend to a significant extent on the continuity of trade routes between Europe and Asia. A ship that bypasses Bab el-Mandeb and Suez does not merely alter a route on a map. It affects lead times, costs, insurance, the availability of goods and competitiveness. For a manufacturing and export-oriented economy such as Italy’s, maritime security in the Red Sea should therefore be considered part of national economic security. There is also a geopolitical dimension. Italy has historically maintained important relations with both shores of the Red Sea and with the Horn of Africa. Its geographical position and diplomatic tradition could enable it to contribute to a less crisis-driven and more strategic European vision of the region. Not merely protecting ships when a crisis arises, but helping to create the conditions to ensure that such crises do not become permanent.
