Political and commercial strategies

Only four EU partners have a direct interest in defending freedom of navigation in Bab el-Mandeb

Between the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, trade flows have already fallen by 44 per cent. Crosetto’s call to strengthen the Aspides mission is crucial, but only the ports of Italia, Greece, Slovenia and Croatia are directly affected by the instability, unlike those of other countries. Not to mention that protection should also extend to non-Italian-flagged vessels (which account for 5 per cent of goods in transit). This may make military intervention less strategically important for other nations

Alle spalle dei due motociclisti una pubblicità digitale raffigurante il leader degli  Houthi Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, lungo una strada di Sana'a nello Yemen EPA

4' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

4' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

Any lasting impairment of freedom of navigation in the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb would have particularly serious consequences for the Italian economy and, above all, for the national port system. Bab el-Mandeb forms the southern gateway to the Red Sea–Suez route and is therefore the only passage – short of circumnavigating Africa – for ships travelling from Asia to the Mediterranean.

For Italia, this geographical position represents a key competitive advantage: via Suez, Italian ports are among the first European ports of call accessible from the major shipping routes from Asia. Gioia Tauro, which in 2025 reached a record 4.49 million TEUs, bases a key part of its competitiveness on its location along the Suez–Gibraltar axis. The same applies, albeit with different characteristics, to Genoa, La Spezia and Trieste. Under normal conditions, approximately 40 per cent of the goods unloaded at Italian ports have passed through Suez.

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The crisis that began with the attacks by the Houthis has already profoundly altered global shipping routes. According to Lloyd’s List Intelligence’s Red Sea Transit Monitor, in August 2026, 273 container ships passed through Bab el-Mandeb, compared with 674 in August 2023: a reduction of 59.5 per cent. Taking Suez and Bab el-Mandeb together, traffic was still 44.1 per cent below August 2023 levels.

It is therefore understandable that the Minister of Defence Guido Crosetto has proposed strengthening the protection of Italian merchant ships as part of the European operation Aspides, established in 2024 and extended until 28 February 2027. The issue is determining to what extent other EU Member States are willing to step up their commitment. The economic impact of a persistent crisis affecting the Red Sea shipping route is, in fact, not evenly distributed.

Egypt is one of the countries most at risk. In 2023, the Suez Canal recorded 26,434 transits and revenue of $10.25 billion. In 2024, the number of ships fell to 13,213 and revenue to $3.99 billion. Saudi Arabia also has a direct interest in the security of the Strait: its western coast, with Jeddah and Yanbu, and the energy infrastructure on the Red Sea, requires secure access to the Indian Ocean.

Among EU countries, the situation is more complex. Greece finds itself in a position similar to that of Italy: the success of Piraeus as a hub for Asian trade in the Mediterranean and in Central and Eastern Europe is closely linked to the Suez route. It is no coincidence that Athens has taken on an important role in Operation Aspides. The situation in Croatia and Slovenia is similar, albeit on a smaller scale.

France’s position is less clear-cut: Marseille-Fos has a direct stake in the full operation of the Mediterranean route, whilst the port system of Le Havre looks towards the Atlantic. This duality becomes even more evident when considering Spain, Morocco and the major ports of Northern Europe.

A ship sailing from Asia round the Cape of Good Hope actually reaches Europe from the south-west and calls at Tanger Med and Spanish ports as the first major hubs for container transhipment. Significantly, Puertos del Estado has noted that the growth of Spanish ports in 2024 was partly driven precisely by the increase in traffic caused by the Red Sea crisis.

The difference becomes even more apparent for Rotterdam, Hamburg and Antwerp. If the route around the Cape were to become the standard route, these ports could strengthen their already dominant position as gateways for goods entering the markets of central and northern Europe. This does not mean that the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium have any interest in the continuation of threats to shipping, but it may certainly limit their willingness to participate in a greater military commitment.

This is the political crux of the matter that Italia must address in Europe. It is not so much a question of convincing its partners that freedom of navigation must be safeguarded – a principle on which there is already a consensus, as reflected in the Operation Aspides – as it is of securing more naval vessels and greater resources to ensure the effective protection of commercial shipping.

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Finally, there is a further problem. Crosetto has proposed escorting Italian-flagged merchant ships, but the proportion of goods unloaded at our ports that pass through Bab el-Mandeb and are carried on these ships is estimated to be around 1 per cent. Even if we take into account the ‘controlled fleet’ – that is, ships owned by Italian shipowners but registered abroad – the figure remains below 5 per cent.

To truly protect the traffic bound for our ports, we must therefore extend these measures to container ships flying other flags as well, involving other states – likely not just European ones.

Part of the future of Italia’s ports and of Italia’s position within the world’s major logistics chains hinges on freedom of navigation through Bab el-Mandeb. Whilst our Navy may be called upon to make an increasing commitment, Italian diplomacy may well be required to make an even greater effort: to demonstrate that the Red Sea crisis is not merely a problem for Italia and the countries of the eastern Mediterranean.

Stefano Zunarelli is a professor of Maritime and Transport Law at the University of Bologna

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