Tensions in the Strait of Hormuz have already cost Europe 50 billion, on fuel alone

The Strait of Hormuz has laid bare the central paradox of Iranian power: Tehran can influence the lifeline through which around a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas passes, but it cannot choke it off without damaging its own economy. The crisis of 2026 has therefore accelerated a transformation destined to outlast the war: railways to Russia and China, Caspian ports and links with Iraq are forming a network designed not to replace Hormuz – a physically impossible undertaking – but to prevent prolonged maritime and financial pressure from leading to Iran’s total isolation. For Europe, and above all for Italia, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, the stakes span energy, inflation, industry, ports, sanctions and the security of shipping routes.

In 2024, according to the US Energy Information Administration, approximately 20 million barrels per day of crude oil, condensates and petroleum products passed through the Strait of Hormuz: roughly 20 per cent of global consumption of petroleum liquids and over a quarter of global seaborne oil trade. Almost 20 per cent of the world’s LNG, mainly from Qatar, also passed through the same route. To date, there is no alternative infrastructure capable of handling comparable volumes. On 7 April 2026, the EIA estimated that Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Bahrain had already collectively cut production by 7.5 million barrels per day in March, as the slowdown in exports was filling storage facilities to capacity. For April, the agency forecast production cuts of 9.1 million barrels per day. When storage facilities fill up, the problem shifts from the sea to the wells: production must be cut, and the subsequent reopening of the strait does not immediately make up for the lost barrels. On 7 July 2026, following the 18 June memorandum between Washington and Tehran and the partial resumption of transit, the EIA still believed that trade flows would only return to near pre-conflict levels towards the end of the year, with the recovery of most of the lost production postponed until early 2027. Hormuz is therefore a multiplier: a maritime disruption leads to a storage crisis, a contraction in production, a reduction in international stocks and, ultimately, imported inflation.

Europe’s vulnerability is not determined by the volume of Iranian crude oil purchased directly. Prices are set on a global market: if China, India, Japan and South Korea lose shipments from the Gulf, they compete with European buyers for supplies from the Atlantic, Africa, the Mediterranean and the Americas. Every barrel diverted from Asia drives up the price of that destined for Rotterdam, Trieste, Marseille or Wilhelmshaven. In 2023, the EU’s energy dependence on imports still stood at 58 per cent, according to Eurostat. In 2025, the EU imported around 435 million tonnes of crude oil, worth over 212 billion euros. The Hormuz crisis is therefore affecting a continent that has diversified its suppliers following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but has not eliminated its dependence on international hydrocarbon prices. In its spring economic forecast published on 21 May 2026, the European Commission assessed a scenario of prolonged disruption in which oil reached around $180 per barrel in the fourth quarter of 2026 and European gas around €80 per megawatt-hour, compared with reference values of $84.7 and €42.2 respectively. These were not unconditional forecasts, but a measure of the potential shock should the resumption of supplies have remained slow. A Commission document dated 22 April 2026 had already quantified the additional cost incurred by the EU for fossil fuel imports since the start of the conflict at €24 billion. Since May, this figure has almost doubled, with a linear projection reaching 50 billion, according to figures provided by Brussels. 

For Italy, Hormuz is an industrial issue even before it is an oil issue. The country benefits from a favourable geographical position, refineries, ports, Mediterranean gas pipelines and regasification capacity; however, it remains exposed to international crude oil and LNG prices. In February 2026, Istat recorded an energy deficit of 3.466 billion euros, albeit lower than the 5 billion recorded in February 2025. In the same month, the surplus in non-energy products had fallen from 9.444 to 8.409 billion. This is the relationship to watch: rising energy prices can erode the trade advantage generated by manufacturing. Italia, however, possesses a strategic advantage that must be translated into European policy. Its port system, its links with North Africa, the Southern Gas Corridor and its LNG terminals could make it a platform for rebalancing towards Central Europe.

France approaches the Strait of Hormuz from a different perspective. In 2024, nuclear power accounted for 41 per cent of its primary energy mix, compared with 28 per cent for oil and 12 per cent for gas; primary production had risen by 10.2 per cent, reaching 1,572 TWh, thanks mainly to the recovery in nuclear and hydroelectric power. This structure reduces the reliance on gas for the electricity system, but does not protect transport, the petrochemical industry, aviation, agriculture and manufacturing from rising oil prices. The energy balance sheet published by the French government on 4 March 2026 shows a net bill of 57.7 billion euros for 2024: €43.7 billion for oil and biofuels and €17.4 billion for gas, partially offset by a favourable electricity balance of €5.2 billion. Domestic oil production covered around 1 per cent of consumption, whilst imports totalled 45.6 million tonnes of oil equivalent. Paris therefore has a more robust electricity buffer, rather than independence from hydrocarbons. On 13 March 2026, the Direction générale du Trésor noted that natural gas accounts for around 70 per cent of the production cost of nitrogen fertilisers. Hormuz thus affects European agricultural prices not only through fuel, but also through ammonia, fertilisers, transport and insurance. France’s energy security remains inextricably linked to the Union’s industrial and food security.