The Asian landscape

Pakistan is seeking a stable foothold in the Gulf

Through the Mecca Pact, Islamabad aims to turn military cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Turkey into political influence and industrial opportunities. However, the burden of debt, energy costs and economic dependence on the Gulf are limiting its room for manoeuvre

by Charlye Ghezzi

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Il primo ministro pakistano Muhammad Shehbaz Sharif  AP Photo/Yuki Iwamura

3' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

3' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

Pakistan is attempting to transform its contribution to Gulf security into a position that will endure beyond emergencies. At stake is the prospect of securing ongoing influence, predictable revenue and industrial responsibilities through permanent military cooperation,

The most significant provision of the Mecca Pact, signed by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey on 7 August 2026, concerns the establishment of an organisation capable of linking political consultation with military assistance. On 5 October, meeting in Riyadh, the three governments appointed retired Pakistani General Nauman Mahmood as the first Secretary-General, with a three-year term, and approved measures for the rapid deployment of the agreed capabilities in Saudi Arabia. The decision links implementation to the approved agreements and national legislation: collective solidarity therefore continues to be channelled through state responsibilities and authorisations.

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For Islamabad, this distinction determines the value of the entire operation. A useful and recognised role can become a source of influence. A military presence lacking sufficiently defined financial and operational boundaries, on the other hand, can turn into a commitment that is difficult to scale back. Pakistan will become more important if its partners continue to require its expertise even once the immediate crisis has subsided; it will become more exposed if every new crisis demands further resources without increasing its decision-making power.

The budget

The Pakistani federal budget for 2026–27 provides for total expenditure of 18,771 billion rupees, of which 8,054 billion is earmarked for debt interest, 3,000 billion for the main defence budget and 1,000 billion for the federal development programme. Interest payments account for approximately 42.9 per cent of the projected expenditure. These are budgeted figures, not final accounts, but they demonstrate how essential it is to assess the marginal cost of any additional commitment.

Remittances also link Pakistan’s economic stability to the Gulf. The central bank recorded $3.6 billion in September 2026 and $10.9 billion in the first quarter of the 2026–27 financial year. Saudi Arabia contributed $8,99.1 million, whilst the UAE contributed $748.5 million: together, this accounts for approximately 45.8 per cent of the rounded monthly total. These are remittances to families, not payments in return for military cooperation. Their scale demonstrates, however, that stability in the Gulf has a direct impact on consumption and the availability of foreign currency in Pakistan.

The report thus contains an inherent tension. A regional crisis could make Islamabad more sought-after militarily whilst, at the same time, rendering it more vulnerable economically. The US Energy Information Administration has indicated an average Brent price of $114 per barrel in September 2026 and, in its report of 6 October, forecast $105 for the fourth quarter. Pakistan’s increased strategic value may therefore go hand in hand with higher energy costs, just as the government needs to finance its obligations.

Industrial cooperation offers a more long-term prospect, but requires specific commercial agreements. Riyadh aims to localise half of its military expenditure by 2030. For foreign suppliers, this target presents opportunities whilst also imposing a constraint: the success of localisation may reduce Saudi Arabia’s need for imported assembly, maintenance and personnel.

Military programmes

The Milgem naval programme between Pakistan and Turkey stems from a 2018 contract for four vessels, with construction split between Istanbul and Karachi. The Saudi agreement with Baykar, on the other hand, comprises a contract dated July 2023 for the Akinci, training and support, alongside prospects for technology transfer and joint production. These programmes predate the agreement: its additional contribution will be reflected in the new contracts, funding and deliveries that it succeeds in generating.

Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, maintains parallel strategic relations. According to the Indian Embassy in Raid, bilateral trade with India reached 41.07 billion dollars in 2025–26. The Partnership Council includes a ministerial committee on defence. Pakistan’s role is therefore part of a wider network: its strength will depend on the function it performs and the cost of replacing it.

Charlye Ghezzi is a geopolitical analyst and specialist in technology and government security

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