Saudi Arabia’s nuclear programme sparks a race for control of the nuclear supply chain across the Middle East

The civil nuclear agreement signed on 22 July 2026 between the United States and Saudi Arabia is not merely about the construction of reactors. Behind the diplomatic rhetoric of cooperation lies a competition for control of the entire supply chain: uranium, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, maintenance, software, security and waste management. It is a market worth tens of billions, but also a power structure set to influence relations with Iran, Israel’s security, Pakistan’s role and the nuclear ambitions of Turkey and Egypt.

The document was signed by the US Secretary of Energy, Chris Wright, and the Saudi Minister of Energy, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman. Washington has presented it as the legal basis for a partnership spanning several decades and worth billions. However, the signing does not mean the agreement has come into force. The agreement has yet to be submitted to Congress, which has 90 days to review it. Only after this stage can procedures begin for export licences, technology transfer, the supply of components and any contracts for reactors. The crucial point remains shrouded in negotiating confidentiality: it is not public knowledge whether Riyadh has been granted approval for uranium enrichment and fuel reprocessing, unlike Abu Dhabi in 2009. Nor is it known whether the implementation of the agreement will be conditional upon the adoption of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol, the instrument that extends inspection powers to include undeclared activities.

The supply chain begins with uranium mining, followed by conversion to hexafluoride, enrichment, the production of ceramic pellets and the assembly of the fuel. Once the plant is up and running, recurring revenue streams follow: periodic refuelling of the core, scheduled maintenance, digital upgrades, replacement of pumps, valves, generators, turbines and safety systems, operator training, spent fuel management and, finally, decommissioning. The figures illustrate the scale of the market. Urenco, one of the world’s leading uranium enrichment groups, closed 2025 with revenues of 2.096 billion euros, an EBITDA of 804 million, investments of 616 million and a record order book of 21.3 billion. The contracts extend into the 2040s. The French company Orano, which operates in mining, conversion, enrichment, reprocessing and services, recorded revenues of €5.138 billion in 2025 and an order book of €34.2 billion, with over 21,000 employees. Whoever wins the Saudi tender will therefore not merely be selling concrete, turbines and containment domes. They will be seeking to secure decades of supply contracts and technological dependence.

The United States can offer reactors, fuel, maintenance, digital systems and access to the Western financial market. Westinghouse remains the name most readily associated with American technology, whilst Urenco USA and Centrus strengthen the enrichment front. The American advantage lies in the integration of industry, security and strategic alliance; the disadvantage is represented by congressional constraints, licensing requirements and non-proliferation conditions. Russia proposes a more vertically integrated model. Rosatom controls mining, enrichment, fuel fabrication, design, construction, financing, training and maintenance. This is the model already used at Akkuyu in Turkey and at El-Dabaa in Egypt. The client receives an integrated package; Moscow secures a very long-term industrial and political relationship. China can link its nuclear offering to public credit, infrastructure, energy investments and strategic partnerships. The Pakistani precedent is significant: four Chinese reactors are operating at Chashma, two ACP1000 units of 1,100 megawatts each are operational in the Karachi area, and a new 1,200-megawatt unit is under construction. France has an almost complete supply chain through EDF, Framatome and Orano. South Korea, on the other hand, can point to its most convincing achievement in the Gulf: the four APR-1400 reactors at Barakah in the United Arab Emirates. Can Riyadh use this competition to secure better prices, greater localisation and industrial transfers? Or will it remain 100 per cent within the American sphere of influence?

The Emirates have demonstrated that it is possible to build a major nuclear industry without enriching uranium on national territory. The four reactors at Barakah generate around a quarter of the country’s electricity. The fuel supply chain was organised through an international network: uranium, conversion and enrichment were sourced from multiple suppliers, whilst fuel assemblies were initially manufactured in South Korea by KEPCO Nuclear Fuel and subsequently diversified through new agreements, including with Framatome. The project has created a significant local economy. By 2015, over 1,100 Emirati companies had already been awarded contracts worth more than $2.5 billion. In the years that followed, 175 American suppliers secured contracts worth over $2.75 billion. This precedent is crucial for Saudi Arabia. It demonstrates that billions of dollars’ worth of work in civil engineering, steel, cabling, logistics, security, maintenance and training can be retained within the country without controlling the enrichment process.