Turkey is capitalising on the economic fragmentation of the Sahel. More weapons and more raw materials

The rift between the countries of the Sahel and the Economic Community of West African States is shifting the regional balance of power, and since politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum, Russia, China and Turkey are expanding their influence. Oil, gold, lithium and trade routes are transforming a security crisis into a matter of economic sovereignty and control over the military supply chain. On 10 July, the AES defence ministers ratified the legal status of the Unified Confederation Force in Ouagadougou. For Mali and Niger, where the World Bank forecasts public deficits of 2.8 per cent and 3.4 per cent of GDP respectively in 2026, the development of joint military capabilities must contend with competing demands for investment and social spending. For this reason, Turkey – even more so than Russia – is taking steps to forge relationships that can be managed independently of budgetary constraints.

The crisis in West Africa has entered a phase in which military security can no longer be separated from the economic stability of states, the availability of strategic infrastructure and competition between external powers. On 29 January 2025 Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger formalised their withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States, creating an institutional rift. However, these states remain dependent on Atlantic ports, international markets and regional financial networks. Local governments are demanding greater political autonomy, but jihadist organisations continue to exert pressure on territories and trade routes. The result is a contradiction set to weigh heavily on European decision-making: politically more independent states may become economically more vulnerable, just as oil, strategic minerals and supply chain security are becoming increasingly important.

The establishment of the Confederation of Sahel States, known as the AES, has altered the political landscape of West Africa, separating Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger from ECOWAS (the Economic Community of West African States), which retains twelve members. This is not merely a redefinition of alliances. The split affects regional trade regulations, rights of movement, customs procedures and the mechanisms through which states coordinate their responses to cross-border threats. ECOWAS itself has acknowledged the economic consequences of a disorderly separation. In January 2025, it called for the continued recognition of existing identity documents, free movement and the trade arrangements provided for under regional agreements until new operating procedures are established. On 23 March 2026, it appointed Lansana Kouyaté, former Prime Minister of Guinea and Executive Secretary of the organisation, as chief negotiator in relations with the three countries. These developments reveal the political crux of the crisis. The governments of the AES may redefine their diplomatic and military relations, but they cannot unilaterally alter the economic landscape.

According to an assessment published in August 2026 by the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, 9,928 fatalities linked to jihadist violence in the Sahel were recorded in the preceding twelve months, out of a total of 23,872 across the entire African continent. In the Lake Chad basin, the number of fatalities rose from 4,153 to 6,643, confirming the intensification of a conflict in which organisations affiliated with the Islamic State and various groups linked to Boko Haram retain significant military capabilities. The distribution of violence, however, is not uniform. Benin and Togo have recorded year-on-year decreases in fatalities, from 277 to 81 and from 194 to 43 respectively. This disparity makes it impossible to describe the whole of West Africa as a region affected by a single process of deterioration.

For 2026, the World Bank forecasts real growth of 5 per cent in Mali and estimates 7 per cent in Niger, driven in part by the expansion of the oil industry. Burkina Faso had already recorded estimated growth of 5.3 per cent in 2025, compared with 4.8 per cent in 2024.