With the military missions now over, it is up to Iraq to manage its air defence and logistics corridors on its own
The international coalition withdrew on 30 September; only NATO-led training activities remain. Whilst the militias are being integrated into the army, the government must manage energy contracts, reform the financial system and deal with the debts incurred for infrastructure projects
The conclusion of the international coalition’s military mission on 30 September 2026 restored direct responsibility for the country’s security to the Iraqi government. Baghdad must ensure that the financial channels through which it collects and utilises oil revenues remain accessible, ensure that armed organisations are effectively brought under its control, protect the territory and transform energy and infrastructure investments into reliable services. For Iraq, the outcome of the withdrawal will therefore depend on the institutions’ ability to maintain a balance between all these elements.
The training camp
The statement issued on 30 September by the British Defence Minister Wes Streeting marks the conclusion of the coalition’s mission and the withdrawal of its forces, alongside the intention to develop a bilateral defence relationship. NATO, on the other hand, is maintaining its advisory mission, having transferred its personnel from Baghdad to the Allied Command in Naples in March 2026. These are different instruments, with different mandates and capabilities.
The issue of air defence makes this distinction particularly tangible. In its press release of 28 September, the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs of the Kurdistan Regional Government reported over a thousand strikes by drones and ballistic missiles during the regional conflict and denounced the lack of an alternative air defence system at the time of the withdrawal. This is the regional authority’s assessment, but the institutional problem it raises concerns the entire state: there is a need for early warning coverage, communications, response procedures and a division of responsibilities that can function effectively between Baghdad and Erbil.
Law No. 40 of 2016 places the Popular Mobilisation Commission within the Iraqi armed forces under the Commander-in-Chief and provides for military discipline, a chain of command and separation from political affiliations. The crucial point is the enforcement of these obligations when a unit contests an appointment, a transfer or an investigation. The handover of weapons only reduces a group’s capabilities if authority over access to depots, procurement, personnel and operational deployment also changes; otherwise, the government may secure a material concession whilst leaving intact the organisational structure that allows autonomy to be re-established.
According to the World Bank, oil accounts for 88 per cent of Iraq’s public revenue and 91 per cent of its exports: a concentration that links the continuity of external payments to the state’s ability to finance services, imports and domestic obligations. The history of the oil accounts in New York, however, requires clarification. The cessation, on 30 June 2011, of the deposit requirements for the Development Fund for Iraq altered the previous international regime; the continued existence of Iraqi accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York does not transfer ownership of the resources to Washington. The constraint operates through access to the financial networks, the applicable rules and the behaviour of intermediaries.
