Yemen, the Strait of Hormuz and Venezuela. Three crises that all boil down to the same rivalry between the US and China

A prolonged disruption to oil flows from the Middle East, coupled with rising transport and insurance costs, could jeopardise this stability. The difficulties faced by Asian refineries during the 2026 crisis demonstrate how quickly geopolitical tensions can lead to supply problems, higher costs and the need to turn to alternative suppliers.

But the key issue is not merely the quantity of oil available. It concerns, above all, the price at which China can purchase it, the security of the routes used, and the degree of political autonomy of the supplier countries. An industrial power can, in fact, continue to receive energy whilst, at the same time, suffering a gradual erosion of its competitive edge if access to that same energy becomes more expensive, uncertain and politically contingent.

Venezuela introduces a further element into this analysis. The South American country possesses some of the largest proven oil reserves on the planet and has for years been a key energy partner for China. US sanctions, political changes and Washington’s growing interest in reviving Venezuelan production have ushered in a new phase in relations between Caracas, the United States and international markets.

Following the political developments of January 2026, Washington sought to encourage new American investment and to channel a larger proportion of Venezuelan crude oil supplies towards its own refineries. Export restrictions and the new licensing system have also affected flows to China, historically one of the main buyers of Venezuelan oil. It would be incorrect to automatically assume that the US exercises control over the entire Venezuelan oil sector.

However, the ability to influence investment, licences, exports and trade destinations is a geopolitical factor of great significance. When this scenario is considered alongside the pressures on Iranian exports and the instability of Middle Eastern energy routes, a strategic question arises: how much scope does China have left to build a supply network that is truly independent of American influence? The economic containment of Beijing would not necessarily require a direct naval blockade. It could manifest itself through sanctions, financial restrictions, rising logistical costs and a gradual reduction in energy alternatives.

Lavoratori venezuelani del settore petrolifero con un cartello con la scritta «Via i gringos. No al saccheggio» durante una manifestazione davanti alla sede centrale della Petroleos de Venezuela a Caracas (Foto AP/Ariana Cubillos)

Every war has different consequences for the parties involved. The populations of the countries affected pay the highest price in terms of loss of life, economic destruction and political instability. Importing economies face higher energy costs, whilst some producers may benefit temporarily from rising prices. The major powers, on the other hand, seek to protect their own interests and, where possible, to turn international developments to their strategic advantage.

It is precisely this distinction that makes it necessary to examine the American role in greater depth. Benefiting from a crisis does not necessarily mean having caused it. But the ability to influence its course, determine its diplomatic conditions and steer its economic consequences constitutes a concrete form of international power. The issue is therefore not merely to establish who started a war, but to understand who is capable of using its effects to alter the global economic balance.

For the countries of the Middle East, this dynamic has particularly serious implications. The region risks becoming, to an ever-greater extent, an arena in which local conflicts, regional rivalries and competition between major powers intersect. Yemen is a significant example of this.

The country’s geographical location, overlooking Bab el-Mandeb, gives it a strategic importance that far exceeds its economic stature. The security of this strait is of concern not only to the Red Sea states, but also to Europe, Asia and all economies that depend on international maritime trade. Consequently, the future of Yemen and the stability of its coastline cannot be regarded solely as regional issues. They form an integral part of international economic security.

But there is also a political risk: that the strategic importance of maritime routes may end up taking precedence over the need to rebuild states and protect the populations caught up in conflicts. Stability in the Red Sea cannot be separated from stability in Yemen, just as international energy security cannot be achieved whilst ignoring the human consequences of wars.

The rivalry between the United States and China is often framed in terms of trade tariffs, technology, semiconductors and industrial competition. But there is an equally important dimension: the ability to guarantee or influence access to energy resources. Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Iran and Venezuela are distinct geopolitical entities, but they share one fundamental element: their role in the international distribution of oil. There is no evidence to suggest that the crises affecting them form part of a single, pre-determined plan.

It is, however, possible that their effects may converge, altering the balance of power amongst the world’s major economies. China needs a stable, affordable and diversified energy supply. The United States has military, diplomatic, financial and energy tools capable of influencing some of the key nodes in this system. It is on this asymmetry, together with China’s ability to diversify its supplies and develop alternatives, that a significant part of the global competition is played out. The crucial question is whether the persistence of seemingly separate crises might ultimately produce a common strategic outcome. If energy is one of the fundamental prerequisites of China’s industrial power, then whoever manages to control access to it also holds a lever to influence the future global economic balance.

So the most important question is not merely who controls the oil, but whether the instability in the regions that produce it and along the routes by which it is transported is becoming a new form of competition between the major powers: a competition in which it is not necessary to stop China militarily in order to try to slow its economic rise.

 Arhab Mohamed Al Sarhi, President of the Yemeni-Italian Friendship Association