Behind the Turkey-Israel row: Erdogan’s strategy to gain (greater) influence in Europe
Arrest warrants, Gaza and control over Syria. Tensions between the two countries are mounting, forcing the EU to take a technological stance. The main impact is on the defence industry, as well as on NATO’s security arrangements in the Black Sea. This is why Ankara is stepping up its efforts in the region
Key points
The standoff between Turkey and Israel is no longer a diplomatic crisis confined to Gaza. It is becoming a contest over the security architecture linking Syria, the eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, European defence, energy corridors and control of strategic routes. Ankara possesses levers that no European capital can ignore: its influence within NATO, the Turkish Straits, its military industry, migration management, energy infrastructure and links with the Caucasus and Central Asia. But its strength has an equally evident structural limitation: its economic interdependence with the European Union. For Italia, France, Germany and the United Kingdom, the issue is therefore not a choice between Ankara and Jerusalem, but preventing a regional rivalry from creating new strategic dependencies within Europe.
The rift becomes systemic
The Turkish Minister of Justice has raised the stakes. ‘As part of the legal proceedings relating to the attack in international waters against the Flotilla activists, and in accordance with the arrest warrants issued on 14 July 2026 against Benyamin Netanyahu and Afek Moskovitch for genocide’ and has asked the Ministry of the Interior to “issue a red notice for their international arrest”. Gaza remains the flashpoint, but it is clear that the strategic focus has shifted. On 3 August 2026, Turkey, Egypt and Qatar, acting as mediators, issued a joint statement on the violations in Gaza and the implementation of the negotiating framework; on 6 August 2026, Ankara signed a new joint position on the crisis with Egypt, Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Ankara is seeking to consolidate its role as a diplomatic platform capable of linking the Palestinian question, the Arab world and regional security. The real clash with Israel, however, is in Syria. On 20 March 2026, the Turkish Foreign Ministry described the Israeli attack on military infrastructure in southern Syria as a dangerous escalation; on 29 June 2026, following attacks on Quneitra and Daraa, Ankara invoked Syrian sovereignty, territorial integrity and the 1974 Agreement on the Withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian Forces. Erdogan advocates the restoration of Syrian sovereignty. Israel, on the other hand, considers it essential to preserve its capacity to intervene against threats originating beyond its own border. There is no need for a deliberate desire for war for the two strategies to clash. They are already doing so.
Ankara, an indispensable power
Turkey controls access between the Mediterranean and the Black Sea via the Straits and has the Alliance’s second-largest army. The Black Sea remains central to the security of Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria; Turkey also links Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Ankara does not control European policy, but it can increase the cost of decisions taken without its involvement. The NATO summit on 7–8 July 2026 made this role even more evident. The Alliance emphasised the expansion of industrial capabilities, precision strikes, unmanned systems and interoperability. On 7 July, Turkey, Italia, France, the United Kingdom, Denmark and Norway joined a multinational project to explore new ground-based precision strike systems; within the same framework, Ankara took part in an initiative for interoperable 155 mm ammunition.
The interconnected defence industry
For Rome, Turkey is not a peripheral issue. It is simultaneously a NATO partner, a key player in the wider Mediterranean, a key interlocutor on Libya and migration, and a potential industrial partner. For Rome, cooperating with Ankara means gaining access to a growing manufacturing base and strengthening the Alliance’s southern pillar. The risk is equally real: that a useful industrial collaboration could turn into a technological or logistical dependency that would be difficult to reverse. Rome therefore has an interest in building partnerships with Turkey whilst maintaining national and European control over intellectual property, maintenance, software, ammunition and critical components.
Germany fits into this pattern
Chancellor Friedrich Merz attended the Ankara summit on 7–8 July 2026 and held a bilateral meeting with President Recep Erdogan. As early as 3 July 2026, Merz had identified increased European responsibility, the expansion of defence industry capabilities and closer cooperation on armaments programmes as priorities for the summit. On the same occasion, he confirmed prior coordination within the E5 format with Italia, France, the United Kingdom and Poland, as well as direct dialogue with Erdogan.
