The Silk Road in the Skies

China brings the space race to the Mediterranean

Beijing’s projects with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Iran involve a range of technologies, and each country adopts different approaches, often sparking competition with European players. The Chang’e-8 lunar mission features an infrared system developed by Bahrain and Egypt, an Iranian instrument for monitoring the Moon’s electric potential, and retroreflectors from the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Frascati

by 24Ore NextMed

19 August 2026

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Versione italiana

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Translated by AI

Versione italiana

For some time now, Beijing has been working to integrate telecommunications, navigation, intelligence, finance, logistics, energy and military command through space. China is extending (at least from 2022 onwards) this architecture to the wider Mediterranean region through satellites, launches, ground stations, the BeiDou project, training and lunar missions. Egypt serves as the main industrial testing ground for this; the Gulf states alternate between cooperation with China and access to Western technologies; Iran is seeking avenues that are compatible with sanctions and isolation. For Italia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the European Union, the challenge is not to prevent all collaboration with Beijing, but to ensure that the associated standards do not transform the Middle East’s space sector growth into a new strategic dependency for Europe – or one that works against Europe’s interests.

Chinese architecture

The Beijing White Paper lists, amongst the tools for international cooperation, complete satellites, subsystems, components, launch services, control stations, applications and data corridors linked to the Belt and Road Initiative. China’s Space Programme: A 2021 Perspective – State Council Information Office – January 2022. On 20 January 2026, the China National Space Administration announced that 50 commercial launches had been carried out in 2025, accounting for 54 per cent of the country’s total launch activity; 311 commercial satellites, equivalent to 84 per cent of the Chinese satellites placed into orbit during the year, had been launched into space.

Egypt is the most advanced example of localisation supported by China. On 29 February 2024, the Egyptian Ministry of International Cooperation put the value of Chinese grants for EgyptSat-2 and the national satellite assembly, integration and testing centre at approximately 92 million dollars; around 21 million of this amount was allocated to the centre. EgyptSat-2 was launched by China on 4 December 2023. The programme comprised the satellite, a telemetry and command station, a ground application system and training. The CNSA had indicated a design life of five years for the satellite and 15 years for the station. The joint team’s staff was divided on a 1:1 basis, with Egyptian technicians involved in design, assembly, testing and maintenance. This constitutes a genuine transfer of technology. However, only when Cairo is able to design the successor to EgyptSat-2, control its software and encryption, qualify the subsystems locally and select the launch vehicle without relying on the original contractor, will it be possible to speak of true sovereignty.

The Egyptian laboratory

In the meantime, however, Egypt’s standing is growing because its Space City is also home to the African Space Agency. The African Union and the Egyptian Government signed the headquarters agreement on 24 January 2023; the AU has established the Egyptian Space Agency, a Space Academy and assembly and testing facilities within the same complex. The African Space Agency (AfSA) was inaugurated on 20 April 2025 with a mandate covering innovation, connectivity, resource management and climate monitoring. Cairo could therefore become the hub through which technology, training and data reach other African countries. This does not imply Chinese control over AfSA, which remains a body of the African Union. It does, however, mean that infrastructure built with Chinese assistance could gain an initial operational advantage. For Europe, the effective response is not to challenge this cooperation, but to offer competing projects, access to data, training and components under transparent conditions.

The Gulf spreads the risks

The United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, is pursuing a different strategy: rather than importing a complete ecosystem, it is distributing the functions amongst several partners. On 7 January 2024, NASA and the Mohammed Bin Rashid Space Centre announced that the MBRSC would supply the Crew and Science Airlock for the Gateway lunar station and provide engineering support throughout the module’s operational life; an Emirati astronaut will take part in a future Artemis mission. At the same time, the joint China–UAE statement of 2 June 2024 committed the two governments to exploring opportunities for cooperation and space research. The UAE is keeping human spaceflight and the most sensitive engineering aspects within the Western framework, whilst maintaining scientific and commercial channels with Beijing. Saudi Arabia signed the Artemis Accords on 16 July 2022; Oman on 26 January 2026. For Beijing, however, it is also important to establish multilateral frameworks. On 24 April 2025, the CNSA selected 10 international projects for Chang’e-8 from 11 countries and regions and one international organisation, having received 41 proposals and offered 200 kilograms of payload capacity for foreign payloads. The mission, scheduled for around 2029 at the lunar south pole, will also test the in situ utilisation of resources. The projects include a visible and infrared imaging system jointly developed by Bahrain and Egypt, an Iranian instrument for monitoring the Moon’s electric potential, and an array of retroreflectors from the National Institute of Nuclear Physics–Frascati National Laboratories. Italia thus becomes a direct participant in the scientific framework of Chang’e-8 without politically aligning itself with the entire Chinese programme.

The approach within Europe

Germany approaches space using the same model as it does for defence – that is, by prioritising an industrial approach. France, on the other hand, is moving in two directions, taking a step towards a multilateral framework. The Centre national d’études spatiales’ DORN instrument, weighing 4.5 kilograms, was launched on Chang’e-6 on 3 May 2024, operated for 48 hours following the lunar landing on 2 June 2024 and supported a mission that returned the samples to Earth on 25 June 2024. Paris demonstrates that scientific cooperation and strategic autonomy are not incompatible, provided that access to data, intellectual property and technological security are defined in advance. France’s strength lies in its ability to link the CNES, industry, defence and diplomacy; the risk arises when scientific cooperation opens up technical channels that are not adequately compartmentalised.

Italia’s interest in the East

For Italia, China and the MENA region, this project brings together national expertise in radar observation, telecommunications, crew modules, robotics, propulsion and downstream services. The involvement of the Frascati Laboratories in the Chang’e-8 mission represents a scientific opportunity, but also a test of governance: Rome must ensure access to data, protection of intellectual property, traceability of components and compatibility with European and Atlantic commitments. Italian industrial interest is also linked to Egypt, the Gulf and Africa – markets in which space programmes support agriculture, water management, maritime security, telecommunications and urban planning. Competing with the Chinese offering requires integrated packages: not just satellites, but credit, training, software, ground stations and support throughout the entire life cycle.

The United Kingdom views space primarily in terms of resilience and operational security. The Space Industrial Plan, published on 7 March 2024, lists industrial growth and operational independence in a contested environment among its objectives. On 24 July 2025, the Commander of UK Space Command stated that London had launched the first British military satellite in 13 years, opened the National Space Operations Centre and invested over 300 million pounds in satellites and software. UK Space Commander’s Speech on Defence in the Space Domain – UK Ministry of Defence – 24 July 2025. London therefore regards the penetration of foreign systems into the Gulf as an issue of NATO interoperability, communications security, intelligence and operational continuity. This perspective complements Berlin’s industrial focus, Paris’s scientific focus and Rome’s Mediterranean focus.

Sovereignty beyond the satellite

The European Union already has the tools in place for a systemic response. On 16 December 2024, the Commission signed the concession contract for IRIS2 with the SpaceRISE consortium. IRIS2 is a planned multi-orbital constellation comprising 290 satellites, designed to ensure secure connectivity and European resilience. Commission Takes Next Step to Deploy the IRIS² Secure Satellite System – European Commission – 16 December 2024. On 25 June 2025, the Commission presented the EU Space Act, centred on security, resilience and sustainability, including requirements for cybersecurity and operational continuity. EU Space Act: Enhancing Market Access and Space Safety – European Commission – 25 June 2025.

IRIS2, Galileo, Copernicus and the future European Space Shield could also become instruments of foreign policy. Europe should offer its MENA partners secure access to data, resilient services, training, assembly capabilities and transparent rules, thereby preventing individual Member States from negotiating separately against a structurally integrated Chinese offer.

In the coming years, Beijing will establish a deeper presence in the wider Mediterranean, without erasing Western influence. Egypt will be able to consolidate its position as an African hub; the Gulf states will continue to spread the risks; Iran will seek limited access; Italia and France will maintain selective scientific cooperation; Germany and the United Kingdom will oversee industry and security respectively. An effective European response does not lie in severing all ties with China. It lies in ensuring that the proposals put forward by Italia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the ESA are industrially credible and financially sustainable. They must present themselves as a practical alternative.