Control over infrastructure is just as important as ownership: not just in the cyber world

On 31 October, the Associated Press published an investigation into more than 115 attacks claimed by Iran and allied groups against US installations in the Middle East. Between February and August, the attacks damaged 26 sites, primarily targeting radar, early-warning systems, communications and logistics, with the aim of compromising surveillance and interception capabilities. A destroyed sensor effectively means time lost in decision-making: an algorithm can process data in milliseconds, but without a source to provide it, it is a useless tool. This highlights the extent to which geopolitical competition is shifting from the possession of capabilities to control over the conditions necessary to utilise them. In the Mediterranean, it is not just a question of who will have the infrastructure, but who will be able to influence its construction, operation and replacement.

A country may have the most advanced aircraft and yet be unable to get them off the ground. At the same time, it may have the best anti-missile systems and yet fail to detect an incoming threat. Billions invested in artificial intelligence can be rendered useless by control of a maritime corridor.

Control of maritime space, in particular, has also become a means of exerting influence over technological infrastructure. It is not necessary to own a cable to influence its construction. It is sufficient to challenge the right to carry out the activities necessary for its laying. And in the Mediterranean, the struggle in this regard has intensified, as demonstrated by the dispute over the East to Med Data Corridor, a submarine cable that will link Saudi Arabia, Cyprus and Greece. Ankara maintains that certain seabed surveys, necessary for its construction, require Turkish consent. The dispute, therefore, begins even before the infrastructure exists. Disputes at sea no longer concern only oil and gas fields, fishing or borders. They now concern the conditions under which the digital connections of tomorrow can be established.

The Strait of Hormuz adds another dimension. To influence a corridor, it is not necessary to close it off completely. It may be enough simply to increase the uncertainty surrounding it, by shifting the risk onto insurers, costs and operators’ decisions. The availability of a route thus becomes a bargaining chip, even without gaining permanent control over it.

This is a contradiction that directly concerns AI. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are channelling energy and capital into computational infrastructure. But data centres and the cloud depend on electricity, cooling, components, connectivity and the continuity of supply. Concentrating these resources produces economies of scale; it can also concentrate vulnerabilities. The advantage of technological power is not measured solely in terms of installed capacity, but in the ability to keep it available during a crisis.