Deaths at Riyadh Airport. The strategy to halt investment in Saudi Arabia

Since the intervention by the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen in 2015, the security of the Kingdom’s southern borders has remained one of the main drivers of its Yemen policy. Experience has shown, however, that the threat is not confined to border areas. Missiles and drones can overcome geographical distances and strike strategic infrastructure far from traditional battlefields. Today, this contradiction appears even more evident. On the one hand, Saudi Arabia supports Yemeni government forces in their attempt to recapture strategic territories. On the other, it faces repeated attacks on civilian and economic infrastructure within its own territory. It is here that the limitations of any strategy based solely on military superiority become apparent. Success in recapturing a city or a coastal position does not necessarily guarantee an end to long-range attacks. Similarly, the ability to intercept missiles and drones, however advanced, does not eliminate the risks that repeated attacks may pose to civil aviation and the economy. This does not diminish the importance of defensive or military operations, but it does demonstrate that restoring security requires more than simply shifting the lines of control across the territory.

The current escalation cannot be viewed in complete isolation from the changes that have taken place in regional relations relating to the Yemen issue. In recent years, differences have emerged between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates regarding certain local forces and the balance of influence and security in Yemen, particularly in the southern and coastal regions. These differences became more apparent towards the end of 2025, before signs of a possible rapprochement and renewed political coordination emerged in recent weeks. On 29 September, Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al Nahyan travelled to Riyadh, where he met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and the Minister of Defence, Prince Khalid bin Salman. The visit took place at a particularly sensitive time, characterised by intensifying fighting in Yemen and growing concerns over security in the Gulf and the Red Sea. This rapprochement can be interpreted as an attempt to bridge the differences between two regional powers whose interests are directly linked to Yemen’s future. However, there is insufficient public evidence to suggest that the visit resulted in a specific military agreement or that it was directly linked to the subsequent attacks on Riyadh airport. Its political significance lies in a broader question: will Riyadh and Abu Dhabi be able to transform the convergence of their security interests into a shared vision for the future of the Yemeni state? Co-ordinating to tackle a military threat may be easier than reaching agreement on the structure of the institutions and the forces that will govern the country once the fighting has ended.

The confrontation between the United States and Iran adds a further dimension to the current escalation. The Houthis maintain political and military ties with Tehran, and their missile capabilities, together with their ability to threaten shipping and strategic infrastructure, have made them an integral part of the regional security balance. However, reducing every decision made by the Houthis to a directive coming directly from Iran would be to oversimplify the nature of the movement and its local interests. The Houthis are one of the parties to the Yemeni conflict and pursue objectives linked to territorial control and negotiations with their adversaries, as well as maintaining regional relations and interests. It is precisely here that one of the main dangers of the current phase lies. Any escalation between Washington and Tehran may increase pressure on the Yemeni theatre, whilst internal developments in Yemen may in turn affect Saudi security and international shipping lanes. The crises are now so interconnected that it is difficult to address them as separate issues. However, this interconnection does not mean that Yemen has lost its own political distinctiveness. The internal causes of the war, the fragmentation of institutions, the multiplicity of armed forces and the absence of a comprehensive political agreement remain factors that cannot be explained solely by the rivalry between Iran and the United States.

Just a few days ago, international attention was focused on Bab el-Mandeb, one of the key maritime chokepoints for trade and energy between Asia and Europe. Today, attention is also turning to Riyadh airport, where flight safety and the continuity of economic activity have become direct consequences of the war. The link between the two locations is clear. The risks threatening maritime navigation are not fundamentally different, in terms of economic consequences, from those affecting air transport. In both cases, repeated attacks may force companies to alter their routes, increase operational and insurance costs, and reassess risks. For Europe, therefore, the issue is not merely about the security of Saudi Arabia or the future of Yemen. It also concerns the stability of the transport, trade and energy networks linking the region to the European economy. However, the protection of these networks cannot be guaranteed in the long term through security measures alone, as long as the conflict fuelling these threats continues.

After more than ten years of war, the region appears to be facing a familiar situation, but one with new costs. Government forces are advancing in one area and the Houthis are responding by increasing pressure on another front or by targeting infrastructure outside Yemen. Military operations are expanding, and the need for air defences and coordination among regional actors is growing. At the same time, the scope for a political solution risks narrowing every time the conflict escalates. There is no guarantee that the continuation of this dynamic will lead to a definitive military victory for either side. Similarly, calling for a political solution does not mean ignoring security risks or attacks on civilian infrastructure. Rather, it means recognising that the protection of civilians, airports and ports requires sustainable security arrangements and a Yemeni political process capable of addressing the causes of the conflict, not merely its military consequences. The main challenge remains the transition from managing mutual threats to resolving the divisions that allow them to recur time and again.

For years, it was possible to view the Yemeni war as a conflict in which the main battles were taking place within a country marked by institutional collapse and a long-standing humanitarian crisis. Recent developments, however, show that its consequences are having an increasingly direct impact on the security and economy of the entire region. From Mokha and Bab el-Mandeb to Taiz, from the Saudi borders to Riyadh airport, the theatre of the war is expanding. The gravity of the latest attacks lies not only in the damage caused, but also in the fact that they raise once again a question to which the region has failed to find a stable answer for over a decade: how can lasting security be guaranteed for Saudi Arabia and the Gulf whilst Yemen remains an active theatre of war? The recapture of military positions can alter the balance of power on the ground, just as air defence systems can limit the consequences of attacks. But regional stability cannot be based on the idea that the war will remain confined within Yemen’s borders. When the airports of capital cities become an extension of the battlefronts, the question is no longer merely how to protect infrastructure from forthcoming attacks, but how to put an end to the war that makes those attacks possible.

Arhab Mohamed Al Sarhi, President of the Yemeni-Italian Friendship Association