In the Red Sea, Europe is discovering the limits of its common defence
Crosetto notes the lack of new contributions to the Aspides mission, whilst Brussels is extending the mandate to include cooperation with the Yemeni Coastguard and the strengthening of Djibouti’s naval capabilities. The security of trade routes is becoming a litmus test of strategic autonomy for the Old Continent
Key points
The crisis facing Europe in the Red Sea is no longer confined to military threats against merchant ships. It has become a test of the European Union’s ability to translate its economic clout and strategic ambitions into concrete operational decisions.
On 10 November, the Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto criticised the lack of concrete contributions from European states to strengthen the Aspides naval mission, despite repeated calls to increase the number of military vessels needed to ensure the safety of shipping. His statements come from one of the countries most concerned with security in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, as well as one of the main participants in European naval initiatives.
This highlights the political and strategic paradox whereby Europe, which for years has emphasised the need to strengthen its autonomy in defence matters, is finding it difficult to mobilise the resources required to protect a trade route directly linked to its economic interests. The issue now centres on the willingness of governments to agree on the responsibilities, resources and decisions essential to making this protection a reality.
From the shipping crisis to the European decision-making crisis
When the European Union launched Operation Aspides in February 2024, the aim was to provide defensive protection for commercial vessels exposed to threats in the Red Sea and surrounding waters. Two years later, the Council of the European Union decided to extend the mission until the end of February 2027, providing for a reference amount of approximately 15 million euros to cover the common costs during the extension period.
Yet extending a political mandate does not automatically mean making ships, crews and the necessary capabilities available to implement it. The mission does not, in fact, have a permanent, autonomous European fleet, but relies on contributions from Member States, which decide to deploy naval vessels and personnel from their respective national armed forces. And this is the system’s main weakness. The European Union manages to agree on the importance of protecting shipping, but finds it more difficult to ensure that each Member State provides the necessary resources to actually achieve this objective.
