The comment

In the Red Sea, Europe is discovering the limits of its common defence

Crosetto notes the lack of new contributions to the Aspides mission, whilst Brussels is extending the mandate to include cooperation with the Yemeni Coastguard and the strengthening of Djibouti’s naval capabilities. The security of trade routes is becoming a litmus test of strategic autonomy for the Old Continent

Il ministro della Difesa italiano Guido Crosetto REUTERS/Remo Casilli

6' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

6' min read

Translated by AI
Versione italiana

The crisis facing Europe in the Red Sea is no longer confined to military threats against merchant ships. It has become a test of the European Union’s ability to translate its economic clout and strategic ambitions into concrete operational decisions.

On 10 November, the Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto criticised the lack of concrete contributions from European states to strengthen the Aspides naval mission, despite repeated calls to increase the number of military vessels needed to ensure the safety of shipping. His statements come from one of the countries most concerned with security in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, as well as one of the main participants in European naval initiatives.

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This highlights the political and strategic paradox whereby Europe, which for years has emphasised the need to strengthen its autonomy in defence matters, is finding it difficult to mobilise the resources required to protect a trade route directly linked to its economic interests. The issue now centres on the willingness of governments to agree on the responsibilities, resources and decisions essential to making this protection a reality.

From the shipping crisis to the European decision-making crisis

When the European Union launched Operation Aspides in February 2024, the aim was to provide defensive protection for commercial vessels exposed to threats in the Red Sea and surrounding waters. Two years later, the Council of the European Union decided to extend the mission until the end of February 2027, providing for a reference amount of approximately 15 million euros to cover the common costs during the extension period.

Yet extending a political mandate does not automatically mean making ships, crews and the necessary capabilities available to implement it. The mission does not, in fact, have a permanent, autonomous European fleet, but relies on contributions from Member States, which decide to deploy naval vessels and personnel from their respective national armed forces. And this is the system’s main weakness. The European Union manages to agree on the importance of protecting shipping, but finds it more difficult to ensure that each Member State provides the necessary resources to actually achieve this objective.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, emphasised the need for at least ten military vessels to ensure a more credible naval presence, whilst the contributions actually available have remained below that level.

This gap primarily reflects a problem with the allocation of resources and the setting of priorities. European states must, in fact, simultaneously fulfil defence commitments in the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, in addition to national security requirements and obligations within the framework of NATO. The decision to deploy a frigate to the Red Sea is a political choice concerning the allocation of limited military resources across different strategic theatres.

Italia: between national interests and European solidarity

Italia is one of the European countries most exposed to this contradiction, given that its geographical position makes the Mediterranean an essential component of its economic and strategic identity, whilst the operations of its ports, industries and trade flows depend on the efficiency of international shipping routes. Consequently, for Rome, the difficulties of navigation in the Red Sea represent a factor that affects transport costs, industrial supplies and the competitiveness of Italian businesses.

Last September, Crosetto went so far as to declare that Italia was prepared to take action to protect Italian ships without necessarily waiting for European procedures, should circumstances require it. But if a Member State is forced to take independent national measures to protect its commercial interests, one cannot help but question the effectiveness of the European collective security mechanism.

The risk is that the systematic recourse to national solutions will ultimately undermine confidence in the Union’s ability to act as a unified strategic entity, particularly when shared economic interests are at stake. Italia thus faces the political dilemma of how to preserve its freedom to intervene to protect its own trade without turning this operational autonomy into yet another demonstration of the weaknesses of the common European defence.

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Strategic autonomy is not measured solely by military spending

In recent years, the European debate has increasingly focused on increasing defence spending, strengthening the defence industry and reducing dependence on the United States in certain strategic sectors. However, the Aspides crisis raises a different question: what value can increased investment have if the available resources are not transformed into operational capabilities that can actually be utilised?

Strategic autonomy is not achieved simply by purchasing advanced equipment or announcing long-term rearmament programmes. It requires the ability to make decisions, mobilise resources, deploy forces, maintain a continuous operational presence and bear the resulting political and financial costs. From this perspective, the mission in the Red Sea highlights three structural problems.

The first relates to the diversity of national priorities. Some European governments regard threats linked to Russia as more urgent than the risks affecting maritime trade in the Middle East. The second concerns the actual availability of resources for prolonged missions. The fact that national fleets include warships does not necessarily mean that vessels are immediately ready for long-term operations far from European waters. The third issue concerns decision-making mechanisms and burden-sharing. The states participating in the missions bear a significant proportion of the operational costs of their naval units, whilst the benefits derived from the protection of commercial shipping are spread across the entire European economy.

Does Europe need to rethink the model for its naval missions?

Contemporary maritime threats include missiles, drones and risks to subsea infrastructure, as well as the need to ensure constant monitoring of maritime space and an effective exchange of information between military and civilian authorities.

In March 2026, the European Union expanded certain tasks of Aspides to include the collection and sharing of information on suspicious activities relating to sensitive maritime infrastructure, cooperation with the Yemeni Coastguard and support for the development of Djibouti’s naval capabilities.

A more comprehensive system is needed, based on surveillance, regional cooperation and the strengthening of local capacities. However, expanding the responsibilities of a mission without proportionally increasing the available resources risks exacerbating the difficulties rather than resolving them. Every new function requires personnel, equipment, information and operational capabilities.

For this reason, the European Union may need to review its model for funding and organising naval operations, reducing its reliance on national contributions that vary and are difficult to guarantee over time. Possible solutions include advance commitments regarding the rotation of naval units, broader mechanisms for sharing operational costs, greater use of reconnaissance and surveillance systems, and more effective coordination with regional partners.

European security begins beyond geographical borders

The crisis in the Red Sea highlights a fundamental strategic reality: the economic borders of Europe are far broader than its geographical borders, given that European industries depend on global supply chains, ports are linked to intercontinental trade networks, and energy security is affected by events taking place thousands of kilometres away from European capitals.

Recognising this reality does not, however, mean that the European Union can or should assume military responsibility for all the world’s sea routes. Sustainable protection also requires cooperation with coastal states, support for local maritime institutions and the development of capabilities for surveillance, early warning and information-sharing.

From this perspective, the inclusion of cooperation with the Yemeni Coastguard amongst the tasks of Aspides signals a gradual shift from a model based predominantly on direct military protection towards a broader approach, which also relies on strengthening local security capabilities. The success of this strategy will, however, depend on the existence of Yemeni institutions capable of operating within a clear political and legal framework, and on the ability of international partners to address existing divisions without exacerbating them.

Three strategic options for the European Union

Faced with this situation, Europe has three possible courses of action.

The first option is to retain the current model, continuing to rely on voluntary contributions from Member States and providing for limited reinforcements in response to escalating threats. This approach offers political flexibility, but leaves the mission vulnerable to changes in national priorities and the intermittent availability of resources.

The second option involves the development of a more binding model, based on the advance allocation of military and financial contributions, the establishment of minimum levels of operational readiness, and more stable mechanisms for funding naval deployments. Such a solution could ensure greater continuity, but would require a political agreement on burden-sharing.

The third approach involves expanding cooperation with regional partners, combining direct naval protection with the strengthening of local capabilities, the exchange of information and the use of advanced surveillance technologies. These options are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They could be integrated into an overall strategy.

Arhab Mohamed Al Sarhi, President of the Yemeni-Italian Friendship Association

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